his thesis argues that the ethics of care is an important lens through which to view complex international moral and political contexts. Specifically, I argue care ethics offers a different perspective than human rights discourses, because the relational perspective care ethics offers generates different questions, and thus different answers, about the moral and political landscape than the traditionally individualist perspective of mainstream human rights theories. This thesis does not deny the usefulness of human rights analysis, but instead questions their assumed pride of place, especially when assessing and addressing contexts such as severe poverty, gender and race oppression, and the activity of care work itself. Further, this thesis argues that the ethics of care is, in some situations, the better philosophical tool for the task at hand.«br /» Fiona Robinson’s body of work on a global ethic of care is central to this project. She claims that global institutional relations structure our lives and our relationships with others, and as such, are a prime target for a critical care analysis, revealing the ways in which governments, corporations, and social norms shape our lives. In particular, her focus is on how such institutions perpetuate harmful relations of power, which continue to marginalize women and the work of care itself from public consideration. This critical care analysis prioritizes understanding the root causes of such moral and political contexts in order to transform the way in which we approach and judge these contexts, which in turn would allow us to craft longer lasting and more holistic solutions. «br /» The global care ethic, however, has faced sharp criticism about its ability to be a prescriptive theory because of its contextual flexibility. I engage with the work of Daniel Engster and Kimberly Hutchings, who each critique the global, critical ethic of care. Engster argues that critical care ethics is too flexible to be practicable, especially where public policy is concerned, and as such he argues a ‘care based’ human rights theory provides better action guidance. Conversely, Hutchings’ critique of care ethics criticises the universalization of the standpoint of care, which then negates its usefulness in making intelligible moral judgments across cultures.«br /» I reject Engster’s ‘caring’ human rights and argue that care ethics can be a substantive guide for public policy. I do so by critiquing Engster’s version of care theory, and then using care ethics to examine real world case studies of public policy to demonstrate its practical applications. I also reject Hutchings’ final claim, arguing we need not relinquish the standpoint of care as an important moral point of view. Instead, I argue that the critical ethic of care is, in fact, able to outline a means by which we can reach moral and political judgments across cultures, spurring the transformation of our moral and political landscape
