Definite Descriptions are Directly Referential

Abstract

Amongst those who have analysed definite descriptions as referential, most have considered them to be indirectly referential. In contrast, I will argue that definite descriptions are directly referential, in the sense of Kaplan (1980). In other words, the informational contents of utterances of definite descriptions are identical to their referents. In this thesis, I will first present a semantic framework inspired primarily by Kaplan (1980) with additions from Russell (2008) and Salmon (1986). I will then present a semantic analysis of definite descriptions whereby they are directly referential expressions. This analysis will also concur with Lewis’ (1979) suggestion that the referents of definite description utterances are determined by comparative salience. I will argue that this analysis provides the most theoretically virtuous explanation of the various semantic properties of definite descriptions. I will also examine a series of problem cases for this analysis and argue that they can be resolved through independently justified means. Firstly, I will discuss Frege’s Puzzle, as presented by Salmon (1986), as it relates to the directly referential analysis of definite descriptions, as well as the related problem of de dicto indirect speech and propositional attitude reports. I will suggest that Salmon’s approach to these problems in the case of proper names will also apply in the case of directly referential definite descriptions. Secondly, I will argue that Kripke’s (1977) analysis of the phenomena discussed by Donnellan (1966) is compatible with the directly referential analysis of definite descriptions. Thirdly, I will provide an ambiguous analysis of modal operators to account for de dicto modal claims. I will conclude by discussing possible links between this analysis and analyses of other singular terms