In collaborative logistics, multiple carriers form a network to share their transportation capacities. Collaboration among carriers results in improved resource utilization and, therefore, reduced costs. In this thesis, we propose an auction-based model for carrier collaboration in transportation services. The model achieves carrier collaboration through facilitating the negotiation among carriers over a group of shipping orders required by one or a group of shippers. The negotiation is conducted through a combinatorial iterative auction mechanism with the objective of minimizing the carriers’ overall costs.
We first present a centralized carrier collaboration problem model in which a central entity has all required information to compute an optimal solution. We then consider a more realistic game theoretic setting where auction-based mechanism is applied to deal with self-interests of carriers. Compared with one-shot auctions, the proposed iterative bidding framework has the properties of reducing carriers’ information revelation and accommodating dynamic changes during the bidding process. Experimental results show that the procurement cost performance and the quality of solutions computed using the proposed iterative auction model is close to that of the optimal solutions
