Automatic detection of safety and security vulnerabilities in open source software

Abstract

Growing software quality requirements have raised the stakes on software safety and security. Building secure software focuses on techniques and methodologies of design and implementation in order to avoid exploitable vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, coding errors have become common with the inexorable growth tendency of software size and complexity. According to the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), these coding errors lead to vulnerabilities that cost the US economy $60 billion each year. Therefore, tracking security and safety errors is considered as a fundamental cornerstone to deliver software that are free from severe vulnerabilities. The main objective of this thesis is the elaboration of efficient, rigorous, and practical techniques for the safety and security evaluation of source code. To tackle safety errors related to the misuse of type and memory operations, we present a novel type and effect discipline that extends the standard C type system with safety annotations and static safety checks. We define an inter-procedural, flow-sensitive, and alias-sensitive inference algorithm that automatically propagates type annotations and applies safety checks to programs without programmers' interaction. Moreover, we present a dynamic semantics of our C core language that is compliant with the ANSI C standard. We prove the consistency of the static semantics with respect to the dynamic semantics. We show the soundness of our static analysis in detecting our targeted set of safety errors. To tackle system-specific security properties, we present a security verification framework that combines static analysis and model-checking. We base our approach on the GCC compiler and its GIMPLE representation of source code to extract model-checkable abstractions of programs. For the verification process, we use an off-the-shelf pushdown system model-checker, and turn it into a fully-fledged security verification framework. We also allow programmers to define a wide range of security properties using an automata-based specification approach. To demonstrate the efficiency and the scalability of our approach, we conduct extensive experiments and case studies on large scale open-source software to verify their compliance with a representative set of the CERT standard secure coding rules

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