Abductive reasoning: constitutes according to Peirce the "first stage" of scientific inquiries (CP 6.469) and of any interpretive processes. "Abduction" is the process of adopting an explanatory hypothesis (CP 5.145) and covers two operations: the selection and the formation of plausible hypotheses. As process of finding premisses, it is the basis of interpretive reconstruction of causes and intentions, as well as of inventive construction of theories

Wirth, Uwe

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What is Abductive Inference?http://user.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth/inferenc.htm[16.11.2009 10:32:18]What is AbductiveInference?Uwe WirthUniversität FrankfurtWirthHomepage AbduktionHomepage Es steht Ihnen frei, diesen Text zukopieren, wenn Sie das Copyrightbeachten. Zitieren Sie bitte nach derPrintversion. Dieser Eintrag ist erschienen in:Encyclopedia of Semiotics, ed. by PaulBouissac, Oxford University Press1998. Lemma "abductive inference".  What is Abductive Inference?Uwe Wirth, Frankfurt University  Abductive reasoning: constitutes according to Peirce the "first stage" of scientificinquiries (CP 6.469) and of any interpretive processes. "Abduction" is the process of adoptingan explanatory hypothesis (CP 5.145) and covers two operations: the selection and theformation of plausible hypotheses. As process of finding premisses, it is the basis ofinterpretive reconstruction of causes and intentions, as well as of inventive construction oftheories.Since the "mind is a sign developing according to the laws of inference" (CP 5.313),"Semiosis", the infinite process of interpretation of sign, is structured as argumentation.Thinking and reasoning is based on abductive, deductive and inductive inferences, aiming atestablishing beliefs, habits, rules and codes.In his early writing "Deduction, Induction and Hypothesis" (1878), Peirce describes the threemodes of inference as different syllogistic forms. In his "Lectures on Pragmatism" (1903)Abduction, Deduction and Induction become interacting aspects with different epistemologicalfunctions. Deduction determines the necessary consequences, relying on logical provablecoherence between premisses and conclusion. Induction is aiming at empirical provablecoherence between the premisses and experience, in order to derive a probablegeneralization. Yet, induction only classifies the data (CP 3.516), while abductive reasoningfurnishes the reasoner with a problematic theory explaining the causal relation among thefacts. From the abductive suggestion, which syntheses a multitude of predicates, "deductioncan draw a prediction which can be tested by induction" (CP 5.171).Motivated by the observation of a surprising fact or an anomaly that disappoints anexpectation, abductive reasoning is a strategy of solving problems and discovering relevantpremisses. It is "inference to the best explanation". Abductive reasoning has the logical formof an inverse modus ponens and is "reasoning backwards" from consequent to antecedent.Therefore Peirce calls it also "Retroductive reasoning" (CP 1.74). From a logical point of view,reasoning backwards is no valid form of inference. It is conjectural, or presumptive thinking,aiming at matching pragmatic standards of plausibility, guided by the reasoner´s "guessinginstinct" (CP 7.46). However, Peirce claims that Abduction is logical inference, because it canbe represented in a "a perfect definite logical form" (CP 5.188): "The surprising fact, C, isobserved; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason tosuspect that A is true" (CP 5.189).What is Abductive Inference?http://user.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth/inferenc.htm[16.11.2009 10:32:18]With his concept of abductive reasoning as a "logic of discovery" Peirce tries to reformulatethe Kantian question, how synthetical reasoning is possible at all. The notion of abductiveinference becomes a fundamental issue in the "pragmatistic" concept of the evolution ofknowledge. In his "Lectures on Pragmatism" Peirce states that the question of pragmatism "isnothing else than the question of the logic of abduction" (CP 5.196). Since it is the "only kindof reasoning which supplies new ideas, the only kind which is, in this sense, synthetic" (CP2.777), it must be by abductive reasoning that we have the capacity "to learn anything or tounderstand phenomena at all" (CP 5.171). Even perceptual judgements are to be regarded as"extreme cases" of abductive inferences (CP 5.181). As an "act of insight" that "comes to uslike a flash" (CP 5.181), Abduction is also related with creative and aesthetic aspects, such ascontemplation, daydream, and play of thought, which Peirce calls "Musement" (CP 6.458).The question of the status of abductive reasoning as major aspect of a "logic of discovery" isa controversial issue in philosophy of science and epistemology. Hanson (1965: 45)differentiates between two aspects in the rational procedure of hypothesis selection, namelyfirstly, reasons for accepting an hypothesis, and secondly reasons for entertaining ahypothesis in the first place. While the first point highlightens the problem of logical coherencethe second stresses the pragmatic relevance.In Popper's concept of "Logic of Science", growth of knowledge is due to a procedure of "trialand error". On the one hand, the ability to solve problems, is "a creative ability to producenew guesses, and more new guesses" (Popper 1979: 261). The task of a logic of science, onthe other hand, is the critical discussion of the methods and the logical criteria of hypothesisfalsification and elimination. The Peircean account of abductive inference, denies thepossibility to draw a sharp borderline between "context of discovery" and "context ofjustification".Peirce describes the evolution of knowledge in analogy to the Darwinian model of evolution.The "selection" of hypotheses is performed by an partly inborn, partly learned "guessinginstinct", which has developed as a part of the universe and is grown during evolution underthe influence of its laws. Therefore, Peirce states that abduction is "nothing but guessing" (CP7.219). In order to make "fair guesses", abductive inference links the reasoner´s "guessinginstinct" with the rational "principle of economy", which is the "leading consideration" inAbduction (CP 5.600). The "Economy of Research" aims at maximal plausibility of thehypothesis and at the maximal efficiency of the process of hypothesis formation andhypothesis testing. Therefore, "the simpler Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile andnatural, the one that instinct suggests, that must be preferred" (CP 6.477). Besides epistemology, the model of abductive inference has an increasing impact onLinguistics, Hermeneutics and Artificial Intelligence. Chomsky uses the Peircean notion ofguessing instinct and abductive inference, in order to explain language acquisition as anprocess of limiting the class of admissible hypotheses that are submitted to "corrective action"(See Chomsky 1968).Bonfantini and Proni suggest to interpret the abductive "guessing instinct" not only as a"natural insight", a lumen naturale, but also as a lumen culturale, an insight in our culturalbackground (See Bonfantini & Proni 1983: 134). Thus, as Eco points out, the abductive "logicof interpretation" could also become a model for hermeneutic processes (See Eco 1990: 59).Recently the concept of abductive reasoning as reasoning to the best explanation isintroduced and discussed in the field of Artificial Intelligence and expert systems (See van derLubbe 1993). Expert systems aim at imitating the reasoning process and the human faculty todeal with uncertain information in a very efficient way. The question, however, is, howabductive inference as a pragmatic strategy of reasoning can be implemented in expertsystems and whether artificial intelligence as a computational automatism can make creativeWhat is Abductive Inference?http://user.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth/inferenc.htm[16.11.2009 10:32:18]guesses. References Bonfantini, Massimo & Proni, Giampaolo, "To guess or not to guess". In: Eco & Sebeok (eds.)The Sign of the Three. Dupin, Holmes, Peirce. Indiana University Press, 1983, pp. 119-134.Chomsky, Noam, Language and Mind. Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968.Hanson, Norwood Russel, "Notes Toward a Logic of Discovery". In: Perspectives on Peirce.Critical Essays on Charles Sanders Peirce. (Ed.) Richard J. Bernstein. New Haven andLondon, 1965, pp. 43-65.Eco, Umberto, The Limits of Interpretation. Indiana University Press, 1990. Lubbe, Jan C.A. van der, "Human-like Reasoning under Uncertainty in Expert Systems". In:Signs, Search and Communication. Semiotic Aspects of Artificial Intelligence. (Eds.) René J.Jorna, Barend van Heusden, Roland Posner. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1993, pp. 113-133. Peirce, Charles Sanders, Collected Papers. (CP). Band I-VI. (Hrsg.) Charles Hartshorne undPaul Weiß. Harvard University Press 1931-1935. Band VII, VIII. (Hrsg.) Arthur W. Burks.1958. Popper, Karl R., Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford, 1979.    

Charles Hartshorne und Paul Weiß.

What is abductive inference?

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