Trust is often conveyed through delegation, or through recommendation. This
makes the trust authorities, who process and publish trust recommendations,
into an attractive target for attacks and spoofing. In some recent empiric
studies, this was shown to lead to a remarkable phenomenon of *adverse
selection*: a greater percentage of unreliable or malicious web merchants were
found among those with certain types of trust certificates, then among those
without. While such findings can be attributed to a lack of diligence in trust
authorities, or even to conflicts of interest, our analysis of trust dynamics
suggests that public trust networks would probably remain vulnerable even if
trust authorities were perfectly diligent. The reason is that the process of
trust building, if trust is not breached too often, naturally leads to
power-law distributions: the rich get richer, the trusted attract more trust.
The evolutionary processes with such distributions, ubiquitous in nature, are
known to be robust with respect to random failures, but vulnerable to adaptive
attacks. We recommend some ways to decrease the vulnerability of trust
building, and suggest some ideas for exploration.Comment: 17 pages; simplified the statement and the proof of the main theorem;
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