'Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb'
Abstract
Naseljavanje čitave zemlje, uspostava republikanske vladavine kao najstabilnije i zbližavanje naroda kroz razmjenu privrednih dobara, među kojima su rasne i religijske razlike često bile uzrok neprijateljstava i ratova, pretpostavke su postizanja vječnog mira. Ove pretpostavke Kant pripisuje "velikoj umjetnici prirodi", jer se zbivaju u sklopu egoističnih materijalnih interesa čovjeka - na razini čovjeka kao prirodnog bića, bez utjecaja njegove umske volje. Polazeći od Kantove konstatacije da je moral za postizanje pretpostavki vječnog mira nedostatan, čak nemoćan, autorica propituje opreku materijalnih interesa čovjeka i svrhe uma u Kantovoj etici. Pokazuje da Kant praktični um shvaća kao čovjekovu dispoziciju za veću potpunost svoje ljudskosti, a opreku svrhe uma i prirodnih nagnuća čovjeka identificira u posvemašnjem isključenju osjetilnih i osjećajnih poticaja iz moralnog čina. Ovo isključenje razmatra autorica povezano s Kantovim pojmom slobode, shvaćenim kao kauzalitet iz slobode umske volje.The prerequisites for achieving perpetual peace are the settlement of the entire Earth, the establishment of republican government (the most stable type of government) and the exchange of goods as a way of bringing peoples together, peoples among whom racial and religious differences have often sparked animosities. Kant attributes these prerequisites to "the great artist Nature", since they occur as a part of egoistic material interests of men - at the level of men as natural beings, without influencin their intelectual will. Starting with Kant\u27s proviso that morality does not suffice for achieving the prerequisites for perpetual peace, the author deals with the opposition between man\u27s material interests and the purpose of of reason in Kant\u27s ethics. She goes on to show that Kant understands practical mind as one\u27s disposition for a complete realization of one\u27s humanness. The polarity between the purpose of the reason and man\u27s natural strivings she identifies in the exclusion of sensory and emotional impulses from moral acts. The author analyzes this exclusion in combination with Kant\u27s concept of freedom, defined as the causality springing from the freedom of rational will
