'Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb'
Abstract
Autor analizira Schmittovu i Luhmannovu teoriju demokracije i ustavne dr- žave. Na temelju komparacije autor utvrđuje da je Schmittova kritika demokratske pluralističke države završila u teoriji neposredne ili plebiscitarne demokracije u kojoj je ustav podložan nepredvidivoj volji političke većine koja ga može prema odnosima moći samovoljno mijenjati. Luhmann, naprotiv, polazi od teze o rastavljenosti prava i politike te svoju koncepciju ustavne države gradi na bipolarnom razlikovanju i međusobnom ograničavanju prava i politike. Autor zaključuje da Luhmann nipošto ne napušta Hobbesovo pesimističko uvjerenje o bestijalnosti ljudske prirode, nego samo predlaže drukčiju strategiju koegzistencije kulturnih divljaka.The author analyses Schmitt’s and Luhmann’s theory of democracy and the constitutional state. By comparing them, he concludes that Schmitt’s critique of the democratic pluralistic state has ended in the theory of direct or plebiscitary democracy in which the constitution is subject to an unpredictable will of political majority which can change it wilfully in line with the power relations. Luhmann, on the other hand, starts from the assumption of the separation between law and politics and builds his concept of the constitutional state on the bipolar differentiation and the mutual checks between law and politics. The author concludes that Luhmann does not give up on Hobbes’ pessimistic conviction that human nature is bestial; he only offers a different strategy for the coexistence of cultured savages
