'Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb'
Abstract
An analysis of the normative/institutional level of the Croatian politics shows that the constitutional arrangements at the levels of the social system and the political sub-system could be labelled as democratic, while the constitutional solutions that regulated the relations among major political institutions could turn out to be insufficient. Hence the semi-presidential system of government in the Croatian wartime/transitional context provided an appropriate institutional framework for authoritarian regressions in the processes of political decision-making and in the content of political decisions. The domination of the president of the state in Croatia’s political life did not stem solely from the existing constitutional arrangements; it also rested on a set of additional premises of activity: a) a decade of harmony between the president and the parliamentary majority; b) the charismatic/clientelist nature of the ruling party; c) a rather weak and suppressed opposition to the ruling party by the unconsolidated opposition parties; and d) the expressive model of orientation of the actors in political activity. Based on the above account of the institutional/political order and the activities of the major actors, it can be surmised that the democratic consolidation in Croatia at the beginning of 2000 was in its incipient stage. Also, the frequent and profound changes in the structure of the cleavageas and the electoral systems as well as the frequent party factioning stood in the way and slowed down the consolidation of the representational level of political system. Nevertheless, a certain level of consolidation is testified to by the four cycles of non-violent parliamentary elections, the peaceful alternation of the parties in power, the contextually relatively low fluctuation of voters, the moderate fragmentation of the parliament, and the acceptance of the parliamentary rules of the game by the majority of the population
