'Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb'
Abstract
Autor analizira što znači “suverenost ustava” i postavlja pitanje ne bi li “ustavnu demokraciju” trebalo shvatiti kao mješavinu dobrog političkog poretka u aristotelovskome smislu taxisa? Autor ispituje različite tradicije u razvoju konstitucionalizma na primjerima Francuske, Engleske i Sjeverne Amerike. U slučaju Sjeverne Amerike on se poziva na ideju stvaranja miješanog oblika ustava ili ustavne demokracije kojim se postiže demokratsko legitimiranje moći ali i njezino konstitucionalno ograničavanje. Iz razvoja konstitucionalizma pokazuje se da ustav zauzima mjesto koje je najprije zauzimala suverena osoba monarha, a zatim, suvereni narod u demokraciji. U osnovi, normativni konstitucionalizam dovodi do situacije u kojoj ustavni sud daje autoritativno tumačenje ustava čime demokratskoparlamentarna država postaje ustavnosudska jurisdikcijska država. Autor zaključuje da sakralizacija ustava i ustavnog sudstva nije uvijek sasvim poticajna za politički proces što otvara nove kontroverzije.The author analyses the meaning of the phrase “sovereignty of constitutions” and wonders whether “constitutional democracy” should be understood as a combination of a good political order in the Aristotelian meaning of taxis? The author looks into the different traditions in the evolution of constitutionalism using the example of France, Britain and North America. In the case of North America he refers to the idea of creating a mixed form of constitution or constitutional democracy which makes for the democratic legitimation of power as well as for its constitutional restriction. The evolution of constitutionalism shows that constitutions now occupy the position which at first used to belong to sovereign monarchs and later to sovereign peoples in democracy. Basically, normative constitutionalism leads to the situation in which constitutional courts give authoritative interpretation of constitutions which turns democratic/parliamentary state into constitutional- court jurisdiction state. The author concludes that the sacralization of constitutions and constitutional courts does not necessarily stimulate the political process, the fact that opens new controversies
