'Croatian Philosophical Society (Hrvatsko filozofsko drustvo)'
Abstract
Fenomenološka tradicija dugo je smatrala da prirodna percepcija nije ni konceptualno artikulirana niti upravljana determinističkim zakonima, već je radije organizirana prema praktično artikuliranoj strukturi tjelesnog bitka-u-svijetu. Ali to ostavlja problem objašnjavanja kako percepcija može omogućiti opravdavajuću podršku mišljenju. Odgovor fenomenologa jest taj da nam značenjska (ali ne konceptualna) struktura prirodne percepcije omogućuje da mislimo o objektima motivirajući pojedinačne misli o objektima kakvima se oni predstavljaju u percepciji. Pokazujem kako takvo gledište omogućuje izlaz iz briga koje more suvremenu filozofiju uma.The phenomenological tradition has long contended that natural perception is neither conceptually articulated nor governed by deterministic laws, but rather organized according to the practically articulated structure of bodily being-in-the-world. But this leaves the problem of explaining how perception can provide justificatory support to thought. The phenomenologists’ answer is to say that the meaningful (but not conceptual) structure of natural perception makes it possible for us to think about objects by motivating particular thoughts about the objects as they present themselves in perception. I show how this view provides a way out of worries that plague contemporary philosophy of mind
