We present a simplified framework for proving sequential composability in the
quantum setting. In particular, we give a new, simulation-based, definition for
security in the bounded-quantum-storage model, and show that this definition
allows for sequential composition of protocols. Damgard et al. (FOCS '05,
CRYPTO '07) showed how to securely implement bit commitment and oblivious
transfer in the bounded-quantum-storage model, where the adversary is only
allowed to store a limited number of qubits. However, their security
definitions did only apply to the standalone setting, and it was not clear if
their protocols could be composed. Indeed, we first give a simple attack that
shows that these protocols are not composable without a small refinement of the
model. Finally, we prove the security of their randomized oblivious transfer
protocol in our refined model. Secure implementations of oblivious transfer and
bit commitment then follow easily by a (classical) reduction to randomized
oblivious transfer.Comment: 21 page