This dissertation deals with negotiation behavior as a function of the negotiators frame -- their conception of their potential own outcomes as gains or as losses (Bazerman, 1983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Negotiatiors with a gain frame see their potential own outcomes in positive terms and evaluate their concessions as decreases in their gains. Negotiatiors with a loss frame, in contrast, see their potential own outcomes in negative terms and evaluate their concessions as increases in their losses (Bazerman, 1983; Kahneman, 1992). ...

Zie: Summary

Dreu, Carsten Karel Willem de

English

University of Groningen

   University of GroningenGain and loss frames in bilateral negotiationDreu, Carsten Karel Willem deIMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite fromit. Please check the document version below.Document VersionPublisher's PDF, also known as Version of recordPublication date:1993Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research databaseCitation for published version (APA):Dreu, C. K. W. D. (1993). Gain and loss frames in bilateral negotiation: concession aersion following theadoption of other's communicated frame. s.n.CopyrightOther than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of theauthor(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).Take-down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediatelyand investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons thenumber of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.Download date: 12-11-2019SummaryThis dissertation deals with negotiation behavior as a function of the negotiators'frame -- their conception of their potential own outcomes as gains or as losses(Bazerman, L983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Negotiators with a gain frame seetheir potential own outcomes in positive terms and evaluate their concessions asdecreases in their gains. Negotiators with a loss frame, in contrast, see theirpotential own outcomes in negative lerms and evaluate their concessions asincreases in their losses (Bazerman, 1983; Kahneman, L992).A review of research dealing with effects of the <lwn gain or loss frame onthe negotiator's own cognition and behavior shows that because losses are moreaversive than equivalent gains are pleasing, negotiators with a loss frame haverelatively stronger concession aversion. Consequently, loss frame negotiatorsdemand more, concede less and settle less easy than negotiators with a gain frame(Carnevale, Gentile & De Dreu, 1992;De Dreu, L992; Kahneman, 1992).In an attempt to augment this past research, a more interpersonal perspectiveon frames is proposed. It is assumed that (a) following iaformation search priorto negotiation, negotiators may have foreknowledge about their opponent'sreference outcome and concomitant gain or loss frame (cf. Russo & Schoemaker,1989), and (b) during negotiation, disputants may exchange information abouttheir own frame: they may communicate their frame (cf. Kahneman, 1992; Neale& Bazerman, L985, 1991). No prior research investigated the impact offoreknowledge about the opposing negotiator's frame, or dealt with the effects ofthe opponent's communicated frame.The primary focus of the laboratory experiments reported in Chapter 2, 3and 4 was on the negotiator's own cognition and behavior as a function of ownframe, opponent's communicated frame, and their interactions. In computer-simulated buyer-seller negotiations, the subject was always the seller and was ledto believe that s/he negotiated the transaction of three issues with another subjectswho assumed the role of buyer. In fact, the buyer was a preprogrammedcomputer. Subjects either negotiated net profit (own gain frame), or expensesthat would cut into their gross outcome (loss frame); the objective outcomes wereidentical in both conditions. The opponent's communicated frame wasmanipulated by messages the buyer sent to the subject on each round of thenegotiation (six in total). In the other's communicated gain frame condition, thebuyer sent messages evaluating the buyer's own outcomes as gains (e.g., "Thisconcession means a big decrease in my gains"), whereas the messages evaluatedthe buyer's own outcomes as losses in the opponent's communicated loss framecondition (e.g., "This concession means a big increase in my losses"). The(preprogrammed) buyer always started the negotiation with a first offer, and aframe-related message, whereupon the subject responded with a counter-offerand, if s/he wanted, a written message. This procedure continued for six rounds,I - )Gain and Loss Frames in Bilateral Nesotiationwhereupon the negotiation was interrupted and a questionnaire was administered.Based on the assumption that negotiators reciprocate other's comnrunication(cf. Putnam & Jones, 1982) and converge toward simiiar definitions of theirsituations (Giles & Smith, 1979; Lewicki & Litterer, L985), the frame adoptionhypothesis predicted that negotiators adopt other's communicated frame. Hence,other's communicated loss frame induces a loss frame with its concomitant strongconcession aversion, whereas other's communicated gain frame induces a gainframe with its concomitant weak concession aversion, low demands and largeconcessions. Because loss framed negotiators are more focused on their ownoutcomes than gain framed negotiators, they may be less sensitive to theopponent's features, characteristics and behaviors (De Dreu, Emans and Van deVliert, 1992a; De Dreu, Lualhati & McCusker, in press; cf. Taylor, 1991). Hence,the predicted frame adoption was expected to occur especially when negotiatorsthemselves have a gain rather than loss frame.The results of the research reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 yielded goodsupport for the frame adoption hypothesis. Negotiators placed higher demandsand made larger concessions when their opponent communicated a loss framerather than a gain frame. Also, they communicated a loss frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a loss frame, and a gain frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a gain frame. This frame-adoption effect wasas expected stronger when subjects themselves had a gain rather than loss frame.Also, as shown in Chapter 4, when opponent's communicated frame wasincongruent with foreknowledge about other's frame (gain--loss or loss--gain), theeffects of other's communicated frame dissipated. This suggests that the frameadoption effect is due to central and systematic rather than peripheral andheuristic processing of other's communicated frame.The studies reported in Chapter 3 dealt with the relationship betweencommunicated frames reflecting the evaluation of the own outcomes, andcommunicated cooperativeness or competitiveness, reflecting the interpersonal goalsthe communicator pursues (cf. Rubin & Brown, 1975). In Study 2, it was foundthat the negotiators' frame is indeed reflected in their communicated frame, aswell as in their communicated cooperativeness, but that the relation between thelatter two variables was nonsignificant. Study 3 examined whether the frameadoption effect was independent of the opponent's communicatedcooperativeness. Results showed that opponent's communicated frame affectsbehavior as predicted in the frame adoption hypothesis, but did not affect thenegotiator's own communicated cooperativeness. Other's communicatedcooperativeness, in contrast, affected the own communicated cooperativeness butnot the own communicated frame. It is concluded that the communicated framedealing with the perception of own outcom€s is independent of the communicatedcooperativeness dealing with the interpersonal relationship.In the experinlarger than equivawould loom largerincrease other's lrdecrease other's gawhen the opponenlliterature (Carnevcooperative the otframe), the highermismatching). Thtthe other appear ngain frame. It is crframe makes the oTaken togethean interpersonal prthat because lossenegotiators are inflthe other's commuoutlined in the pr,negotiators often tr(Neale & Bazermavery counter-prodropponent, and enconcessions. Conrand may lead to er1 ALSummaryIn the experiment in Chapter 4 it was also predicted that because losses loomlarger than equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), other's concessionswould loom larger when the other has a loss frame (and other's concessionsincrease other's losses), rather than a gain frame (and other's concessionsdecrease other's gains). Hence, the opponent would be seen as more cooperativewhen the opponent has a loss rather than a gain frame. Following the negotiationliterature (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), it was also predicted that the morecooperative the other was seen (in the case of other's loss rather than gainframe), the higher the own demands and the smaller the own concessions (i.e.,mismatching). The results supported both suppositions: other's loss frame madethe other appear more cooperative, and led to higher own demands than other'sgain frame. It is concluded that foreknowledge about the opponent's gain or lossframe makes the other appear less, or more cooperative, respectively.Taken together, this dissertation underscores the validity and importance ofan interpersonal perspective on negotiator frame. The studies consistently showthat because losses loom larger and are more aversive than equivalent gains,negotiators are influenced by their own frame, foreknowledge about other's frame,the other's communicated frame, and their interactions. Given the conclusionsoutlined in the preceding paragraph, it is interesting to note that professionalnegotiators often try to convince their opponent that they have a loss perspective(Neale & Bazerman,1991). This dissertation shows that such a strategy might bevery counter-productive. Conveying a loss frame induces a loss frame in theopponent, and enhances other's tendency to mismatch one's apparent largerconcessions. Conveying a loss frame thus increases other's concession aversionand may lead to escalation rather than de-escalation of the conflict.75

Gain and loss frames in bilateral negotiation:concession aersion following the adoption of other's communicated frame

Proceedings - University of Groningen

   University of GroningenGain and loss frames in bilateral negotiationDreu, Carsten Karel Willem deIMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite fromit. Please check the document version below.Document VersionPublisher's PDF, also known as Version of recordPublication date:1993Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research databaseCitation for published version (APA):Dreu, C. K. W. D. (1993). Gain and loss frames in bilateral negotiation: concession aersion following theadoption of other's communicated frame. s.n.CopyrightOther than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of theauthor(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license.More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.Take-down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediatelyand investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons thenumber of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.Download date: 31-10-2023SummaryThis dissertation deals with negotiation behavior as a function of the negotiators'frame -- their conception of their potential own outcomes as gains or as losses(Bazerman, L983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Negotiators with a gain frame seetheir potential own outcomes in positive terms and evaluate their concessions asdecreases in their gains. Negotiators with a loss frame, in contrast, see theirpotential own outcomes in negative lerms and evaluate their concessions asincreases in their losses (Bazerman, 1983; Kahneman, L992).A review of research dealing with effects of the <lwn gain or loss frame onthe negotiator's own cognition and behavior shows that because losses are moreaversive than equivalent gains are pleasing, negotiators with a loss frame haverelatively stronger concession aversion. Consequently, loss frame negotiatorsdemand more, concede less and settle less easy than negotiators with a gain frame(Carnevale, Gentile & De Dreu, 1992;De Dreu, L992; Kahneman, 1992).In an attempt to augment this past research, a more interpersonal perspectiveon frames is proposed. It is assumed that (a) following iaformation search priorto negotiation, negotiators may have foreknowledge about their opponent'sreference outcome and concomitant gain or loss frame (cf. Russo & Schoemaker,1989), and (b) during negotiation, disputants may exchange information abouttheir own frame: they may communicate their frame (cf. Kahneman, 1992; Neale& Bazerman, L985, 1991). No prior research investigated the impact offoreknowledge about the opposing negotiator's frame, or dealt with the effects ofthe opponent's communicated frame.The primary focus of the laboratory experiments reported in Chapter 2, 3and 4 was on the negotiator's own cognition and behavior as a function of ownframe, opponent's communicated frame, and their interactions. In computer-simulated buyer-seller negotiations, the subject was always the seller and was ledto believe that s/he negotiated the transaction of three issues with another subjectswho assumed the role of buyer. In fact, the buyer was a preprogrammedcomputer. Subjects either negotiated net profit (own gain frame), or expensesthat would cut into their gross outcome (loss frame); the objective outcomes wereidentical in both conditions. The opponent's communicated frame wasmanipulated by messages the buyer sent to the subject on each round of thenegotiation (six in total). In the other's communicated gain frame condition, thebuyer sent messages evaluating the buyer's own outcomes as gains (e.g., "Thisconcession means a big decrease in my gains"), whereas the messages evaluatedthe buyer's own outcomes as losses in the opponent's communicated loss framecondition (e.g., "This concession means a big increase in my losses"). The(preprogrammed) buyer always started the negotiation with a first offer, and aframe-related message, whereupon the subject responded with a counter-offerand, if s/he wanted, a written message. This procedure continued for six rounds,I - )Gain and Loss Frames in Bilateral Nesotiationwhereupon the negotiation was interrupted and a questionnaire was administered.Based on the assumption that negotiators reciprocate other's comnrunication(cf. Putnam & Jones, 1982) and converge toward simiiar definitions of theirsituations (Giles & Smith, 1979; Lewicki & Litterer, L985), the frame adoptionhypothesis predicted that negotiators adopt other's communicated frame. Hence,other's communicated loss frame induces a loss frame with its concomitant strongconcession aversion, whereas other's communicated gain frame induces a gainframe with its concomitant weak concession aversion, low demands and largeconcessions. Because loss framed negotiators are more focused on their ownoutcomes than gain framed negotiators, they may be less sensitive to theopponent's features, characteristics and behaviors (De Dreu, Emans and Van deVliert, 1992a; De Dreu, Lualhati & McCusker, in press; cf. Taylor, 1991). Hence,the predicted frame adoption was expected to occur especially when negotiatorsthemselves have a gain rather than loss frame.The results of the research reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 yielded goodsupport for the frame adoption hypothesis. Negotiators placed higher demandsand made larger concessions when their opponent communicated a loss framerather than a gain frame. Also, they communicated a loss frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a loss frame, and a gain frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a gain frame. This frame-adoption effect wasas expected stronger when subjects themselves had a gain rather than loss frame.Also, as shown in Chapter 4, when opponent's communicated frame wasincongruent with foreknowledge about other's frame (gain--loss or loss--gain), theeffects of other's communicated frame dissipated. This suggests that the frameadoption effect is due to central and systematic rather than peripheral andheuristic processing of other's communicated frame.The studies reported in Chapter 3 dealt with the relationship betweencommunicated frames reflecting the evaluation of the own outcomes, andcommunicated cooperativeness or competitiveness, reflecting the interpersonal goalsthe communicator pursues (cf. Rubin & Brown, 1975). In Study 2, it was foundthat the negotiators' frame is indeed reflected in their communicated frame, aswell as in their communicated cooperativeness, but that the relation between thelatter two variables was nonsignificant. Study 3 examined whether the frameadoption effect was independent of the opponent's communicatedcooperativeness. Results showed that opponent's communicated frame affectsbehavior as predicted in the frame adoption hypothesis, but did not affect thenegotiator's own communicated cooperativeness. Other's communicatedcooperativeness, in contrast, affected the own communicated cooperativeness butnot the own communicated frame. It is concluded that the communicated framedealing with the perception of own outcom€s is independent of the communicatedcooperativeness dealing with the interpersonal relationship.In the experinlarger than equivawould loom largerincrease other's lrdecrease other's gawhen the opponenlliterature (Carnevcooperative the otframe), the highermismatching). Thtthe other appear ngain frame. It is crframe makes the oTaken togethean interpersonal prthat because lossenegotiators are inflthe other's commuoutlined in the pr,negotiators often tr(Neale & Bazermavery counter-prodropponent, and enconcessions. Conrand may lead to er1 ALSummaryIn the experiment in Chapter 4 it was also predicted that because losses loomlarger than equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), other's concessionswould loom larger when the other has a loss frame (and other's concessionsincrease other's losses), rather than a gain frame (and other's concessionsdecrease other's gains). Hence, the opponent would be seen as more cooperativewhen the opponent has a loss rather than a gain frame. Following the negotiationliterature (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), it was also predicted that the morecooperative the other was seen (in the case of other's loss rather than gainframe), the higher the own demands and the smaller the own concessions (i.e.,mismatching). The results supported both suppositions: other's loss frame madethe other appear more cooperative, and led to higher own demands than other'sgain frame. It is concluded that foreknowledge about the opponent's gain or lossframe makes the other appear less, or more cooperative, respectively.Taken together, this dissertation underscores the validity and importance ofan interpersonal perspective on negotiator frame. The studies consistently showthat because losses loom larger and are more aversive than equivalent gains,negotiators are influenced by their own frame, foreknowledge about other's frame,the other's communicated frame, and their interactions. Given the conclusionsoutlined in the preceding paragraph, it is interesting to note that professionalnegotiators often try to convince their opponent that they have a loss perspective(Neale & Bazerman,1991). This dissertation shows that such a strategy might bevery counter-productive. Conveying a loss frame induces a loss frame in theopponent, and enhances other's tendency to mismatch one's apparent largerconcessions. Conveying a loss frame thus increases other's concession aversionand may lead to escalation rather than de-escalation of the conflict.75

ARTS repository - University of Groningen

   University of GroningenGain and loss frames in bilateral negotiationDreu, Carsten Karel Willem deIMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite fromit. Please check the document version below.Document VersionPublisher's PDF, also known as Version of recordPublication date:1993Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research databaseCitation for published version (APA):Dreu, C. K. W. D. (1993). Gain and loss frames in bilateral negotiation: concession aersion following theadoption of other's communicated frame. s.n.CopyrightOther than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of theauthor(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license.More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.Take-down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediatelyand investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons thenumber of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.Download date: 09-09-2023SummaryThis dissertation deals with negotiation behavior as a function of the negotiators'frame -- their conception of their potential own outcomes as gains or as losses(Bazerman, L983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Negotiators with a gain frame seetheir potential own outcomes in positive terms and evaluate their concessions asdecreases in their gains. Negotiators with a loss frame, in contrast, see theirpotential own outcomes in negative lerms and evaluate their concessions asincreases in their losses (Bazerman, 1983; Kahneman, L992).A review of research dealing with effects of the <lwn gain or loss frame onthe negotiator's own cognition and behavior shows that because losses are moreaversive than equivalent gains are pleasing, negotiators with a loss frame haverelatively stronger concession aversion. Consequently, loss frame negotiatorsdemand more, concede less and settle less easy than negotiators with a gain frame(Carnevale, Gentile & De Dreu, 1992;De Dreu, L992; Kahneman, 1992).In an attempt to augment this past research, a more interpersonal perspectiveon frames is proposed. It is assumed that (a) following iaformation search priorto negotiation, negotiators may have foreknowledge about their opponent'sreference outcome and concomitant gain or loss frame (cf. Russo & Schoemaker,1989), and (b) during negotiation, disputants may exchange information abouttheir own frame: they may communicate their frame (cf. Kahneman, 1992; Neale& Bazerman, L985, 1991). No prior research investigated the impact offoreknowledge about the opposing negotiator's frame, or dealt with the effects ofthe opponent's communicated frame.The primary focus of the laboratory experiments reported in Chapter 2, 3and 4 was on the negotiator's own cognition and behavior as a function of ownframe, opponent's communicated frame, and their interactions. In computer-simulated buyer-seller negotiations, the subject was always the seller and was ledto believe that s/he negotiated the transaction of three issues with another subjectswho assumed the role of buyer. In fact, the buyer was a preprogrammedcomputer. Subjects either negotiated net profit (own gain frame), or expensesthat would cut into their gross outcome (loss frame); the objective outcomes wereidentical in both conditions. The opponent's communicated frame wasmanipulated by messages the buyer sent to the subject on each round of thenegotiation (six in total). In the other's communicated gain frame condition, thebuyer sent messages evaluating the buyer's own outcomes as gains (e.g., "Thisconcession means a big decrease in my gains"), whereas the messages evaluatedthe buyer's own outcomes as losses in the opponent's communicated loss framecondition (e.g., "This concession means a big increase in my losses"). The(preprogrammed) buyer always started the negotiation with a first offer, and aframe-related message, whereupon the subject responded with a counter-offerand, if s/he wanted, a written message. This procedure continued for six rounds,I - )Gain and Loss Frames in Bilateral Nesotiationwhereupon the negotiation was interrupted and a questionnaire was administered.Based on the assumption that negotiators reciprocate other's comnrunication(cf. Putnam & Jones, 1982) and converge toward simiiar definitions of theirsituations (Giles & Smith, 1979; Lewicki & Litterer, L985), the frame adoptionhypothesis predicted that negotiators adopt other's communicated frame. Hence,other's communicated loss frame induces a loss frame with its concomitant strongconcession aversion, whereas other's communicated gain frame induces a gainframe with its concomitant weak concession aversion, low demands and largeconcessions. Because loss framed negotiators are more focused on their ownoutcomes than gain framed negotiators, they may be less sensitive to theopponent's features, characteristics and behaviors (De Dreu, Emans and Van deVliert, 1992a; De Dreu, Lualhati & McCusker, in press; cf. Taylor, 1991). Hence,the predicted frame adoption was expected to occur especially when negotiatorsthemselves have a gain rather than loss frame.The results of the research reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 yielded goodsupport for the frame adoption hypothesis. Negotiators placed higher demandsand made larger concessions when their opponent communicated a loss framerather than a gain frame. Also, they communicated a loss frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a loss frame, and a gain frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a gain frame. This frame-adoption effect wasas expected stronger when subjects themselves had a gain rather than loss frame.Also, as shown in Chapter 4, when opponent's communicated frame wasincongruent with foreknowledge about other's frame (gain--loss or loss--gain), theeffects of other's communicated frame dissipated. This suggests that the frameadoption effect is due to central and systematic rather than peripheral andheuristic processing of other's communicated frame.The studies reported in Chapter 3 dealt with the relationship betweencommunicated frames reflecting the evaluation of the own outcomes, andcommunicated cooperativeness or competitiveness, reflecting the interpersonal goalsthe communicator pursues (cf. Rubin & Brown, 1975). In Study 2, it was foundthat the negotiators' frame is indeed reflected in their communicated frame, aswell as in their communicated cooperativeness, but that the relation between thelatter two variables was nonsignificant. Study 3 examined whether the frameadoption effect was independent of the opponent's communicatedcooperativeness. Results showed that opponent's communicated frame affectsbehavior as predicted in the frame adoption hypothesis, but did not affect thenegotiator's own communicated cooperativeness. Other's communicatedcooperativeness, in contrast, affected the own communicated cooperativeness butnot the own communicated frame. It is concluded that the communicated framedealing with the perception of own outcom€s is independent of the communicatedcooperativeness dealing with the interpersonal relationship.In the experinlarger than equivawould loom largerincrease other's lrdecrease other's gawhen the opponenlliterature (Carnevcooperative the otframe), the highermismatching). Thtthe other appear ngain frame. It is crframe makes the oTaken togethean interpersonal prthat because lossenegotiators are inflthe other's commuoutlined in the pr,negotiators often tr(Neale & Bazermavery counter-prodropponent, and enconcessions. Conrand may lead to er1 ALSummaryIn the experiment in Chapter 4 it was also predicted that because losses loomlarger than equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), other's concessionswould loom larger when the other has a loss frame (and other's concessionsincrease other's losses), rather than a gain frame (and other's concessionsdecrease other's gains). Hence, the opponent would be seen as more cooperativewhen the opponent has a loss rather than a gain frame. Following the negotiationliterature (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), it was also predicted that the morecooperative the other was seen (in the case of other's loss rather than gainframe), the higher the own demands and the smaller the own concessions (i.e.,mismatching). The results supported both suppositions: other's loss frame madethe other appear more cooperative, and led to higher own demands than other'sgain frame. It is concluded that foreknowledge about the opponent's gain or lossframe makes the other appear less, or more cooperative, respectively.Taken together, this dissertation underscores the validity and importance ofan interpersonal perspective on negotiator frame. The studies consistently showthat because losses loom larger and are more aversive than equivalent gains,negotiators are influenced by their own frame, foreknowledge about other's frame,the other's communicated frame, and their interactions. Given the conclusionsoutlined in the preceding paragraph, it is interesting to note that professionalnegotiators often try to convince their opponent that they have a loss perspective(Neale & Bazerman,1991). This dissertation shows that such a strategy might bevery counter-productive. Conveying a loss frame induces a loss frame in theopponent, and enhances other's tendency to mismatch one's apparent largerconcessions. Conveying a loss frame thus increases other's concession aversionand may lead to escalation rather than de-escalation of the conflict.75

Dissertations of the University of Groningen

   University of GroningenGain and loss frames in bilateral negotiationDreu, Carsten Karel Willem deIMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite fromit. Please check the document version below.Document VersionPublisher's PDF, also known as Version of recordPublication date:1993Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research databaseCitation for published version (APA):Dreu, C. K. W. D. (1993). Gain and loss frames in bilateral negotiation: concession aersion following theadoption of other's communicated frame. s.n.CopyrightOther than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of theauthor(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license.More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.Take-down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediatelyand investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons thenumber of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.Download date: 04-06-2022SummaryThis dissertation deals with negotiation behavior as a function of the negotiators'frame -- their conception of their potential own outcomes as gains or as losses(Bazerman, L983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Negotiators with a gain frame seetheir potential own outcomes in positive terms and evaluate their concessions asdecreases in their gains. Negotiators with a loss frame, in contrast, see theirpotential own outcomes in negative lerms and evaluate their concessions asincreases in their losses (Bazerman, 1983; Kahneman, L992).A review of research dealing with effects of the <lwn gain or loss frame onthe negotiator's own cognition and behavior shows that because losses are moreaversive than equivalent gains are pleasing, negotiators with a loss frame haverelatively stronger concession aversion. Consequently, loss frame negotiatorsdemand more, concede less and settle less easy than negotiators with a gain frame(Carnevale, Gentile & De Dreu, 1992;De Dreu, L992; Kahneman, 1992).In an attempt to augment this past research, a more interpersonal perspectiveon frames is proposed. It is assumed that (a) following iaformation search priorto negotiation, negotiators may have foreknowledge about their opponent'sreference outcome and concomitant gain or loss frame (cf. Russo & Schoemaker,1989), and (b) during negotiation, disputants may exchange information abouttheir own frame: they may communicate their frame (cf. Kahneman, 1992; Neale& Bazerman, L985, 1991). No prior research investigated the impact offoreknowledge about the opposing negotiator's frame, or dealt with the effects ofthe opponent's communicated frame.The primary focus of the laboratory experiments reported in Chapter 2, 3and 4 was on the negotiator's own cognition and behavior as a function of ownframe, opponent's communicated frame, and their interactions. In computer-simulated buyer-seller negotiations, the subject was always the seller and was ledto believe that s/he negotiated the transaction of three issues with another subjectswho assumed the role of buyer. In fact, the buyer was a preprogrammedcomputer. Subjects either negotiated net profit (own gain frame), or expensesthat would cut into their gross outcome (loss frame); the objective outcomes wereidentical in both conditions. The opponent's communicated frame wasmanipulated by messages the buyer sent to the subject on each round of thenegotiation (six in total). In the other's communicated gain frame condition, thebuyer sent messages evaluating the buyer's own outcomes as gains (e.g., "Thisconcession means a big decrease in my gains"), whereas the messages evaluatedthe buyer's own outcomes as losses in the opponent's communicated loss framecondition (e.g., "This concession means a big increase in my losses"). The(preprogrammed) buyer always started the negotiation with a first offer, and aframe-related message, whereupon the subject responded with a counter-offerand, if s/he wanted, a written message. This procedure continued for six rounds,I - )Gain and Loss Frames in Bilateral Nesotiationwhereupon the negotiation was interrupted and a questionnaire was administered.Based on the assumption that negotiators reciprocate other's comnrunication(cf. Putnam & Jones, 1982) and converge toward simiiar definitions of theirsituations (Giles & Smith, 1979; Lewicki & Litterer, L985), the frame adoptionhypothesis predicted that negotiators adopt other's communicated frame. Hence,other's communicated loss frame induces a loss frame with its concomitant strongconcession aversion, whereas other's communicated gain frame induces a gainframe with its concomitant weak concession aversion, low demands and largeconcessions. Because loss framed negotiators are more focused on their ownoutcomes than gain framed negotiators, they may be less sensitive to theopponent's features, characteristics and behaviors (De Dreu, Emans and Van deVliert, 1992a; De Dreu, Lualhati & McCusker, in press; cf. Taylor, 1991). Hence,the predicted frame adoption was expected to occur especially when negotiatorsthemselves have a gain rather than loss frame.The results of the research reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 yielded goodsupport for the frame adoption hypothesis. Negotiators placed higher demandsand made larger concessions when their opponent communicated a loss framerather than a gain frame. Also, they communicated a loss frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a loss frame, and a gain frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a gain frame. This frame-adoption effect wasas expected stronger when subjects themselves had a gain rather than loss frame.Also, as shown in Chapter 4, when opponent's communicated frame wasincongruent with foreknowledge about other's frame (gain--loss or loss--gain), theeffects of other's communicated frame dissipated. This suggests that the frameadoption effect is due to central and systematic rather than peripheral andheuristic processing of other's communicated frame.The studies reported in Chapter 3 dealt with the relationship betweencommunicated frames reflecting the evaluation of the own outcomes, andcommunicated cooperativeness or competitiveness, reflecting the interpersonal goalsthe communicator pursues (cf. Rubin & Brown, 1975). In Study 2, it was foundthat the negotiators' frame is indeed reflected in their communicated frame, aswell as in their communicated cooperativeness, but that the relation between thelatter two variables was nonsignificant. Study 3 examined whether the frameadoption effect was independent of the opponent's communicatedcooperativeness. Results showed that opponent's communicated frame affectsbehavior as predicted in the frame adoption hypothesis, but did not affect thenegotiator's own communicated cooperativeness. Other's communicatedcooperativeness, in contrast, affected the own communicated cooperativeness butnot the own communicated frame. It is concluded that the communicated framedealing with the perception of own outcom€s is independent of the communicatedcooperativeness dealing with the interpersonal relationship.In the experinlarger than equivawould loom largerincrease other's lrdecrease other's gawhen the opponenlliterature (Carnevcooperative the otframe), the highermismatching). Thtthe other appear ngain frame. It is crframe makes the oTaken togethean interpersonal prthat because lossenegotiators are inflthe other's commuoutlined in the pr,negotiators often tr(Neale & Bazermavery counter-prodropponent, and enconcessions. Conrand may lead to er1 ALSummaryIn the experiment in Chapter 4 it was also predicted that because losses loomlarger than equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), other's concessionswould loom larger when the other has a loss frame (and other's concessionsincrease other's losses), rather than a gain frame (and other's concessionsdecrease other's gains). Hence, the opponent would be seen as more cooperativewhen the opponent has a loss rather than a gain frame. Following the negotiationliterature (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), it was also predicted that the morecooperative the other was seen (in the case of other's loss rather than gainframe), the higher the own demands and the smaller the own concessions (i.e.,mismatching). The results supported both suppositions: other's loss frame madethe other appear more cooperative, and led to higher own demands than other'sgain frame. It is concluded that foreknowledge about the opponent's gain or lossframe makes the other appear less, or more cooperative, respectively.Taken together, this dissertation underscores the validity and importance ofan interpersonal perspective on negotiator frame. The studies consistently showthat because losses loom larger and are more aversive than equivalent gains,negotiators are influenced by their own frame, foreknowledge about other's frame,the other's communicated frame, and their interactions. Given the conclusionsoutlined in the preceding paragraph, it is interesting to note that professionalnegotiators often try to convince their opponent that they have a loss perspective(Neale & Bazerman,1991). This dissertation shows that such a strategy might bevery counter-productive. Conveying a loss frame induces a loss frame in theopponent, and enhances other's tendency to mismatch one's apparent largerconcessions. Conveying a loss frame thus increases other's concession aversionand may lead to escalation rather than de-escalation of the conflict.75

   University of GroningenGain and loss frames in bilateral negotiationDreu, Carsten Karel Willem deIMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite fromit. Please check the document version below.Document VersionPublisher's PDF, also known as Version of recordPublication date:1993Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research databaseCitation for published version (APA):Dreu, C. K. W. D. (1993). Gain and loss frames in bilateral negotiation: concession aersion following theadoption of other's communicated frame. s.n.CopyrightOther than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of theauthor(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license.More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.Take-down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediatelyand investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons thenumber of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.Download date: 03-06-2022SummaryThis dissertation deals with negotiation behavior as a function of the negotiators'frame -- their conception of their potential own outcomes as gains or as losses(Bazerman, L983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Negotiators with a gain frame seetheir potential own outcomes in positive terms and evaluate their concessions asdecreases in their gains. Negotiators with a loss frame, in contrast, see theirpotential own outcomes in negative lerms and evaluate their concessions asincreases in their losses (Bazerman, 1983; Kahneman, L992).A review of research dealing with effects of the <lwn gain or loss frame onthe negotiator's own cognition and behavior shows that because losses are moreaversive than equivalent gains are pleasing, negotiators with a loss frame haverelatively stronger concession aversion. Consequently, loss frame negotiatorsdemand more, concede less and settle less easy than negotiators with a gain frame(Carnevale, Gentile & De Dreu, 1992;De Dreu, L992; Kahneman, 1992).In an attempt to augment this past research, a more interpersonal perspectiveon frames is proposed. It is assumed that (a) following iaformation search priorto negotiation, negotiators may have foreknowledge about their opponent'sreference outcome and concomitant gain or loss frame (cf. Russo & Schoemaker,1989), and (b) during negotiation, disputants may exchange information abouttheir own frame: they may communicate their frame (cf. Kahneman, 1992; Neale& Bazerman, L985, 1991). No prior research investigated the impact offoreknowledge about the opposing negotiator's frame, or dealt with the effects ofthe opponent's communicated frame.The primary focus of the laboratory experiments reported in Chapter 2, 3and 4 was on the negotiator's own cognition and behavior as a function of ownframe, opponent's communicated frame, and their interactions. In computer-simulated buyer-seller negotiations, the subject was always the seller and was ledto believe that s/he negotiated the transaction of three issues with another subjectswho assumed the role of buyer. In fact, the buyer was a preprogrammedcomputer. Subjects either negotiated net profit (own gain frame), or expensesthat would cut into their gross outcome (loss frame); the objective outcomes wereidentical in both conditions. The opponent's communicated frame wasmanipulated by messages the buyer sent to the subject on each round of thenegotiation (six in total). In the other's communicated gain frame condition, thebuyer sent messages evaluating the buyer's own outcomes as gains (e.g., "Thisconcession means a big decrease in my gains"), whereas the messages evaluatedthe buyer's own outcomes as losses in the opponent's communicated loss framecondition (e.g., "This concession means a big increase in my losses"). The(preprogrammed) buyer always started the negotiation with a first offer, and aframe-related message, whereupon the subject responded with a counter-offerand, if s/he wanted, a written message. This procedure continued for six rounds,I - )Gain and Loss Frames in Bilateral Nesotiationwhereupon the negotiation was interrupted and a questionnaire was administered.Based on the assumption that negotiators reciprocate other's comnrunication(cf. Putnam & Jones, 1982) and converge toward simiiar definitions of theirsituations (Giles & Smith, 1979; Lewicki & Litterer, L985), the frame adoptionhypothesis predicted that negotiators adopt other's communicated frame. Hence,other's communicated loss frame induces a loss frame with its concomitant strongconcession aversion, whereas other's communicated gain frame induces a gainframe with its concomitant weak concession aversion, low demands and largeconcessions. Because loss framed negotiators are more focused on their ownoutcomes than gain framed negotiators, they may be less sensitive to theopponent's features, characteristics and behaviors (De Dreu, Emans and Van deVliert, 1992a; De Dreu, Lualhati & McCusker, in press; cf. Taylor, 1991). Hence,the predicted frame adoption was expected to occur especially when negotiatorsthemselves have a gain rather than loss frame.The results of the research reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 yielded goodsupport for the frame adoption hypothesis. Negotiators placed higher demandsand made larger concessions when their opponent communicated a loss framerather than a gain frame. Also, they communicated a loss frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a loss frame, and a gain frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a gain frame. This frame-adoption effect wasas expected stronger when subjects themselves had a gain rather than loss frame.Also, as shown in Chapter 4, when opponent's communicated frame wasincongruent with foreknowledge about other's frame (gain--loss or loss--gain), theeffects of other's communicated frame dissipated. This suggests that the frameadoption effect is due to central and systematic rather than peripheral andheuristic processing of other's communicated frame.The studies reported in Chapter 3 dealt with the relationship betweencommunicated frames reflecting the evaluation of the own outcomes, andcommunicated cooperativeness or competitiveness, reflecting the interpersonal goalsthe communicator pursues (cf. Rubin & Brown, 1975). In Study 2, it was foundthat the negotiators' frame is indeed reflected in their communicated frame, aswell as in their communicated cooperativeness, but that the relation between thelatter two variables was nonsignificant. Study 3 examined whether the frameadoption effect was independent of the opponent's communicatedcooperativeness. Results showed that opponent's communicated frame affectsbehavior as predicted in the frame adoption hypothesis, but did not affect thenegotiator's own communicated cooperativeness. Other's communicatedcooperativeness, in contrast, affected the own communicated cooperativeness butnot the own communicated frame. It is concluded that the communicated framedealing with the perception of own outcom€s is independent of the communicatedcooperativeness dealing with the interpersonal relationship.In the experinlarger than equivawould loom largerincrease other's lrdecrease other's gawhen the opponenlliterature (Carnevcooperative the otframe), the highermismatching). Thtthe other appear ngain frame. It is crframe makes the oTaken togethean interpersonal prthat because lossenegotiators are inflthe other's commuoutlined in the pr,negotiators often tr(Neale & Bazermavery counter-prodropponent, and enconcessions. Conrand may lead to er1 ALSummaryIn the experiment in Chapter 4 it was also predicted that because losses loomlarger than equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), other's concessionswould loom larger when the other has a loss frame (and other's concessionsincrease other's losses), rather than a gain frame (and other's concessionsdecrease other's gains). Hence, the opponent would be seen as more cooperativewhen the opponent has a loss rather than a gain frame. Following the negotiationliterature (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), it was also predicted that the morecooperative the other was seen (in the case of other's loss rather than gainframe), the higher the own demands and the smaller the own concessions (i.e.,mismatching). The results supported both suppositions: other's loss frame madethe other appear more cooperative, and led to higher own demands than other'sgain frame. It is concluded that foreknowledge about the opponent's gain or lossframe makes the other appear less, or more cooperative, respectively.Taken together, this dissertation underscores the validity and importance ofan interpersonal perspective on negotiator frame. The studies consistently showthat because losses loom larger and are more aversive than equivalent gains,negotiators are influenced by their own frame, foreknowledge about other's frame,the other's communicated frame, and their interactions. Given the conclusionsoutlined in the preceding paragraph, it is interesting to note that professionalnegotiators often try to convince their opponent that they have a loss perspective(Neale & Bazerman,1991). This dissertation shows that such a strategy might bevery counter-productive. Conveying a loss frame induces a loss frame in theopponent, and enhances other's tendency to mismatch one's apparent largerconcessions. Conveying a loss frame thus increases other's concession aversionand may lead to escalation rather than de-escalation of the conflict.75

   University of GroningenGain and loss frames in bilateral negotiationDreu, Carsten Karel Willem deIMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite fromit. Please check the document version below.Document VersionPublisher's PDF, also known as Version of recordPublication date:1993Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research databaseCitation for published version (APA):Dreu, C. K. W. D. (1993). Gain and loss frames in bilateral negotiation: concession aersion following theadoption of other's communicated frame. s.n.CopyrightOther than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of theauthor(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license.More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.Take-down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediatelyand investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons thenumber of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.Download date: 08-06-2022SummaryThis dissertation deals with negotiation behavior as a function of the negotiators'frame -- their conception of their potential own outcomes as gains or as losses(Bazerman, L983; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Negotiators with a gain frame seetheir potential own outcomes in positive terms and evaluate their concessions asdecreases in their gains. Negotiators with a loss frame, in contrast, see theirpotential own outcomes in negative lerms and evaluate their concessions asincreases in their losses (Bazerman, 1983; Kahneman, L992).A review of research dealing with effects of the <lwn gain or loss frame onthe negotiator's own cognition and behavior shows that because losses are moreaversive than equivalent gains are pleasing, negotiators with a loss frame haverelatively stronger concession aversion. Consequently, loss frame negotiatorsdemand more, concede less and settle less easy than negotiators with a gain frame(Carnevale, Gentile & De Dreu, 1992;De Dreu, L992; Kahneman, 1992).In an attempt to augment this past research, a more interpersonal perspectiveon frames is proposed. It is assumed that (a) following iaformation search priorto negotiation, negotiators may have foreknowledge about their opponent'sreference outcome and concomitant gain or loss frame (cf. Russo & Schoemaker,1989), and (b) during negotiation, disputants may exchange information abouttheir own frame: they may communicate their frame (cf. Kahneman, 1992; Neale& Bazerman, L985, 1991). No prior research investigated the impact offoreknowledge about the opposing negotiator's frame, or dealt with the effects ofthe opponent's communicated frame.The primary focus of the laboratory experiments reported in Chapter 2, 3and 4 was on the negotiator's own cognition and behavior as a function of ownframe, opponent's communicated frame, and their interactions. In computer-simulated buyer-seller negotiations, the subject was always the seller and was ledto believe that s/he negotiated the transaction of three issues with another subjectswho assumed the role of buyer. In fact, the buyer was a preprogrammedcomputer. Subjects either negotiated net profit (own gain frame), or expensesthat would cut into their gross outcome (loss frame); the objective outcomes wereidentical in both conditions. The opponent's communicated frame wasmanipulated by messages the buyer sent to the subject on each round of thenegotiation (six in total). In the other's communicated gain frame condition, thebuyer sent messages evaluating the buyer's own outcomes as gains (e.g., "Thisconcession means a big decrease in my gains"), whereas the messages evaluatedthe buyer's own outcomes as losses in the opponent's communicated loss framecondition (e.g., "This concession means a big increase in my losses"). The(preprogrammed) buyer always started the negotiation with a first offer, and aframe-related message, whereupon the subject responded with a counter-offerand, if s/he wanted, a written message. This procedure continued for six rounds,I - )Gain and Loss Frames in Bilateral Nesotiationwhereupon the negotiation was interrupted and a questionnaire was administered.Based on the assumption that negotiators reciprocate other's comnrunication(cf. Putnam & Jones, 1982) and converge toward simiiar definitions of theirsituations (Giles & Smith, 1979; Lewicki & Litterer, L985), the frame adoptionhypothesis predicted that negotiators adopt other's communicated frame. Hence,other's communicated loss frame induces a loss frame with its concomitant strongconcession aversion, whereas other's communicated gain frame induces a gainframe with its concomitant weak concession aversion, low demands and largeconcessions. Because loss framed negotiators are more focused on their ownoutcomes than gain framed negotiators, they may be less sensitive to theopponent's features, characteristics and behaviors (De Dreu, Emans and Van deVliert, 1992a; De Dreu, Lualhati & McCusker, in press; cf. Taylor, 1991). Hence,the predicted frame adoption was expected to occur especially when negotiatorsthemselves have a gain rather than loss frame.The results of the research reported in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 yielded goodsupport for the frame adoption hypothesis. Negotiators placed higher demandsand made larger concessions when their opponent communicated a loss framerather than a gain frame. Also, they communicated a loss frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a loss frame, and a gain frame more frequentwhen their opponent communicated a gain frame. This frame-adoption effect wasas expected stronger when subjects themselves had a gain rather than loss frame.Also, as shown in Chapter 4, when opponent's communicated frame wasincongruent with foreknowledge about other's frame (gain--loss or loss--gain), theeffects of other's communicated frame dissipated. This suggests that the frameadoption effect is due to central and systematic rather than peripheral andheuristic processing of other's communicated frame.The studies reported in Chapter 3 dealt with the relationship betweencommunicated frames reflecting the evaluation of the own outcomes, andcommunicated cooperativeness or competitiveness, reflecting the interpersonal goalsthe communicator pursues (cf. Rubin & Brown, 1975). In Study 2, it was foundthat the negotiators' frame is indeed reflected in their communicated frame, aswell as in their communicated cooperativeness, but that the relation between thelatter two variables was nonsignificant. Study 3 examined whether the frameadoption effect was independent of the opponent's communicatedcooperativeness. Results showed that opponent's communicated frame affectsbehavior as predicted in the frame adoption hypothesis, but did not affect thenegotiator's own communicated cooperativeness. Other's communicatedcooperativeness, in contrast, affected the own communicated cooperativeness butnot the own communicated frame. It is concluded that the communicated framedealing with the perception of own outcom€s is independent of the communicatedcooperativeness dealing with the interpersonal relationship.In the experinlarger than equivawould loom largerincrease other's lrdecrease other's gawhen the opponenlliterature (Carnevcooperative the otframe), the highermismatching). Thtthe other appear ngain frame. It is crframe makes the oTaken togethean interpersonal prthat because lossenegotiators are inflthe other's commuoutlined in the pr,negotiators often tr(Neale & Bazermavery counter-prodropponent, and enconcessions. Conrand may lead to er1 ALSummaryIn the experiment in Chapter 4 it was also predicted that because losses loomlarger than equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), other's concessionswould loom larger when the other has a loss frame (and other's concessionsincrease other's losses), rather than a gain frame (and other's concessionsdecrease other's gains). Hence, the opponent would be seen as more cooperativewhen the opponent has a loss rather than a gain frame. Following the negotiationliterature (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), it was also predicted that the morecooperative the other was seen (in the case of other's loss rather than gainframe), the higher the own demands and the smaller the own concessions (i.e.,mismatching). The results supported both suppositions: other's loss frame madethe other appear more cooperative, and led to higher own demands than other'sgain frame. It is concluded that foreknowledge about the opponent's gain or lossframe makes the other appear less, or more cooperative, respectively.Taken together, this dissertation underscores the validity and importance ofan interpersonal perspective on negotiator frame. The studies consistently showthat because losses loom larger and are more aversive than equivalent gains,negotiators are influenced by their own frame, foreknowledge about other's frame,the other's communicated frame, and their interactions. Given the conclusionsoutlined in the preceding paragraph, it is interesting to note that professionalnegotiators often try to convince their opponent that they have a loss perspective(Neale & Bazerman,1991). This dissertation shows that such a strategy might bevery counter-productive. Conveying a loss frame induces a loss frame in theopponent, and enhances other's tendency to mismatch one's apparent largerconcessions. Conveying a loss frame thus increases other's concession aversionand may lead to escalation rather than de-escalation of the conflict.75

Dreu, Carsten Karel Willem de,

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Gain and loss frames in bilateral negotiation: concession aersion following the adoption of other's communicated frame

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Gain and loss frames in bilateral negotiation:concession aersion following the adoption of other's communicated frame

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