Sul significato dell’argomento aπὸ τοῦ νοεῖν del De ideis di Aristotele (Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph. 81, 25-82, 6)

Abstract

Nel presente contributo si discute l\u2019argomento del \u3a0\u3b5\u3c1\u1f76 \u1f30\u3b4\u3b5\u1ff6\u3bd aristotelico noto come \uabargomento dal pensare\ubb (\u1f00\u3c0\u1f78 \u3c4\u3bf\u1fe6 \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd), vale a dire l\u2019argomento che afferma che le forme esistono perch\ue9 possiamo pensare cose che sono e non sono particolari anche dopo che si sono corrotte. Si mostra qui come Aristotele muova non una, ma due obiezioni a tale argomento. Tali obiezioni si fondano su un significato di \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd differente da quello attribuito ai platonici. Questo, infatti, prevede capacit\ue0 di astrazione, mentre le critiche di Aristotele si limitano al pensiero di individui. Gail Fine ha distinto un significato broad del verbo \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd (i.e. il pensiero genericamente inteso) da un significato high del verbo (i.e. la forma pi\uf9 alta di pensiero in senso tecnico). Su questa base ha sostenuto che l\u2019argomento attribuito ai platonici sia diverso dal secondo degli \uabargomenti dalle scienze\ubb perch\ue9 adotta un significato broad di \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd. Io sostengo invece che l\u2019argomento \u1f00\u3c0\u1f78 \u3c4\u3bf\u1fe6 \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd \ue8 differente dal secondo degli \uabargomenti dalle scienze\ubb, nonostante adotti un significato high di \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd. Infine, si prende in esame la connessione tra la memoria e le forme attribuita da Aristotele ai platonici, mostrando come si tratti verosimilmente di un argomento extra e intra-academico non attribuibile direttamente a Platone.On the meaning of the argument of Aristotle's De ideis (Alex Aphrod in Metaph. 81, 25-82, 6) In my paper I aim to discuss the so-called \uabargument from the thought\ubb (\u1f00\u3c0\u1f78 \u3c4\u3bf\u1fe6 \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd) exposed in Aristotle\u2019s \u3a0\u3b5\u3c1\u1f76 \u1f30\u3b4\u3b5\u1ff6\u3bd, i.e. the argument according to which the Forms exist because we are able to think things that exist and that are not particulars after they get corrupted as well. In my paper I argue that Aristotle offers not just a single but instead a twofold refutation of this argument. Furthermore, Aristotle\u2019s criticism is based on a different meaning of \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd from the one which is ascribed to the Platonists by Aristotle himself. Indeed, Plato\u2019s use implies the ability to abstract non-particular items, whereas Aristotle\u2019s criticism is based on the understanding of the act of thinking as thinking of individuals. Gail Fine operates a distinction between a broad meaning of \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd (i.e. the act of thinking unspecifically understood) and a high-level meaning (i.e. the higher form of thought in a rather technical, speculative sense). On this basis she claims that the argument ascribed to the Platonists is different from the second of the \uabarguments from the sciences\ubb because it is based on a broad meaning of \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd. In my opinion, however, the argument \u1f00\u3c0\u1f78 \u3c4\u3bf\u1fe6 \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd is different from the second among the \uabarguments from the sciences\ubb despite its being based on a high-level meaning of \u3bd\u3bf\u3b5\u1fd6\u3bd. In the final part of my paper, I shall discuss the connection between the Forms and the memory, something which is attributed by Aristotle to the Platonists: my aim is to show that this was most probably both an intra- and an extra-Academic argument, although it cannot be attributed directly to Plato