La presente tesi propone un\u2019articolata riflessione sui vari modelli di sentenza concretamente rinvenibili nell\u2019esperienza giuridica dell\u2019Europa occidentale, dei quali viene offerta la seguente tipologia: (a) il modello di sentenza come \u201cdecisione parzialmente motivata\u201d, proprio dell\u2019esperienza romana; (b) il modello di sentenza come \u201cdecisione non motivata\u201d, proprio dell\u2019esperienza pre-moderna; (c) il modello di sentenza come \u201cdecisione motivata\u201d, che segna il passaggio dall\u2019et\ue0 pre-moderna a quella moderna; (d) e il suo immediato sviluppo, rappresentato dal modello di sentenza come \u201cdecisione necessariamente motivata\u201d. In particolare, la tesi si sofferma sull\u2019analisi dei due opposti modelli: (b) della sentenza come \u201cdecisione non motivata\u201d e (c) della sentenza come \u201cdecisione motivata\u201d, dei quali vengono indagate le ragioni giustificative (o giustificazioni), corrispondenti, rispettivamente, ad altrettante risposte alle domande: \u201cperch\ue9 non motivare la sentenza?\u201d e \u201cperch\ue9 motivare la sentenza?\u201d. Scopo della tesi \ue8 mostrare che le \u201cragioni per motivare\u201d la sentenza \u2013 che vengono identificate nei principi: (A) di legittimazione \u201ctecnica\u201d del giudice, (B) di sindacabilit\ue0 (o controllabilit\ue0) della sentenza e (C) di separazione dei poteri \u2013 sono opposte e speculari alle \u201cragioni per non motivare\u201d la sentenza \u2013 che vengono invece identificate nei principi: A) di autorit\ue0, B) di in-sindacabilit\ue0 (o in-controllabilit\ue0) della sentenza e C) di concentrazione dei poteri.The subject of the present thesis is an articulated consideration on the various models of Court judgment, concretely identifiable in the juridical experience of Western Europe and of which the following types of sentence models are given: (a) the model of Court judgment where the grounds for the ruling are partially disclosed, specific to the Roman experience; (b) the model of Court judgment where the grounds for the ruling are not disclosed, specific to the pre-modern experience; (c) the model of Court judgment where the grounds for the ruling are disclosed, which points out the transition from pre-modern age to the modern age; (d) and its linked development, represented by the model of Court judgment where the grounds for the ruling are necessarily disclosed. The thesis focuses, in particular, on the analysis of two opposite models of Court judgment: (b) where the grounds for the ruling are not disclosed, specific to the pre-modern experience and (c) where the grounds for the ruling are disclosed. Within this scope, the corresponding reasons will be investigated to answer respectively these questions: \u201cWhy the grounds for the ruling should not be disclosed?\u201d and \u201cWhy the grounds for the ruling should be disclosed?\u201d. The purpose of the thesis is to introduce that the \u201creasons to give the grounds for the ruling\u201d are opposite and specular to the \u201creasons not to give the grounds for the ruling\u201d. In fact, the \u201creasons to give the grounds for the ruling\u201d are identifiable in: (A) the principle of judge\u2019s \u201ctechnical\u201d legitimacy; (B) the principle of the questionable (or controllable) nature of the Court judgment; (C) the principle of separation of powers. On the contrary, the \u201creasons not to give the grounds for the ruling\u201d are identifiable in: (A) the principle of authority; (B) the principle of non-questionable (or non-controllable) nature of the Court judgment; (C) the principle of concentration of powers
