Charalambous, Giorgos

Ioannou, Gregoris

English

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Fragmented we fight: what's Left in Greece in 2015?

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2/12/2019 Fragmented we fight: what’s Left in Greece in 2015? | openDemocracyhttps://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fragmented-we-fight 1/6Custom SeaopenDemocracy oDR oD-UK oD 50.50 democraciaAbierta Shine A Light Transformation MoreFragmented we fight: what’s Left inGreece in 2015?GIORGOS CHARALAMBOUS and GREGORIS IOANNOU 18 September2015The openings produced by the Syriza phenomenon have been closed bySyriza itself. What, then, is the current state of the Greek political left withyet another national vote pending? SYRIZA President Alexis Tsipras addresses supporters in Patras. Menelaos Mich/Demotix.All rights reserved.In the study of society and politics in contemporary Europe, Greece lends itselfas a case of dynamism, growth, realignment, recomposition, fissure andfragmentation in the political arena. Over the last few years social contentionhas increased, producing an overhaul of the political system. This comes in thecontext of the deep economic crisis and its brutal neoliberal managementthrough a variety of austerity measures that have devastated the overwhelmingmajority of the Greek society.In this article we focus on the developments of parties in Greece the left of thepolitical spectrum and attempt an analysis of the conditions and dynamics in thecurrent conjuncture. The Left constitutes an important parameter not only forthe political system but also for the social movements and for the shaping of thedominant ideological frame – perhaps more so today due to the inherently fluidstate of affairs.About  Submit Login or RegisterAbout NorthAfricaWestAsia openGlobalRights Human rights and the internet CanEuropeMakeIt? BeyondSlavery2/12/2019 Fragmented we fight: what’s Left in Greece in 2015? | openDemocracyhttps://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fragmented-we-fight 2/6Syriza’s experimentSyriza’s communication strategy under Tsipras’ leadership since 2008, andespecially after 2010, was one premised on the potential of left governmentalityand the shift from an oppositional imaginary into a ruling one. This was anexperiment immersed in uncertainty from the very beginning. Everything was atstake –Syriza’s cohesion, its leadership’s popularity, the coercive capacity of theclientelistic Greek state, and the Troika’s and the EU’s true flexibility.The latter was a key expectation in Syriza’s strategising and one on which itsprogrammatic positions were crafted. The slogan ‘No sacrifice for the Euro, nodelusion for the drachma’ was quite popular back then but gradually itdisappeared from the vocabulary of both members and officials.Challenging the dominant political paradigm, which has its origins inSynaspismos affirming that the solution had to be sought within the confines ofthe single currency, remained marginal within the party. Yet, the nucleus of theEurozone - Germany, France and the European Commission - stayed firmlyattached to the agenda they were warning Tsipras about months before he wonthe election of January 2015.Potential allies, namely Italy, proved unstable, unable and unwilling to push forless strictness in dealing with Greece. The balance of power within theEurozone and between the EU side and the IMF side of the Troika could not beshifted simply based on Syriza’s growing domestic and pan-European appeal.On none of the three main axes of the negotiations - the debt, structural reformsand budget balances – did the lenders balk. Both their ideological dogmas andtheir interests remained deeply entrenched and inelastic.Syriza had of course travelled a long distance from early 2012 to early 2015:diluting its political positioning on a variety of issues, flattening out the edges ofits slogans, downplaying the more radical elements of its policy proposals andshelving some of them altogether in the context of a general drift to the right,while preparing to take over executive power.This continued after its electoral victory in January 2015 when its inability orreluctance to implement its programme was covered by symbolic moves and byfully prioritising the negotiations with the international lenders. In a sense, theseeds of the eventual capitulation in July were sown in the previous years andwatered in the previous months.Syriza gradually shifted towards the model of a ‘normal’ party, a broker party,which acted as a mediator between diverse interests. Within Syriza a corenucleus of leading officials designed and implemented government strategy,without systematic consultation with the party organs. Decision-making becameincreasingly centralised.Local self-organisation gave way to hierarchical institutions of power and thepedagogical possibilities that characterised the party’s relations with themovements since the late 1990s were subsumed into careful balancing actsbetween the radical segments of the party, public opinion and the exigencies ofpower. Thereby, the drift of Syriza to the right between 2012 and 2015 was alsoescorted by demobilisation and the shift of contentious politics from the social tothe political field – from the streets to the ballot box.Various commentators and activists had warned about this since approximately2012, but attention remained focused not on the problem of Syriza but on thatof Syriza taking power and exercising it in a radical way. Yet, the latter concernis largely dependent on the former’s appropriate resolution. For all itsmomentum Syriza was in 2015 still a new party, within which neither significantcohesion that could run the test of incumbency nor programmatic clarity thatwould suffice for full confrontation existed.Stathis Gourgouris described Syriza as ‘a loose, self-contradictory, andinternally antagonistic coalition of leftist thought and practice, very muchdependent on the capacity of social movements of all kinds, thoroughlydecentralized and driven by the activism of solidarity networks ...’.Even if this description held in its entirety at some point in time, the problemwith Syriza is that, once in government and even before, it gradually stoppedbeing all of the above. Its looseness disappeared as key issues in governmentpolicy was limited to a core circle of cabinet ministers.2/12/2019 Fragmented we fight: what’s Left in Greece in 2015? | openDemocracyhttps://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fragmented-we-fight 3/6The internally antagonistic coalitions of leftist thought and practice turned into adistinction between the majority led by Tsipras and a minority expressedpartially by the Left Platform. Whilst Tsipras and insisted on keeping Greecewithin the Eurozone the Left Platform hesitantly posed the Eurozone issue asan open question rather than as a finalised position but nevertheless chose notto argue in support of Grexit.Any sort of dialectical interaction between the positions and assessments of thevarious tendencies inside Syriza, even if these ceased to be institutionalised in2013, was put on hold. All organisational and ideological processes that wouldlead to further development paused along with it.The party was no longer the main issue; running the state was. For a new partywithout highly developed structures and the lack of internal cohesionmasqueraded by abolishing the system of tendencies, running the state is atricky business. The practice of having those working for the party notparticipating in government may have worked in achieving the continuance ofSyriza on the ground but it also resulted to the ground’s detachment from theparty in public office.Many features portrayed by Syriza since February 2015 had previously beenexhibited by AKEL, the first case of a left-wing party heading the government inthe EU and the Eurozone. In both cases, executive responsibility wasaccompanied by ideological moderation, consecutive compromises and populistrhetoric that was disproportional to the party’s traditional constituencies.The leadership of both parties premised their potential to govern on the basis oftheir more egalitarian programme based on the possibility of negotiatingeffectively within the ambit of Eurozone mechanisms, institutions, politicaldynamics and geopolitical surroundings. In both cases they failed.If AKEL’s case did not affect the rest of the European radical left, themainstream drift of Syriza has done damage already. It hurt the European anti-austerity movements and parties like Podemos, whose claims – that theEurozone’s confines are adjustable – and tactics – to remain focused on aconsensual mood and pursue institutional negotiations at the EU level – areinspired by assumptions previously defended by Syriza.Cyprus may be viewed as too small to matter, the crisis hadn’t arrived whenAKEL assumed power and the Cypriot communists never symbolised themovement-like dynamism of the anti-austerity march that Syriza contributedtowards creating. As for Greece, the question of concern should not be if Syriza will be radicallyleft-wing but, rather, if it will attract individuals and collectivities that are.Although, in theory, it is simply impossible for Syriza to truly represent at thesame time those who stand to benefit from the third memorandum and austerityand those who stand to lose from them, Pasok was able to do so in the period2009-2012.Syriza’s new identity may not be at stake at this point – its Pasokification seemsinevitable – so if the party retains radical left activists, trade unionists, membersand voters within its ranks, then it is stealing away from even the softestresistance to more austerity.The referendum and its aftermathThe referendum was of critical significance and its impact on Greek society andpolitics has not yet been exhausted. In societal terms, it awoke parts of themovement and it has also allowed large segments of society to return topolitics, to develop positions and express them in public.In political terms, it affected various components of the party system: change inthe leadership of New Democracy, with an opening up of the question of thatparty’s orientation, the establishment of bridges between Syriza and Antarsya -as the No campaign was largely conducted by rank and file left-wing activistsacross the board and the revelation of To Potami as an ultra-neoliberal forcehaving to shed any remaining centrist pretenses.Above all, it allowed for the crystallisation of the position of Eurozone exit withinthe ranks of Syriza and now Popular Unity. For the first time, a significantportion of former Syriza cadres and activists are explicitly calling for withdrawalfrom the Eurozone and have formulated a political programme based on thisfundamental goal. It seems that it had previously been difficult for them to2/12/2019 Fragmented we fight: what’s Left in Greece in 2015? | openDemocracyhttps://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fragmented-we-fight 4/6project this position based on speculation. Having to face the lenders’ruthlessness proved to be detrimental for the next step in left-wingEuroscepticism.Indeed, since the referendum the underlying cleavage of divisions within the leftconcerns above all the issue of European integration. Syriza is arguing againstthe viability of a Eurozone exit and is willing to succumb to austerity at least forthe moment; the position of Popular Unity projects Eurozone exit as the onlyprogressive solution and, whilst willing to discuss EU membership, insists onpractices that are as consensual as possible; Antarsya is calling for a rupturewith both the Eurozone and the EU without concern for consensus and on thebasis of a radical transition towards socialism; and the KKE insists on theimmediate and complete socialisation of the means of production outside of theEU.Although the position of Antarsya, along with some other fringe left-winggroups, is closer to that of the KKE rather than Popular Unity, theirexpectations, discussions and aborted attempts for common action have so farbeen orientated towards Popular Unity rather than KKE.There is an ideological reason as well as a practical one for this. The ideologicalreason is the Trotskyist emphasis on a ‘transitional’ programme of actionwhereby advanced reformist demands are articulated by revolutionaries whoexpect radicalisation as these demands cannot be accommodated in thecurrent conjuncture by the bourgeois state.The practical reason concerns the historic isolationism of the KKE, a legacy ofboth its Stalinist tradition and its own mode of operation, which precludes anyalliance with other political formations. These two factors have been relevant forsome time now and the stance of KKE in the referendum has strengthenedthem further.The KKE’s decision to call for a blank vote bordered on narcissisticsectarianism, whereby the party, its structures, its ideology and its programmeare not open to any kind of questioning, amendment or postponement. Theissue was misidentified as an ideological rather than as a political one.That is why in real political terms, the KKE failed ‘to be there’, ready andcapable of mobilising and leading the left after the capitulation of the Syrizaleadership. It was such a huge opportunity that was missed, that one cannot butwonder if the KKE ever aimed at leading individuals and organisations that donot yet have a fully developed class-consciousness and are hesitant as to thepotential for direct confrontation.Both within and outside parliament, the KKE has spent enormous resourcesvilifying the whole of Syriza, and more so its radical-left elements. In this light, itis as if the Communist Party as a shared experience rests on the refutation ofany other kind of left-wing experiment, even ones that could be potentially wonover to the party’s perspective on many issues. Above all, KKE views itselfdiachronically as the only truly revolutionary force. This is not based on anempirical assessment of the other left wing forces but more importantlyconstitutes a monist ontological premise that there can only be one vanguard ofthe working class.Inasmuch as electoral potential is concerned, Popular Unity is currently thefront-runner in the attempt to revive Syriza’s popular radicalism. Nevertheless,its current appeal, weaknesses and opportunities have been delimited bymistakes made while its leaders were still members of Syriza.The decision to form a party may not have been an erratic one in the sense thata maturation process preceded the establishment of Popular Unity, time-wise,however, this maturation period was short. Many of those now leading or activeinside Popular Unity had no idea they would soon form a new party before thereferendum and had to face the confusion of a collective existential crisis.In any case, trusting the government too much, not preparing for this optionand, in essence, for capitulation, Syriza’s left delayed significantly a left turn andthis now carries significant costs for the anti-austerity forces; it limits itscredibility, organisational cohesion and programmatic articulation.It is a medium-term matter whether Popular Unity can operate a different andradical signifying framework of political action. This is primarily, but notexclusively, an issue of party organisation. As points of command are2/12/2019 Fragmented we fight: what’s Left in Greece in 2015? | openDemocracyhttps://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fragmented-we-fight 5/6SUBSCRIBEGet weekly updates on EuropeThe Can Europe make it? debate on openDemocracy bringsyou a thoughtful weekly email of economic, political, social andcultural developments from the storm-tossed continent.Your email addressestablished within the party structure so ideological tendencies crystallise intopolitical trends. The formation process of Popular Unity is indicative of the clay feet that theparty will soon be standing on without a 25 strong parliamentary group. This isnot an entity that is actively supported by the movements of which it is a part, asthe movements themselves are still at awe, in total disarray and with the senseof defeat.Its economic programme, one based on the research and argumentation of ahandful of economists, is full of contradictions, simplifications and ‘constructiveambiguities’. Clearly, there is still an amorphous space inside Popular Unity andin electoral terms this translates into an inclination not to push public opinion toofar by suggesting two steps forward instead of one. This is still a project in the making. It must not therefore be viewed as a ‘finalproduct’ that will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future or that will not besubject to internal dynamics and antagonisms or the developments in relation tothe other forces of the left.This is both the end of an era and the closing of a window of opportunity for theleft. On the one hand it experientially revealed the limitations of a systemic fight,at least in what concerns the Eurozone, and it also exposed neoliberalfundamentalism in all its nakedness. In the process of doing so, the referendum has repoliticised Greek society,opened up questions of EU membership and currency type. On the other hand,the third memorandum signed by Tsipras signifies political surrender and. moreimportantly, ideological defeat for the left.Whether this setback proves temporary or long lasting remains, of course, anopen question that depends on a series of factors both in relation to the socialreception of the new austerity package in Greece, as well as regarding thedevelopments in the economies and societies of other European countries.The social and political openings produced by the Syriza phenomenon havebeen closed by Syriza itself. Yet political processes such as the rise of an anti-austerity force from obscurity to power and political events such as the defianceby a bankrupt state’s citizens for the Troika’s final offer, are now historicalprecedents. They are present and ready to be taken on by new forces in searchof signifiers for rupture.If you enjoyed this article then please consider liking Can Europe Make it? onFacebook and following us on Twitter @oD_Europe  Related ArticlesWhy I am standing as a candidate for To Potami in the upcoming Greekelection PAVLOS ELEFTHERIADIS 2/12/2019 Fragmented we fight: what’s Left in Greece in 2015? | openDemocracyhttps://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fragmented-we-fight 6/6The Syriza problem: radical democracy and left governmentality inGreece STATHIS GOURGOURIS This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0International licence. If you have any queries about republishing please contact us.Please check individual images for licensing details.We encourage anyone to comment, please consult the  oD commenting guidelines if you have any questions.

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Fragmented we fight: what's Left in Greece in 2015?

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