This paper presents a computational approach to evaluate the resilience of
electricity Distribution Networks (DNs) to cyber-physical failures. In our
model, we consider an attacker who targets multiple DN components to maximize
the loss of the DN operator. We consider two types of operator response: (i)
Coordinated emergency response; (ii) Uncoordinated autonomous disconnects,
which may lead to cascading failures. To evaluate resilience under response
(i), we solve a Bilevel Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Program which is
computationally challenging due to mixed-integer variables in the inner problem
and non-convex constraints. Our solution approach is based on the Generalized
Benders Decomposition method, which achieves a reasonable tradeoff between
computational time and solution accuracy. Our approach involves modifying the
Benders cut based on structural insights on power flow over radial DNs. We
evaluate DN resilience under response (ii) by sequentially computing autonomous
component disconnects due to operating bound violations resulting from the
initial attack and the potential cascading failures. Our approach helps
estimate the gain in resilience under response (i), relative to (ii)