We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum
optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our
Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to
one player (incomplete information feature), but known to the other one
(asymmetric information feature). We formulate the problem and reduce it to a
fully Markovian setup where the uninformed player optimises over stopping times
and the informed one uses randomised stopping times in order to hide their
informational advantage. Then we provide a general verification result which
allows us to find the value of the game and players' optimal strategies by
solving suitable quasi-variational inequalities with some non-standard
constraints. Finally, we study an example with linear payoffs, in which an
explicit solution of the corresponding quasi-variational inequalities can be
obtained.Comment: 31 pages, 5 figures, small changes in the terminology from game
theor
