Interpersonal understanding is rooted in social engagement. The question is: How? What features of intersubjective coordination are essential for the growth of concepts about the mind, and how does development proceed on this basis? Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) offer many telling insights, but their account begs questions about the earliest forms of self-other linkage and differentiation, especially as mediated by processes of identification

Hobson, RP

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Behavioral and Brain Scienceshttp://journals.cambridge.org/BBSAdditional services for Behavioral and Brain Sciences:Email alerts: Click hereSubscriptions: Click hereCommercial reprints: Click hereTerms of use : Click hereUnderstanding self and otherR. Peter HobsonBehavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 27 / Issue 01 / February 2004, pp 109 ­ 110DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X04360036, Published online: 01 February 2004Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X04360036How to cite this article:R. Peter Hobson (2004). Understanding self and other. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,27, pp 109­110 doi:10.1017/S0140525X04360036Request Permissions : Click hereDownloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/BBS, IP address: 144.82.107.151 on 13 Aug 2012the emergence of a so-called “theory of mind” in young children:theory-theory, simulation, and modularity accounts. They neglect,however, to address how a constructivist account might be relatedto a newer, rapidly maturing, alternative theoretical perspective –the executive function account.The term “executive function” broadly refers to those cognitivefunctions that underlie goal-directed behavior and that arethought to be mediated by the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Welsh et al.1991). A growing number of researchers maintain that gains madein executive function abilities in the preschool years contributesignificantly to theory-of-mind performance (e.g., Carlson &Moses 2001; Carlson et al. 1998; 2002; Frye et al. 1995b; Hala &Russell 2001; Hala et al. 2003; Hughes 1998; Russell 1996; Zelazoet al. 1997). As children increase their capacity to control and di-rect their own actions, they become able to view alternativecourses of action – including actions based on beliefs (Russell1996).In contrast to the theories criticized by C&L, an executive ac-count can readily incorporate the notion of a more gradual onsetof social understanding. Development of both executive controland social understanding begin early and emerge over an ex-tended period of time. Indeed, the precocious performance foundin many “modified” false belief and deception tasks (which the au-thors highlight as increasing personal or social activity) may be ex-plained in terms of reductions in the executive demands of thetasks.To illustrate: typical false belief tasks draw on at least two exec-utive demands: (1) working memory (of where the object was inthe beginning or what the child thought was in a box) combinedwith (2) inhibitory control (inhibit pointing to the spot where theobject is now known to be or reporting what one now knows is re-ally in the box). Recent research has confirmed that those execu-tive tasks that combine both working memory and inhibitory con-trol are most strongly related to theory-of-mind performance(Carlson et al. 2002; Hala et al. 2003). Reducing one or both ofthese executive demands may result in improved performance.For example, Freeman and Lacohée (1995) found that havingchildren “post” a picture of what they thought was in a box helpedthem later to recall their own false belief in a contents task. Al-though personal activity is certainly increased in this version, atthe same time so are the executive demands reduced (in this case,working memory). Similarly, reducing the inhibitory demands ofdeception tasks also results in improved performance (Carlson etal. 1998; Hala & Russell 2001), whereas simply removing the op-ponent – and hence reducing the social demands – does not (Hala& Russell 2001). The reverse pattern is also found. That is, in-creasing the inhibitory demands of theory-of-mind tasks detractsfrom performance (Leslie & Polizzi 1998).Though I use these examples of modified tasks to illustrate thata more gradual onset of social understanding is consistent with anexecutive account, I am not claiming that it is simply information-processing complexities of specific tasks that stand in the way ofyoung children and their supposed theories of mind. Instead, I,and others, suggest that there is a deeper relation between exec-utive function and developing social understanding. Exactly whatthis relation is has yet to be specified. Development of executivefunction may make possible the emergence of a theory of mind(Moses 2001). Alternatively, it may be that a strong relation is con-sistently found between theory of mind and executive control, notbecause one is causally implicated in the other in a linear fashion,but because the two are interdependent in their development.Admittedly, the bulk of the research on the relation between ex-ecutive function and social understanding is of the individual-dif-ferences variety and has not, as yet, wed itself to charting the so-cial interactions the child is surrounded by. In principle, however,the executive and constructivist accounts are not mutually exclu-sive. Interaction with others challenges children’s current execu-tive abilities, and, in Piaget’s terms, adaptation in knowledge struc-tures may result, leading to increased knowledge and flexibility intheir thinking about their own and others’ mental lives. As chil-dren grow in their executive function abilities, they become moreadept at interacting with and understanding others.Introducing executive function ability into the epistemic equa-tion affords a view of the process of development as bidirectional.As has long been maintained by those who adopt a dynamic sys-tems approach (e.g., Bronfenbrenner 1989; Gottlieb 1991; Scarr& McCartney 1983/1984), the characteristics of the child influ-ence the response of the environment just as the environment in-fluences the child. In this vein, children’s executive maturity will,at least in part, influence how their parents respond to them,which in turn will influence and further enhance their developingexecutive control and social understanding.ACKNOWLEDGMENTThe author is supported by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Eco-nomic Research Council, Canada.Understanding self and otherR. Peter HobsonDevelopmental Psychology Research Unit, Tavistock Clinic and UniversityCollege London, London NW3 5BA, United Kingdom. r.Hobson@ucl.ac.ukAbstract: Interpersonal understanding is rooted in social engagement.The question is: How? What features of intersubjective coordination areessential for the growth of concepts about the mind, and how does devel-opment proceed on this basis? Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) offer manytelling insights, but their account begs questions about the earliest formsof self-other linkage and differentiation, especially as mediated byprocesses of identification.The article by Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) is an important cor-rective to contemporary misconceptions about the developmentof interpersonal understanding. The authors analyse distortionsintroduced by individualistic “theory of mind” perspectives thatpurport to show how children might derive concepts (even con-cepts of mind) without appropriate forms of interpersonal en-gagement, and they highlight the equally devastating limitationsof simulationist accounts that presuppose understanding of one’sown mind as a basis for understanding the minds of others. Thearguments they marshal from Wittgenstein and Chapman in par-ticular are, in my view, decisive. As C&L indicate, a theory inwhich social exchanges are constitutive of understanding does notlead to cultural relativism. On the contrary, it is only through in-volvement with others that human beings are in a position to ac-cord objective reality the status it deserves, and only when objec-tive reality is conceived as such do concepts such as “belief” gaina purchase. Moreover, mutual interpersonal relations that entailcommunication and reference vis-à-vis a shared external worldprovide a necessary basis for uniquely human ways of (1) acquir-ing knowledge about that world; (2) understanding what it is to bea person with alternative psychological perspectives on that world;and even (3) thinking symbolically and creatively about peopleand things and constructing concepts with which to think.How, then, should we frame our account of early human devel-opment if we are to elucidate how all this is possible and how de-velopment proceeds from its starting point? Here I wonderwhether C&L are sufficiently radical in their revamping of theory.Consider how concepts of “self” and “other” are integral to con-cepts of mind. There is a paradox at the heart of any attempt toreconcile developmental accounts of self-other understandingthat focus on the individual’s cognitive endowment, on the onehand, and social influences, on the other. The paradox is that anindividual has to have bedrock experience of the social as social inorder to build upon this to construct progressively elaborated un-derstandings of minds as connected and differentiated centres ofconsciousness. Without some primitive modes of experiencing selfas self in relation to others, and of others as others in relation toself, it is difficult to see how concepts of self and other could bederived. (Note: this does not mean that infants, even infants at theCommentary/Carpendale & Lewis: Constructing an understanding of mindBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1 109end of the first year of life, have concepts or “understandings” ofthe mental lives of others.)The direction in which C&L move on this one, is to stress theactivities within which human interaction is embedded, adoptingwhat they call “a relational, action-based perspective” withinwhich communicative interaction also plays an essential role. Yes,but what is the grounding for communication? When the authorsstate that “Children’s social knowledge is based on action” (sect. 3,para. 4), they are in danger of losing the plot. The crux is how in-fants experience the activities and attitudes of self and other in in-terpersonal relations, not merely how they act or interact with oth-ers. C&L refer to the embodied nature of human exchanges, butthey do little to explain how infants are aware of persons as hav-ing a mental as well as physical dimension, and how the nature ofthis awareness is such as to allow for the partitioning into what be-longs to the other and what to the self over successive phases ofdevelopment. What we need to explain, after all, is how a childcomes to understand persons as centres of individual experience,not merely as centres of causality, and how the child’s conceptsabout the different facets of subjective orientation towards theworld (intentions, feelings, wishes, beliefs, and so on) develop inthe early years of life. Alongside this, we need to account for theforms of reflection and thinking about people – oneself as well asothers – that such concepts entail.I think the solution to the conundrum is that humans areequipped with a propensity for forms of role-taking that both linkan individual infant or child or adult with someone else, and at thesame time register the distinctiveness of self and other. At firstsuch role-taking is cognitively unelaborated, not yet amounting tounderstanding: It takes place without pre-existing thought and ina manner that is heavily imbued with emotion. From early in life,children are moved by the attitudes of others: They are drawn toidentify with the psychological stance of a person with whom theyengage. It is through this mechanism that mutual relations withothers vis-à-vis a shared world yield the ability to relate to one’sown mental relations, and with this, creates a kind of mental spacewithin which new forms of thinking are possible. A prime exam-ple of how individuals interiorize the social, Vygotsky-style.There is another sense in which this approach is more radicalthan that of C&L. These authors give weight to the influence ofmother-child as well as peer relations in the ability to acquire andapply concepts of mind. Here the active ingredients of develop-ment are conceptualised in terms of cooperative social interactionand exposure to talk about mental states. No doubt these thingsare important. Beyond this, however, powerful socio-emotionalforces are at play.Especially when you are in the heat of relating to others, it canbe an emotionally taxing business to think flexibly and to deploymental concepts effectively. Critically important for the early de-velopment of this capacity are young children’s relations with atleast one other person who is able to tune into their minds. Thedevelopmental influences are not merely intellectual, they are alsoemotional. Studies in developmental psychopathology reveal thatin order to employ mind-related thinking effectively, one needs todo more than construct understanding. To maintain a reflectivestance towards one’s own and others’ minds, one also needs to bein appropriate forms of relation with oneself and others. Emo-tional relatedness towards persons-as-represented in the mind isa vital force in intrapsychic as well as interpersonal functioning,and such relatedness and representation are powerfully influ-enced by identification with the attitudes of others.The sources of mentalistic understanding involve much morethan action, even co-action with others.The sibling relationship as a context for thedevelopment of social understandingNina HoweDepartment of Education, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec H3G 1M8,Canada. nina.howe@education.concordia.caCommentary/Carpendale & Lewis: Constructing an understanding of mind110 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2004) 27:1Text removed due to third party copyright

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