The decision to incinerate hazardous industrial waste in cement plants (the socalled
‘co-incineration’ process) gave rise to one of the most heated environmental
conflicts ever to take place in Portugal. The bitterest period was between 1997 and
2002, after the government had made a decision. Strong protests by residents,
environmental organizations, opposition parties, and some members of the
scientific community forced the government to backtrack and to seek scientific
legitimacy for the process through scientific expertise. The experts ratified the
government’s decision, stating that the risks involved were socially acceptable.
The conflict persisted over a decade and ended up clearing the way for a more
sustainable method over which there was broad social consensus – a multifunctional
method which makes it possible to treat, recover and regenerate most
wastes. Focusing the analysis on this conflict, this paper has three aims: (1) to
discuss the implications of the fact that expertise was ‘confiscated’ after the
government had committed itself to the decision to implement co-incineration and
by way of a reaction to the atmosphere of tension and protest; (2) to analyse the
uses of the notions of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ in scientific reports from both
experts and counter-experts’ committees, and their different assumptions about
controllability and criteria for considering certain practices to be sufficiently safe
for the public; and (3) to show how the existence of different technical scientific
and political attitudes (one more closely tied to government and the corporate
interests of the cement plants, the other closer to the environmental values of reuse
and recycling and respect for the risk perception of residents who challenged
the facilities) is closely bound up with problems of democratic legitimacy. This
conflict showed how adopting more sustainable and lower-risk policies implies a
broader view of democratic legitimacy, one which involves both civic movements
and citizens themselves
