Transnational corporations and human rights: an institutional responsibilities framework

Abstract

This thesis argues that transnational corporations (TNCs) bear primarily negative moral duties in relation to human rights, i.e. to avoid doing harm, and that they can be held responsible when they fail to discharge such duties. Thus, their duties are not primarily to protect human rights, as some commentators have argued. To defend the negative duties claim, I detail ways in which corporations inflict harm not only directly through their operations, but also by shaping and supporting a global institutional arrangement that foreseeably and avoidably produces human rights harms. Therefore, the negative duties of corporations should be understood to include refraining from engaging in harmful institutional practices, or participating overall in a harmful institutional order without providing adequate compensation to the victims of harm. If they fail to do so, TNCs can be held accountable for the negative outcomes engendered by the global order

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