Wittgenstein, in contrast with a number of recent
epistemologists (e.g., Audi 1998, 130-48; Fricker 1994),
held that hearing another person assert that p may itself
constitute sufficient reason for one to believe that p â€”
without one"s needing to have positive grounds for one"s
belief that the other person is sincere or reliable. (Cf.
Wittgenstein 1992, Â§Â§ 143, 160-1) In this paper I will
argue that Wittgenstein"s position follows immediately from
an understanding of assertion as a language-game
governed by norms binding the rational action of
participant speakers and hearers

Shieber, Joseph

English

Elektronisch archivierte Theorie - Sammelpunkt

  231
Assertion as a Language-Game: 
the Role of Linguistic Agency in Social-Epistemic Agency 
 
Joseph Shieber, Brown University 
 
 
Wittgenstein, in contrast with a number of recent 
epistemologists (e.g., Audi 1998, 130-48; Fricker 1994), 
held that hearing another person assert that p may itself 
constitute sufficient reason for one to believe that p — 
without one’s needing to have positive grounds for one’s 
belief that the other person is sincere or reliable. (Cf. 
Wittgenstein 1992, §§ 143, 160-1)  In this paper I will 
argue that Wittgenstein’s position follows immediately from 
an understanding of assertion as a language-game 
governed by norms binding the rational action of 
participant speakers and hearers. 
A theory delineating the norms of assertion would 
seem to have to meet two general desiderata.  Such a 
theory ought (1) to illuminate the norms to which an agent 
would have to be sensitive in order to make an assertion.  I 
will call these the norms of asserting.  Furthermore - and 
this is an aspect of such a theory almost universally 
neglected - it should (2) make explicit the norms to which 
recipients (hearers, readers, etc.) of putative assertions 
would have to be sensitive.  I will refer to these as the 
norms of attending.  Recognizing the norms governing 
assertion as a language-game will, I argue, allow us to 
recognize the centrality of testimony as a basic source of 
justified belief, and thus to recognize the role of linguistic 
agency in social-epistemic agency. 
I suggest that the norms governing an agent’s 
performance of assertions all stem from one overarching 
norm: 
 
[TRUTH] Assert that p only if it is true that p. 
 
Conveying content truthfully is a uniquely linguistic 
enterprise.  One cannot do so other than by using 
language.  The detective who provides pictorial proof of a 
crime by providing accurate photographic evidence does 
not thereby convey truths until she tells her client what she 
has discovered.  On the other hand, those various non-
truth-related tasks for which we employ language — 
entertaining, annoying, etc. — are ones that can equally be 
accomplished by other means.  Thus, although one can 
entertain Herman by telling him a joke, one could equally 
do so by taking a pratfall or pulling a rubber chicken out of 
one’s trousers.  In contrast both to the conveyance of 
accurate (as opposed to true) information, and to the 
achievement of goals such as annoyance, entertainment, 
seduction, etc., the conveyance of truth is a goal properly 
belonging only to the use of language. (cf. Jackson 1987, 
98) 
To make this claim, however, is to claim that the 
conveyance of truth-evaluable information is thus 
peculiarly linguistic goal, one that is, in fact, constitutive. 
(cf. Wittgenstein, §§ 80-84, 455)  It is one of the goals that 
distinguishes language qua language.  Furthermore, to the 
extent that [TRUTH] is a norm of assertion, the fact that 
the conveyance of truth-evaluable information is a 
constitutive function of language singles out assertion as a 
core linguistic practice. 
What does it mean, however, to say that [TRUTH] 
is a norm governing the performance of assertions?  It 
means that in order to be competent in the performance of 
assertions, one must be sensitive to [TRUTH].  That is, if 
one is to be competent in making assertions, and one 
wishes to make an assertion, one must be sensitive to the 
fact that there is a pro tanto reason to see to it that the 
content of one’s assertion be true.  Thus, to recognize 
[TRUTH] as a norm of asserting is not to require that all 
assertions be assertions of the true.  There can be false 
and/or lying assertions.  Rather, it is to require that, in 
those cases in which one asserts that p and it is false that 
p, one has overridden the pro tanto reason characterized 
by [TRUTH] for reasons external to the practice of 
assertion. 
Thus, consider a case in which you lie in order to 
save the life of someone taking refuge with you from a 
murderer.  In such a case, your reason not to lie, given that 
you wish to make an assertion, has been overridden by 
stronger considerations of the danger to those to whom 
you have granted refuge.  Even in the more commonplace, 
less altruistic cases in which one lies for the sake of some 
advantage, one will at least believe oneself to have a 
reason whose force overrides the force of the reason, 
internal to the practice of assertion, that one has to tell the 
truth.  Whether one ought to be held blameworthy in such 
a case will depend upon whether it is in fact the case that 
the reason in question was strong enough to outweigh 
one’s reason for telling the truth.   
What [TRUTH] does, however, exclude as 
irrational would be a case in which one would be 
competent in making assertions, intend to make an 
assertion, and fail to tell the truth for no reason at all.  Such 
a case would violate the norms of asserting.  Given this, 
however, one might contend that [TRUTH] is too strong a 
requirement.  Certainly there are many cases in which one 
is highly justified in believing that what one says is true, 
although in fact it is not.  We would not, however, wish to 
claim that one is irrational if one makes such an assertion. 
It is true that we would not wish to call such a case 
of asserting an irrational one.  However, if we accept 
[TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, we are not forced to do 
so.  For, if we accept [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, we 
must accept only that the falsity of p is a reason not to 
assert p; it does not suggest that we are always aware of 
our reasons not to make an assertion.  In a case in which 
one asserts something on the basis of very strong, but 
misleading, evidence that what one asserts was true, then 
we must only hold that, in such a case, one is unaware of 
the reason for not asserting what one does in fact assert. 
This explanation, however, may fail to satisfy.  For, 
if we accept [TRUTH], we must at least say that there was 
something wrong with false, but highly justified, assertions.  
And it may be that we are tempted to say that, in such a 
case, there is nothing wrong with my assertion at all.  Such 
a reaction would, I contend, be mistaken.  There is 
something wrong with my barn assertion qua assertion, 
although we might feel uncomfortable terming what it is 
that is wrong a case of irrationality.  I will postpone a 
discussion of what it is that is wrong in such a case, 
Assertion as a Language-Game: the Role of Linguistic Agency in Social-Epistemic Agency - Joseph Shieber 
 
 
 232 
however, until our discussion of the relation between the 
norms of assertion and knowledge, below. 
There is, however, a more immediate issue raised 
by the above discussion with which we are in a position to 
deal at this point.  If [TRUTH] is the central norm of 
asserting, it is not the sole norm.  If one is to be sensitive 
to [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, one must also be 
sensitive to one’s having reasons for holding the content of 
one’s assertion true.  This, however, leaves it open as to 
what sorts of reasons are sufficient to license one in 
making assertions.  Further consideration lends at least 
some credence to the idea that the level of evidence that 
one should require for those cases in which one has a 
reason to ( only if p is true) is a level sufficient to 
underwrite knowledge.  That is, there is some reason to 
accept, as a general principle governing rational action 
[where parentheses indicate the scope of “should” in (2)]: 
 
(2) If you should ( only if p is true), then you 
should ( only if you know p). 
 
To see this, consider what must clearly be a norm 
of good electricianship: one should not rewire electric 
circuits when the power is not shut off. (Cf. Williamson 
2000, 245)  In the case of this norm, it is clear that the 
level of evidence one ought to have is a level sufficient to 
underwrite knowledge.  If one should not rewire electric 
circuits when the power is not shut off, then one should not 
rewire electric circuits if one does not know that the power 
is shut off. 
Even if one judges that (2) ought not be accepted 
as a general rule characterizing rational action, however, 
there are independent reasons for taking assertion to be 
governed by (2), and thus by: 
 
[KNOWLEDGE] Assert p only if you know that p. 
 
First, there is support for [KNOWLEDGE] provided 
by evidence from our everyday practices in response to 
assertions.  If one asserts that p and I wish to challenge 
that assertion, or simply wish to receive additional 
information, I can ask: “How do you know?”  In response to 
such a question, any provision of information short of 
evidence that the assertor does know is not a defense of 
the original assertion, but a retreat from that assertion. 
The second consideration in support of the 
acceptance of [KNOWLEDGE] as a norm characterizing 
assertion provides a reason in support of one of the 
arguments left open previously — viz., that one would be 
accountable for asserting a falsehood, even in those cases 
in which one does not know that the content of one’s 
assertion is false.  Consider someone who, because of 
some lack of background information, was subject to a 
host of skeptical situations (Cartesian evil demon, brain-in-
a-vat, etc.) to which his interlocutors are not subject.  If 
such a speaker were to make assertions concerning that 
range of subjects for which he is subject to those sorts of 
unwitting failures of knowledge, he would eventually 
acquire a reputation for unknowing assertion among his 
interlocutors.  Having done so, however, he will cease to 
be able to accomplish one of the primary goals of 
assertion, namely fostering belief in others — even if, ex 
hypothesi, the speaker in question has an unimpeachable 
reputation for sincerity.  That is, even if, in such a situation, 
we would not hold the hapless speaker to be blameworthy 
for his failings, we would hold him accountable, in the 
following way.  We would no longer believe what he 
asserts, at least with respect to that range of topics for 
which he is not reliable.  This is a form of censure internal 
to the practice of assertion, (cf. Brandom 1994) in a way in 
which we will now be able to explicate. 
We have just classified certain forms of censure 
for failure to comply with the norms of asserting — viz., 
those involving the withholding of belief in the content 
asserted — as internal censures.  This suggests that there 
are norms governing the reception of assertions, by 
hearers, readers, etc., in addition to those norms, already 
discussed, governing the performance of assertions.  
Consider for a moment the parallel case of issuing 
commands.  It seems reasonable to suppose that the 
speech act of commanding would not exist, were it not the 
case that the issuer of commands could expect, as a result 
of the understanding of those commands, the performance 
of appropriate acts on the part of those commanded.  
Similarly, one might argue that there would be no point to 
the act of assertion, were it not the case that the maker of 
assertions could expect, as a result of the understanding of 
assertions, that her audience would come to believe the 
contents of those assertions. (Cf. Wittgenstein 1992, §354) 
Indeed, when we introduced our discussion of 
[TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, we did so in the context 
of a discussion of the central linguistic role of assertion in 
conveying information.  The conveyance of information 
involves more than the making public of information on the 
part of its possessor, however; it also involves the 
acquisition of information on the part of some audience.  
This would suggest the following as the central norm of 
attending: 
 
[BELIEF] If you understand a speech act  
as involving the assertion that p, believe that p. 
 
Unlike the norms of asserting, however, [BELIEF], 
involving as it does a norm pertaining to belief, provides a 
prima facie, defeasible reason to believe the content 
asserted. 
That there is such a norm governing attending to 
assertions should be clear upon reflection.  Just as 
assertors need to have a good reason in order to override 
the norm of [TRUTH] without incurring blame, recipients of 
assertions need to have a reason in order to override the 
norm of [BELIEF].  We would not, e.g., consider it a good 
reason for not believing an assertion that the assertor is 
black.  Nor would we consider it rational behavior for one 
to dismiss an assertion for no reason at all.  If you are 
aware of an assertion to the effect that p, and you have no 
reason to the contrary, you cannot but take that assertion 
as positive evidence to the effect that p. 
Having discussed the norms of asserting above, 
we can recognize that there are, in fact, two sources of the 
reason expressed by the norm of [BELIEF].  Given that 
there could be no practice of assertion, were it not for the 
existence of the norm of [BELIEF], there is a practice-
internal reason for comporting with the norm.  And, as 
assertion fulfills the fundamental linguistic goal of making 
possible the conveyance of true content, this practice-
internal reason is one tied to the pursuit of that aim of 
theoretical reason, the acquisition of true beliefs.  
Furthermore, assuming that there is an established 
practice of assertion, the fact that the norms of asserting 
include [TRUTH] and [KNOWLEDGE] provide excellent, 
more immediately truth-directed reasons for comporting 
Assertion as a Language-Game: the Role of Linguistic Agency in Social-Epistemic Agency - Joseph Shieber 
 
 
 233
with the norm.  As long as interlocutors follow both the 
norms of asserting and the norm of attention, the practice 
of assertion will increase the distribution of true beliefs 
within a population. 
Thus, for competent linguistic agents, it is a norm 
of assertion that one ought to believe what one is told 
unless and until one has positive reason to doubt it.  That 
is, a correct conception of assertion as a language-game 
governed by, inter alia, the norms of [TRUTH], 
[KNOWLEDGE], and [BELIEF] supports Wittgenstein’s 
claims to the effect that one need not have positive 
grounds to support one’s belief in the information one 
acquires from one’s communications with others.  Our 
status as linguistic agents thus has implications for our 
obligations to one another as social-epistemic agents. 
 
References 
Audi, R. 1998 Epistemology, London: Routledge. 
Brandom, R. 1994 Making It Explicit, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Fricker, E. 1994 “Against Gullibility,” in B.K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Knowing From 
Words, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 125-61. 
Jackson, F. 1987 Conditionals, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. 
Williamson, T. 2000 Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wittgenstein, L. 1992 Über Gewißheit, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


Assertion as a Language-Game:
the Role of Linguistic Agency in Social-Epistemic Agency

Name not available

  231Assertion as a Language-Game: the Role of Linguistic Agency in Social-Epistemic Agency  Joseph Shieber, Brown University   Wittgenstein, in contrast with a number of recent epistemologists (e.g., Audi 1998, 130-48; Fricker 1994), held that hearing another person assert that p may itself constitute sufficient reason for one to believe that p — without one’s needing to have positive grounds for one’s belief that the other person is sincere or reliable. (Cf. Wittgenstein 1992, §§ 143, 160-1)  In this paper I will argue that Wittgenstein’s position follows immediately from an understanding of assertion as a language-game governed by norms binding the rational action of participant speakers and hearers. A theory delineating the norms of assertion would seem to have to meet two general desiderata.  Such a theory ought (1) to illuminate the norms to which an agent would have to be sensitive in order to make an assertion.  I will call these the norms of asserting.  Furthermore - and this is an aspect of such a theory almost universally neglected - it should (2) make explicit the norms to which recipients (hearers, readers, etc.) of putative assertions would have to be sensitive.  I will refer to these as the norms of attending.  Recognizing the norms governing assertion as a language-game will, I argue, allow us to recognize the centrality of testimony as a basic source of justified belief, and thus to recognize the role of linguistic agency in social-epistemic agency. I suggest that the norms governing an agent’s performance of assertions all stem from one overarching norm:  [TRUTH] Assert that p only if it is true that p.  Conveying content truthfully is a uniquely linguistic enterprise.  One cannot do so other than by using language.  The detective who provides pictorial proof of a crime by providing accurate photographic evidence does not thereby convey truths until she tells her client what she has discovered.  On the other hand, those various non-truth-related tasks for which we employ language — entertaining, annoying, etc. — are ones that can equally be accomplished by other means.  Thus, although one can entertain Herman by telling him a joke, one could equally do so by taking a pratfall or pulling a rubber chicken out of one’s trousers.  In contrast both to the conveyance of accurate (as opposed to true) information, and to the achievement of goals such as annoyance, entertainment, seduction, etc., the conveyance of truth is a goal properly belonging only to the use of language. (cf. Jackson 1987, 98) To make this claim, however, is to claim that the conveyance of truth-evaluable information is thus peculiarly linguistic goal, one that is, in fact, constitutive. (cf. Wittgenstein, §§ 80-84, 455)  It is one of the goals that distinguishes language qua language.  Furthermore, to the extent that [TRUTH] is a norm of assertion, the fact that the conveyance of truth-evaluable information is a constitutive function of language singles out assertion as a core linguistic practice. What does it mean, however, to say that [TRUTH] is a norm governing the performance of assertions?  It means that in order to be competent in the performance of assertions, one must be sensitive to [TRUTH].  That is, if one is to be competent in making assertions, and one wishes to make an assertion, one must be sensitive to the fact that there is a pro tanto reason to see to it that the content of one’s assertion be true.  Thus, to recognize [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting is not to require that all assertions be assertions of the true.  There can be false and/or lying assertions.  Rather, it is to require that, in those cases in which one asserts that p and it is false that p, one has overridden the pro tanto reason characterized by [TRUTH] for reasons external to the practice of assertion. Thus, consider a case in which you lie in order to save the life of someone taking refuge with you from a murderer.  In such a case, your reason not to lie, given that you wish to make an assertion, has been overridden by stronger considerations of the danger to those to whom you have granted refuge.  Even in the more commonplace, less altruistic cases in which one lies for the sake of some advantage, one will at least believe oneself to have a reason whose force overrides the force of the reason, internal to the practice of assertion, that one has to tell the truth.  Whether one ought to be held blameworthy in such a case will depend upon whether it is in fact the case that the reason in question was strong enough to outweigh one’s reason for telling the truth.   What [TRUTH] does, however, exclude as irrational would be a case in which one would be competent in making assertions, intend to make an assertion, and fail to tell the truth for no reason at all.  Such a case would violate the norms of asserting.  Given this, however, one might contend that [TRUTH] is too strong a requirement.  Certainly there are many cases in which one is highly justified in believing that what one says is true, although in fact it is not.  We would not, however, wish to claim that one is irrational if one makes such an assertion. It is true that we would not wish to call such a case of asserting an irrational one.  However, if we accept [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, we are not forced to do so.  For, if we accept [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, we must accept only that the falsity of p is a reason not to assert p; it does not suggest that we are always aware of our reasons not to make an assertion.  In a case in which one asserts something on the basis of very strong, but misleading, evidence that what one asserts was true, then we must only hold that, in such a case, one is unaware of the reason for not asserting what one does in fact assert. This explanation, however, may fail to satisfy.  For, if we accept [TRUTH], we must at least say that there was something wrong with false, but highly justified, assertions.  And it may be that we are tempted to say that, in such a case, there is nothing wrong with my assertion at all.  Such a reaction would, I contend, be mistaken.  There is something wrong with my barn assertion qua assertion, although we might feel uncomfortable terming what it is that is wrong a case of irrationality.  I will postpone a discussion of what it is that is wrong in such a case, Assertion as a Language-Game: the Role of Linguistic Agency in Social-Epistemic Agency - Joseph Shieber    232 however, until our discussion of the relation between the norms of assertion and knowledge, below. There is, however, a more immediate issue raised by the above discussion with which we are in a position to deal at this point.  If [TRUTH] is the central norm of asserting, it is not the sole norm.  If one is to be sensitive to [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, one must also be sensitive to one’s having reasons for holding the content of one’s assertion true.  This, however, leaves it open as to what sorts of reasons are sufficient to license one in making assertions.  Further consideration lends at least some credence to the idea that the level of evidence that one should require for those cases in which one has a reason to ( only if p is true) is a level sufficient to underwrite knowledge.  That is, there is some reason to accept, as a general principle governing rational action [where parentheses indicate the scope of “should” in (2)]:  (2) If you should ( only if p is true), then you should ( only if you know p).  To see this, consider what must clearly be a norm of good electricianship: one should not rewire electric circuits when the power is not shut off. (Cf. Williamson 2000, 245)  In the case of this norm, it is clear that the level of evidence one ought to have is a level sufficient to underwrite knowledge.  If one should not rewire electric circuits when the power is not shut off, then one should not rewire electric circuits if one does not know that the power is shut off. Even if one judges that (2) ought not be accepted as a general rule characterizing rational action, however, there are independent reasons for taking assertion to be governed by (2), and thus by:  [KNOWLEDGE] Assert p only if you know that p.  First, there is support for [KNOWLEDGE] provided by evidence from our everyday practices in response to assertions.  If one asserts that p and I wish to challenge that assertion, or simply wish to receive additional information, I can ask: “How do you know?”  In response to such a question, any provision of information short of evidence that the assertor does know is not a defense of the original assertion, but a retreat from that assertion. The second consideration in support of the acceptance of [KNOWLEDGE] as a norm characterizing assertion provides a reason in support of one of the arguments left open previously — viz., that one would be accountable for asserting a falsehood, even in those cases in which one does not know that the content of one’s assertion is false.  Consider someone who, because of some lack of background information, was subject to a host of skeptical situations (Cartesian evil demon, brain-in-a-vat, etc.) to which his interlocutors are not subject.  If such a speaker were to make assertions concerning that range of subjects for which he is subject to those sorts of unwitting failures of knowledge, he would eventually acquire a reputation for unknowing assertion among his interlocutors.  Having done so, however, he will cease to be able to accomplish one of the primary goals of assertion, namely fostering belief in others — even if, ex hypothesi, the speaker in question has an unimpeachable reputation for sincerity.  That is, even if, in such a situation, we would not hold the hapless speaker to be blameworthy for his failings, we would hold him accountable, in the following way.  We would no longer believe what he asserts, at least with respect to that range of topics for which he is not reliable.  This is a form of censure internal to the practice of assertion, (cf. Brandom 1994) in a way in which we will now be able to explicate. We have just classified certain forms of censure for failure to comply with the norms of asserting — viz., those involving the withholding of belief in the content asserted — as internal censures.  This suggests that there are norms governing the reception of assertions, by hearers, readers, etc., in addition to those norms, already discussed, governing the performance of assertions.  Consider for a moment the parallel case of issuing commands.  It seems reasonable to suppose that the speech act of commanding would not exist, were it not the case that the issuer of commands could expect, as a result of the understanding of those commands, the performance of appropriate acts on the part of those commanded.  Similarly, one might argue that there would be no point to the act of assertion, were it not the case that the maker of assertions could expect, as a result of the understanding of assertions, that her audience would come to believe the contents of those assertions. (Cf. Wittgenstein 1992, §354) Indeed, when we introduced our discussion of [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, we did so in the context of a discussion of the central linguistic role of assertion in conveying information.  The conveyance of information involves more than the making public of information on the part of its possessor, however; it also involves the acquisition of information on the part of some audience.  This would suggest the following as the central norm of attending:  [BELIEF] If you understand a speech act  as involving the assertion that p, believe that p.  Unlike the norms of asserting, however, [BELIEF], involving as it does a norm pertaining to belief, provides a prima facie, defeasible reason to believe the content asserted. That there is such a norm governing attending to assertions should be clear upon reflection.  Just as assertors need to have a good reason in order to override the norm of [TRUTH] without incurring blame, recipients of assertions need to have a reason in order to override the norm of [BELIEF].  We would not, e.g., consider it a good reason for not believing an assertion that the assertor is black.  Nor would we consider it rational behavior for one to dismiss an assertion for no reason at all.  If you are aware of an assertion to the effect that p, and you have no reason to the contrary, you cannot but take that assertion as positive evidence to the effect that p. Having discussed the norms of asserting above, we can recognize that there are, in fact, two sources of the reason expressed by the norm of [BELIEF].  Given that there could be no practice of assertion, were it not for the existence of the norm of [BELIEF], there is a practice-internal reason for comporting with the norm.  And, as assertion fulfills the fundamental linguistic goal of making possible the conveyance of true content, this practice-internal reason is one tied to the pursuit of that aim of theoretical reason, the acquisition of true beliefs.  Furthermore, assuming that there is an established practice of assertion, the fact that the norms of asserting include [TRUTH] and [KNOWLEDGE] provide excellent, more immediately truth-directed reasons for comporting Assertion as a Language-Game: the Role of Linguistic Agency in Social-Epistemic Agency - Joseph Shieber    233with the norm.  As long as interlocutors follow both the norms of asserting and the norm of attention, the practice of assertion will increase the distribution of true beliefs within a population. Thus, for competent linguistic agents, it is a norm of assertion that one ought to believe what one is told unless and until one has positive reason to doubt it.  That is, a correct conception of assertion as a language-game governed by, inter alia, the norms of [TRUTH], [KNOWLEDGE], and [BELIEF] supports Wittgenstein’s claims to the effect that one need not have positive grounds to support one’s belief in the information one acquires from one’s communications with others.  Our status as linguistic agents thus has implications for our obligations to one another as social-epistemic agents.  References Audi, R. 1998 Epistemology, London: Routledge. Brandom, R. 1994 Making It Explicit, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fricker, E. 1994 “Against Gullibility,” in B.K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Knowing From Words, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 125-61. Jackson, F. 1987 Conditionals, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. Williamson, T. 2000 Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wittgenstein, L. 1992 Über Gewißheit, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.        

Assertion as a Language-Game: the Role of Linguistic Agency in Social-Epistemic Agency

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