Identity is not what prudentially matters in survival
(this is originally and most famously argued in Parfit 1984,
245-280). Consider the case of division. a is one of three
identical triplets. In World 1 his equipollent cerebral
hemispheres are removed from his head and each is
inserted into the (suitably emptied) skull of one of his
brothers, resulting in the existence of two persons, b and c.
In World 2, only one of his hemispheres is transplanted
(while the other is destroyed), resulting in the existence of
b*. Note that, assuming the necessity and transitivity of
identity, b* is identical to neither b nor c

Holtug, Nils

English

Elektronisch archivierte Theorie - Sammelpunkt

  90 
Personal Identity and What Matters 
 
Nils Holtug, Kopenhagen 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Identity is not what prudentially matters in survival 
(this is originally and most famously argued in Parfit 1984, 
245-280). Consider the case of division. a is one of three 
identical triplets. In World 1 his equipollent cerebral 
hemispheres are removed from his head and each is 
inserted into the (suitably emptied) skull of one of his 
brothers, resulting in the existence of two persons, b and c. 
In World 2, only one of his hemispheres is transplanted 
(while the other is destroyed), resulting in the existence of 
b*. Note that, assuming the necessity and transitivity of 
identity, b* is identical to neither b nor c. 
Now, in World 1 a stands in the relation that 
matters to b* (indeed, it is plausible to claim that they are 
one and the same person). Furthermore, since in World 2, 
a stands in the exact same intrinsic physical and 
psychological relation to both b and c, he also stands in 
the relation that matters to each of them. But since he 
cannot be identical to two person (who are not identical to 
each other), identity cannot be what matters in survival. 
Furthermore, the conclusion that identity is not 
what matters is supported by our intuitions about what 
matters in cases of division. Consider World 2 again. 
Assume that a is informed that b* is going to be tortured 
terribly immediately after the brain transplant has been 
completed. Naturally, a is devastated. But now suppose 
that a learns that, as it turns out, both of his brain 
hemispheres are going to receive a new body, that is, that 
the actual world is World 1. Nevertheless, the person on 
the left branch is still going to be tortured terribly. Putting 
myself in a’s shoes, I am inclined to care just as much 
about b’s torture in World 1 as I would about b*’s torture in 
World 2. (While, to some extent, benefits to c may 
compensate for b's torture in World 1, this would not affect 
my attitude to the torture itself). In other words, the 
existence of c (say, in some other wing of the hospital) 
does not change my attitude to the torture. And this 
suggests that the relation that matters is preserved equally 
well in both worlds, despite the fact that a only survives in 
one of them. And so it suggests that identity is not what 
matters. 
Nevertheless, I now want to consider three recent 
objections to these arguments. I shall argue that theyare 
not conclusive. 
 
2. Survival, Existence and What Matters 
My description of the case of division may seem to 
lead to absurdities. First, whether a continues to exist 
depends upon whether someone else, c, comes into 
existence. After all, in World 2, where c does not come into 
existence, a survives the transplant (a is identical to b*), 
whereas he does not survive in World 1. Second, whether 
b comes into existence also depends upon whether c 
comes into existence. b only comes into existence in World 
1 because here, c does so as well (note that b and b* are 
not identical). And these judgements may seem quite 
absurd. After all, c's existence does not causally affect b. 
Of course, similar accounts of the identities of 
other types of objects (that can divide) have similar 
implications. And, in general, such accounts seem to me 
quite plausible, or at least more plausible than alternative 
accounts. Regarding insentient objects, the fact that their 
persistence and existence may depend upon whether 
other causally unrelated objects come into existence does 
not seem disturbing. To a large extent, this is because 
their persistence conditions do not have the sort of 
significance the persistence conditions of persons have. 
Except maybe for legal reasons, it does not seem terribly 
important which of two ships is in fact Theseus' original 
ship. Now, this is controversial, but I shall merely assume 
that the implications are acceptable regarding insentient 
objects. 
What makes it particularly difficult to believe that 
the persistence of persons may depend on causally 
unrelated matters is the apparent great significance of our 
survival. However, the crux of the above argument is that 
although a will cease to exist if c comes into existence, this 
sort of death does not matter from his perspective. Neither 
of a’s continuers will be him, but his relation to them will 
contain what matters. Therefore, the special sort of 
badness that is associated with the death of a person (but 
not with the death of a ship) does not even come into play. 
And so the absurdity of the first alleged absurdity may be 
more apparent than real. 
The second alleged absurdity has received less 
attention in the literature. It does not concern the 
significance of identity over time, but of coming into 
existence in the first place. Why, exactly, is the second 
'absurdity' thought to be absurd? According to Harold 
Noonan we could say to b: “You should consider yourself 
fortunate that the other fellow’s brain transplant [that is, c’s 
brain transplant] went so well - if it hadn’t you would never 
have existed” (Noonan 1989, p. 160). But why claim that b 
is fortunate? Just as it does not matter from a's point of 
view whether his future continuers are identical to him, as 
long as the relevant relations hold between him and them, 
it may be claimed that it does not matter from b’s point of 
view whether the person who comes into existence in the 
b-body is b. After all, if all the nonexistence of b would 
really amount to would be the nonexistence of c, then why 
should nonexistence matter from b’s perspective? This, I 
think, takes some of the sting out of the second absurdity 
as well. 
Let me briefly elaborate on this point. Noonan 
holds World 1 to be better than World 2 from what we may 
call b's prudential point of view. This is because b exists in 
the former world but not in the latter. But the existence of b 
depends in a very intimate way on the existence of c. This 
is clear when we consider that World 2 contains everything 
that is needed for the existence of b except the existence 
of c. Furthermore, while c enables the existence of b in 
World 1, this is not in virtue of any causal relations 
between them. Rather, it is the mere existence of c that 
brings b into existence here. 
In the light of these connections between the 
existence of b and the existence of c, can we maintain 
that, since b exists in World 1 but not in World 2, World 1 is 
better from b's prudential point of view? Such a claim 
would not be incoherent. Nevertheless, it seems to me 
very hard to believe. The difference between World 1 and 
World 2 in virtue of which b exists in the former but not in 
the latter is simply that (the causally isolated) c exists in 
Personal Identity and What Matters - Nils Holtug 
 
 
 91
the former but not in the latter. And why should the 
existence of c make a difference from b's prudential point 
of view? 
 
3. Division and Indeterminacy 
According to Mark Johnston and Peter Unger, the 
case of division does not support the claim that identity is 
not what matters (Johnston 1997, pp. 169-170, Unger 
1990, pp. 255-259). They hold that in World 1, it is not 
determinately true that a ceases to exist. This is because it 
is neither determinately true that a is identical to (for 
instance) b, nor determinately true that they are not 
identical. Indeed, almost all of what ordinary survival 
consists in is present in World 1 - all that prevents a’s 
survival is that he stands in the relevant relation to both b 
and c. Therefore, a’s prudential concern for b (and c) is a 
reasonable extension of his concern for himself. So while 
identity is what matters, a person’s concern for himself 
(and so for identity) may in certain rather bizarre situations 
be extended to people to whom he is not (determinately) 
identical. 
However, I am inclined to hold that it is, in fact, 
determinately true that a is not identical to b (or c for that 
matter). This is not because I believe that statements 
about identity always have determinate answers. In a 
spectrum of gradual physical and psychological changes 
where a person is dismantled one cell at the time, I believe 
that there is a range in which it is neither true that the 
person ceases to exist, nor true that he does not cease to 
exist. But it seems to me that the case of division is 
relevantly different. Here, we have a clear reason to claim 
that a is not identical to b or c. He cannot be, since neither 
has the stronger claim to being identical to a. 
Furthermore, the view that it is not determinately 
true that a is not identical to b, and not determinately true 
that a is not identical to c has counterintuitive implications. 
Intuitively, there is one and only one person inhabiting the 
a-body before division takes place. However, if it is not 
determinately true that a is not identical to b and not 
identical to c, then there is no determinate answer to the 
question of how many persons there are in the a-body at 
this stage. Therefore, it is not determinately true that there 
is only one person inhabiting the a-body prior to division 
(Garrett 1998, p. 64). 
Finally, I believe that it is uneconomical to claim 
that what matters is identity, but that the concern for 
oneself can be extended to beings one is not determinately 
identical to. Suppose that we correctly believe that a 
particular criterion of personal identity is true, say, a 
psychological criterion, according to which personal 
identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity. 
And suppose that we hold that what matters is the sort of 
psychological continuity referred to in this criterion, 
regardless of whether it branches or not. The difference 
between our view of what matters and the view that 
identity is what matters will then consist merely in the fact 
that the latter view has a clause to rule out branching. 
Which view should we accept? 
I noted that my attitude to the torture of b would be 
no different than my attitude to the torture of b*. The 
existence or nonexistence of a further continuer, besides 
the one who will be tortured, will not make a difference (or 
more precisely, it will not make a difference to my attitude 
to the torture). But this means that the fact that in World 2, 
psychological continuity takes a non-branching form is 
irrelevant for my attitude towards the torture. 
In other words, the fact that the relevant relation 
holds uniquely does not seem to make a difference. So it 
appears that we can account for our value judgements 
merely by invoking the view that what matters is 
psychological continuity whether or not branching occurs. 
Why, then, claim that uniqueness matters? We do 
not need to claim this in order to explain our judgements. 
And since the only difference between our view of what 
matters and the view that identity is what matters is that 
the latter includes a clause to rule out branching, it seems 
that the former view is superior. In particular, it is 
uneconomical to claim that what matters is identity and 
that in cases of indeterminacy the concern for oneself is 
extended to one’s continuer(s). At best, this would be to 
assign a role to uniqueness in which it makes no 
difference. 
 
4. Other values 
There is one final objection I want to consider. 
Brian Garrett has argued that even if we do not consider 
division as bad as ordinary death, this does not support the 
claim that identity is not what matters (Garrett 1998, pp. 
92-93). Rather, this merely means that given the choice 
between ordinary death and division, we would choose 
division. And there may be reasons for preferring division 
other than the judgement that identity is not what matters. 
Garrett suggests the following: if a divides, b and c can 
complete his public projects (those of his projects that 
others can complete). That is, b and c can, say, finish his 
book, look after his family etc. 
I agree with Garrett that even if we prefer division 
to ordinary death, this does not prove that identity does not 
matter. However, I made a stronger claim than that division 
is preferable to ordinary death. I argued that a's attitude to 
future torture is not likely to change just because he is 
informed that it will be b rather than b* who receives it. If 
this is correct, then a's attitude to the torture will not 
depend on whether he is identical to the recipient or not. 
And this suggests that identity does not matter. 
This, of course, is compatible with the other claim 
that Garrett makes, namely that the completion of public 
projects matters. Both b and b* may complete a's public 
projects, and this fact may provide part of the reason why 
they matter to a. But note that even if it is important to a 
that someone completes his public projects, this need not 
be because this someone prudentially matters to a. It may 
be because the completion of these projects matters in the 
sense that his strivings will then not have been in vain, and 
so his life will have been better. Or it may even be because 
these projects matter in what we might call an 'impersonal' 
or 'other-regarding sense'. Perhaps it is important to a that 
someone takes care of his family, not because it either 
benefits him or someone else to whom he stands in the 
relation that prudentially matters, but simply because it 
makes his family better off. 
In conclusion, I believe that none of the three 
objections pulls through. Identity is not what matters. 
 
References 
Garrett, B. 1998 Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, London: 
Routledge. 
Johnston, M. 1998 "Human Concerns without Superlative Selves", 
in J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Noonan, H. 1989 Personal Identity, London: Routledge. 
Parfit, D. 1984 Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Unger, P. 1990 Identity, Consciousness and Value, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 


Personal Identity and What Matters

Copenhagen University Research Information System

Name not available

  90 Personal Identity and What Matters  Nils Holtug, Kopenhagen   1. Introduction  Identity is not what prudentially matters in survival (this is originally and most famously argued in Parfit 1984, 245-280). Consider the case of division. a is one of three identical triplets. In World 1 his equipollent cerebral hemispheres are removed from his head and each is inserted into the (suitably emptied) skull of one of his brothers, resulting in the existence of two persons, b and c. In World 2, only one of his hemispheres is transplanted (while the other is destroyed), resulting in the existence of b*. Note that, assuming the necessity and transitivity of identity, b* is identical to neither b nor c. Now, in World 1 a stands in the relation that matters to b* (indeed, it is plausible to claim that they are one and the same person). Furthermore, since in World 2, a stands in the exact same intrinsic physical and psychological relation to both b and c, he also stands in the relation that matters to each of them. But since he cannot be identical to two person (who are not identical to each other), identity cannot be what matters in survival. Furthermore, the conclusion that identity is not what matters is supported by our intuitions about what matters in cases of division. Consider World 2 again. Assume that a is informed that b* is going to be tortured terribly immediately after the brain transplant has been completed. Naturally, a is devastated. But now suppose that a learns that, as it turns out, both of his brain hemispheres are going to receive a new body, that is, that the actual world is World 1. Nevertheless, the person on the left branch is still going to be tortured terribly. Putting myself in a’s shoes, I am inclined to care just as much about b’s torture in World 1 as I would about b*’s torture in World 2. (While, to some extent, benefits to c may compensate for b's torture in World 1, this would not affect my attitude to the torture itself). In other words, the existence of c (say, in some other wing of the hospital) does not change my attitude to the torture. And this suggests that the relation that matters is preserved equally well in both worlds, despite the fact that a only survives in one of them. And so it suggests that identity is not what matters. Nevertheless, I now want to consider three recent objections to these arguments. I shall argue that theyare not conclusive.  2. Survival, Existence and What Matters My description of the case of division may seem to lead to absurdities. First, whether a continues to exist depends upon whether someone else, c, comes into existence. After all, in World 2, where c does not come into existence, a survives the transplant (a is identical to b*), whereas he does not survive in World 1. Second, whether b comes into existence also depends upon whether c comes into existence. b only comes into existence in World 1 because here, c does so as well (note that b and b* are not identical). And these judgements may seem quite absurd. After all, c's existence does not causally affect b. Of course, similar accounts of the identities of other types of objects (that can divide) have similar implications. And, in general, such accounts seem to me quite plausible, or at least more plausible than alternative accounts. Regarding insentient objects, the fact that their persistence and existence may depend upon whether other causally unrelated objects come into existence does not seem disturbing. To a large extent, this is because their persistence conditions do not have the sort of significance the persistence conditions of persons have. Except maybe for legal reasons, it does not seem terribly important which of two ships is in fact Theseus' original ship. Now, this is controversial, but I shall merely assume that the implications are acceptable regarding insentient objects. What makes it particularly difficult to believe that the persistence of persons may depend on causally unrelated matters is the apparent great significance of our survival. However, the crux of the above argument is that although a will cease to exist if c comes into existence, this sort of death does not matter from his perspective. Neither of a’s continuers will be him, but his relation to them will contain what matters. Therefore, the special sort of badness that is associated with the death of a person (but not with the death of a ship) does not even come into play. And so the absurdity of the first alleged absurdity may be more apparent than real. The second alleged absurdity has received less attention in the literature. It does not concern the significance of identity over time, but of coming into existence in the first place. Why, exactly, is the second 'absurdity' thought to be absurd? According to Harold Noonan we could say to b: “You should consider yourself fortunate that the other fellow’s brain transplant [that is, c’s brain transplant] went so well - if it hadn’t you would never have existed” (Noonan 1989, p. 160). But why claim that b is fortunate? Just as it does not matter from a's point of view whether his future continuers are identical to him, as long as the relevant relations hold between him and them, it may be claimed that it does not matter from b’s point of view whether the person who comes into existence in the b-body is b. After all, if all the nonexistence of b would really amount to would be the nonexistence of c, then why should nonexistence matter from b’s perspective? This, I think, takes some of the sting out of the second absurdity as well. Let me briefly elaborate on this point. Noonan holds World 1 to be better than World 2 from what we may call b's prudential point of view. This is because b exists in the former world but not in the latter. But the existence of b depends in a very intimate way on the existence of c. This is clear when we consider that World 2 contains everything that is needed for the existence of b except the existence of c. Furthermore, while c enables the existence of b in World 1, this is not in virtue of any causal relations between them. Rather, it is the mere existence of c that brings b into existence here. In the light of these connections between the existence of b and the existence of c, can we maintain that, since b exists in World 1 but not in World 2, World 1 is better from b's prudential point of view? Such a claim would not be incoherent. Nevertheless, it seems to me very hard to believe. The difference between World 1 and World 2 in virtue of which b exists in the former but not in the latter is simply that (the causally isolated) c exists in Personal Identity and What Matters - Nils Holtug    91the former but not in the latter. And why should the existence of c make a difference from b's prudential point of view?  3. Division and Indeterminacy According to Mark Johnston and Peter Unger, the case of division does not support the claim that identity is not what matters (Johnston 1997, pp. 169-170, Unger 1990, pp. 255-259). They hold that in World 1, it is not determinately true that a ceases to exist. This is because it is neither determinately true that a is identical to (for instance) b, nor determinately true that they are not identical. Indeed, almost all of what ordinary survival consists in is present in World 1 - all that prevents a’s survival is that he stands in the relevant relation to both b and c. Therefore, a’s prudential concern for b (and c) is a reasonable extension of his concern for himself. So while identity is what matters, a person’s concern for himself (and so for identity) may in certain rather bizarre situations be extended to people to whom he is not (determinately) identical. However, I am inclined to hold that it is, in fact, determinately true that a is not identical to b (or c for that matter). This is not because I believe that statements about identity always have determinate answers. In a spectrum of gradual physical and psychological changes where a person is dismantled one cell at the time, I believe that there is a range in which it is neither true that the person ceases to exist, nor true that he does not cease to exist. But it seems to me that the case of division is relevantly different. Here, we have a clear reason to claim that a is not identical to b or c. He cannot be, since neither has the stronger claim to being identical to a. Furthermore, the view that it is not determinately true that a is not identical to b, and not determinately true that a is not identical to c has counterintuitive implications. Intuitively, there is one and only one person inhabiting the a-body before division takes place. However, if it is not determinately true that a is not identical to b and not identical to c, then there is no determinate answer to the question of how many persons there are in the a-body at this stage. Therefore, it is not determinately true that there is only one person inhabiting the a-body prior to division (Garrett 1998, p. 64). Finally, I believe that it is uneconomical to claim that what matters is identity, but that the concern for oneself can be extended to beings one is not determinately identical to. Suppose that we correctly believe that a particular criterion of personal identity is true, say, a psychological criterion, according to which personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity. And suppose that we hold that what matters is the sort of psychological continuity referred to in this criterion, regardless of whether it branches or not. The difference between our view of what matters and the view that identity is what matters will then consist merely in the fact that the latter view has a clause to rule out branching. Which view should we accept? I noted that my attitude to the torture of b would be no different than my attitude to the torture of b*. The existence or nonexistence of a further continuer, besides the one who will be tortured, will not make a difference (or more precisely, it will not make a difference to my attitude to the torture). But this means that the fact that in World 2, psychological continuity takes a non-branching form is irrelevant for my attitude towards the torture. In other words, the fact that the relevant relation holds uniquely does not seem to make a difference. So it appears that we can account for our value judgements merely by invoking the view that what matters is psychological continuity whether or not branching occurs. Why, then, claim that uniqueness matters? We do not need to claim this in order to explain our judgements. And since the only difference between our view of what matters and the view that identity is what matters is that the latter includes a clause to rule out branching, it seems that the former view is superior. In particular, it is uneconomical to claim that what matters is identity and that in cases of indeterminacy the concern for oneself is extended to one’s continuer(s). At best, this would be to assign a role to uniqueness in which it makes no difference.  4. Other values There is one final objection I want to consider. Brian Garrett has argued that even if we do not consider division as bad as ordinary death, this does not support the claim that identity is not what matters (Garrett 1998, pp. 92-93). Rather, this merely means that given the choice between ordinary death and division, we would choose division. And there may be reasons for preferring division other than the judgement that identity is not what matters. Garrett suggests the following: if a divides, b and c can complete his public projects (those of his projects that others can complete). That is, b and c can, say, finish his book, look after his family etc. I agree with Garrett that even if we prefer division to ordinary death, this does not prove that identity does not matter. However, I made a stronger claim than that division is preferable to ordinary death. I argued that a's attitude to future torture is not likely to change just because he is informed that it will be b rather than b* who receives it. If this is correct, then a's attitude to the torture will not depend on whether he is identical to the recipient or not. And this suggests that identity does not matter. This, of course, is compatible with the other claim that Garrett makes, namely that the completion of public projects matters. Both b and b* may complete a's public projects, and this fact may provide part of the reason why they matter to a. But note that even if it is important to a that someone completes his public projects, this need not be because this someone prudentially matters to a. It may be because the completion of these projects matters in the sense that his strivings will then not have been in vain, and so his life will have been better. Or it may even be because these projects matter in what we might call an 'impersonal' or 'other-regarding sense'. Perhaps it is important to a that someone takes care of his family, not because it either benefits him or someone else to whom he stands in the relation that prudentially matters, but simply because it makes his family better off. In conclusion, I believe that none of the three objections pulls through. Identity is not what matters.  References Garrett, B. 1998 Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, London: Routledge. Johnston, M. 1998 "Human Concerns without Superlative Selves", in J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell. Noonan, H. 1989 Personal Identity, London: Routledge. Parfit, D. 1984 Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Unger, P. 1990 Identity, Consciousness and Value, New York: Oxford University Press. 

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