The most grandiose of the many philosophical
problems of time is whether it is real or not. An example of
a metaphysical argument to the effect that time is unreal is
that of the idealist F.H. Bradley. In setting forth his case
he made a distinction between 1) time as space-like and 2)
time "as presented,â€? the "now.â€

Stanley, Maurice F.

English

Name not available

  245Wittgenstein on Personal Time  Maurice F. Stanley, Wilmington   The most grandiose of the many philosophical problems of time is whether it is real or not.  An example of a metaphysical argument to the effect that time is unreal is that of the idealist F.H. Bradley.  In setting forth his case he made a distinction between 1) time as space-like and 2) time “as presented,” the “now.”  Both conceptions, he argues, involve contradiction.  Time as space-like must somehow contain, as parts of it, past and future. “Time in fact is ‘before’ and ‘after’ in one; and without this diversity it is not time.” (Bradley, 1893, 34) But if time – the whole thing – has duration, then all its units must have duration, too.  But then these “units” are not really units.  So time as space-like is contradictory.  On the other hand, Bradley argues, we also conceive of time as the “now,”  “as presented,” which Bradley pictures beautifully:  “Let us fancy ourselves in total darkness hung over a stream and looking down on it.  The stream has no banks, and its current is covered and filled continuously with floating things.  Right under our eyes is a bright illuminated spot on the water, which ceaselessly widens and narrows its area, and shows us what passes away on the current. And this spot that is light is our now, our present.”   (Bradley, 1994, 44) Bradley finds that this image of time  as the moving “now”  also harbors a  contradiction: “But presented time must be time present, and we must agree, at least provisionally, not to go beyond the ‘now’… is the ‘now’ simple and indivisible?  We can at once reply in the negative.  For time implies before and after, and by consequence diversity; and hence the simple is not time.”  (Bradley, 1893, 34-35) So the “now” is also contradictory. My intent here is not to wrestle with Bradley’s metaphysical arguments but to introduce Wittgenstein’s arguments and statements on time by way of a serious example of a metaphysical  pseudo-problem, in its natural habitat, so to speak. I also want to point out the distinction Bradley makes between “space-like” time and time “as presented” (the “now”) which Wittgenstein and certain other philosophers also make.      Wittgenstein in his various discussions of time made points relevant to Bradley’s treatment of time (as well as to those of St. Augustine,  Schopenhauer,  McTaggart. and many others): “The puzzles about time are due to the analogy between time and motion.  There is an analogy, but we press it too far; we are tempted by it to talk nonsense.  We say time ‘flows’, and then ask where to and where from, and so on.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, 60-61) “Why does one feel tempted to say “ The only reality is the present”? … The person who says only the present is real because past and future are not here has before his mind the image of something moving [past him].                           past      present      future                                 Å------------------  “This image is misleading … That the statement “Only the present experience is real” [as Schopenhauer believed] seems to mean something is due to familiar images we associate with it, images of things passing us in space.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 25)  Wittgenstein is definite in his rejection of such arguments, but at this point he modestly attributes their failure to the standard fallacy of false analogy, rather than to a mistake in “philosophical grammar”: “When words in our ordinary language have prima facie analogous grammars we are inclined to try to interpret them analogously; i.e. we try to make the analogy hold throughout. ___”  (Wittgenstein, 1958, 7) This is a big generalization, but not yet a theory of  “philosophical grammar.”  But then  he speaks more directly about the “apparent contradictions” in the grammar of time: “Consider as an example the question “What is time?” as Saint Augustine and others have asked it.  … Now the puzzlement about the grammar of the word “time” arises from what one might call apparent contradictions in that grammar. “It was such a “contradiction” which puzzled Saint Augustine when he argued:  How is it possible that one should measure time?  For the past can’t be measured, as it is gone by; and the future can’t be measured because it has not yet come.  And the present can’t be measured for it has no extension.” (Wittgenstein, 1958, 26) But then he quits talking about false analogies and introduces the concept of “philosophical grammar,” which he uses to dissolve the cluster of pseudo-problems involving  “mental processes,” “minds,” “pain,” and so on:  It is difficult to find a brief quote in PI that sums up this long argument, but the following passages will perhaps serve to call it to mind: “I have a pain in my hand” has the same surface grammar as “I have a quarter in my hand, ” so we wrongly infer that pains are things, physical objects.  But I can throw the quarter away, or up in the air, but not the pain.  So pains are not objects.  But this argument seems to suggest that pains don’t exist, but Wittgenstein is not saying that, of course.  Pain is real but it is not a thing, like a coin, as Wittgenstein says: “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behavior accompanied by pain and pain-behavior without any pain?”--  Admit it? What greater difference could there be? – “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing.” – Not at all.  It is not a something, but not a nothing either … We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.””(Wittgenstein, 1953, 102)          Wittgenstein on Personal Time - Maurice F. Stanley    246 This is perhaps Wittgenstein’s most famous passage.  Therefore we expect him to say something quite similar about time.  The appropriate argument would be (now, after Wittgenstein) easy to supply: “I went back to 1940” has the same surface grammar as “I went back to Dallas,” so 1940 must be “space-like.”  We have clearly been misled by grammar, as Wittgenstein says.  Or, “He slept from Tuesday until Friday” has the same grammar as “He slept from Paris to Vienna,” so Tuesday and Friday must be “space-like,” like places or like stops on a railroad line, moving, flowing, etc.   What Wittgenstein has said about pain we expect him to say about time.  Instead he brings up certain very odd considerations:                            “How does the temporal character of facts manifest itself?  How does it express itself, if not by certain expressions having to occur in our sentences?”…      “We are inclined to say that negation and disjunction are connected with the nature of the proposition, but that time is connected with its content rather than with its nature.” (Wittgenstein, 1974, 215)      “Might one also put the question thus:  “How does it happen that every fact of experience can be brought into a relationship with what is shown by a clock?” (Wittgenstein, 1974, 216)     Since time and the truth functions taste so different, and since they manifest their nature only and wholly in grammar, it is grammar that must explain the different taste.” “One tastes like content, the other like form of representation.” (Wittgenstein, 1974, 216) The “taste” of time, the “taste” of negation and disjunction?  What can he mean? I think he means that the time of a thing or event is part of it, the fact or event, rather than a part of the statement. In “My poker is hot at time t” the time, or temporal aspect, is  part of the proposition,  while the negation of it must be stuck on.  Then he makes a distinction between “personal time” and “measurable time”: “It is noteworthy that the time of which I am here speaking is not time in a physical sense. We are not concerned with measuring time. It is fishy that something which is unconnected with measurement is supposed to have a role in propositions like that of physical time in the hypotheses of physics.” (Wittgenstein, 1974, 217) Then in the margin of PG at this point he begins (but at a later date) to approach time and time-language in the same way he approached the language of pain: “ A sentence can contain time in very different senses,” he says, and gives a list of  sentences about time: You are hurting me. Water freezes at 0 degrees. etc., etc.  (Wittgenstein, 1974, 217) Wittgenstein goes no further in this direction.  But we do know that time is not a thing or a place, not a something, not a nothing either.  We know that pain language is not referential but is a replacement for a cry.  So perhaps time language is also a replacement for something.  It’s also true about time that it is in all assertions, but has the taste of the content of assertions, not their form. So time is deep in assertions, deeper than pain.  And the kind of time we are talking about is personal time, not measurable time – subjective time, not objective time. Heidegger made very much the same distinction between “real,” (subjective) time and  “measurable” (objective) time: “Time familiar to us as the succession in the sequence of nows is what we mean when measuring and calculating time.  It seems that we have calculated time immediately and palpably before us when we pick up a watch … look at the hands and say “Now it is eight-fifty (o’clock).  “We say “now” and mean time.  But time cannot be found anywhere in the watch that indicates time … nor can it be found  in modern technological chronometers.  The assertion forces itself upon us:  the more technological – the more exact and informative – the chronometer, the less occasion to give thought first of all to time’s peculiar character.”(Heidegger, 1972, 11) “Measurable time” for Heidegger is scientific, technological time, which draws us off the path  of serious thinking.  “Real” time is subjective time, of course, for Heidegger: “Time is not a thing, thus nothing which is.”  (Heidegger, 1972, 3) “There is no time without man.”  (Heidegger, 1972, 16)  These passages represent  Heidegger’s way of holding the personal and human as real in the case of time, as against the inhumanity, impersonality and abstractness of scientific, measured time.  How can a more technologically advanced watch get us closer to the truth of real, personal time?  It is the lived experience of time that is of philosophic interest.  (This insight derives from Husserl.)  Obviously Wittgenstein was interested in personal time, too, rather than scientific, objective, “measurable” time. Interestingly, Heidegger, concerned with “true time” which, he says,  appears as the “It” of  “It gives being” (“es gibt Sein”, or in the English idiom, “What time is it?”) asks parenthetically:  “Or are we puzzled now only because we have allowed ourselves to be led astray by language or, more precisely,  by the grammatical interpretation of language?” (This passage might be brought into harmony with Wittgenstein’s  view of language.) On the other hand, the logician W.V. Quine holds an absolutely opposite, even antagonistic view.  He accepts the space-time view for reasons of simplifying grammar, avoiding theoretical awkwardness, etc. in the task of the “artificial regimentation” of ordinary language. He does not seem to even  recognize any such distinction as Bradley, Wittgenstein and Heidegger made.  Quine is interested only in  “theoretical simplicity,” which can be achieved through the “artifice of canonical notation,” the “regimentation of ordinary language”:   “Where the artifice comes is in taking the present tense as timeless always, and dropping other tenses.  This artifice frees us to omit temporal information or when we please, handle it like spatial information.”  (Quine, 1960, 170) Quine is committed to space-time: “This four-dimensional view of things is an aid to relativity physics; also it is a simplification of grammar, by resolution of tense … (Quine,  1970,  30-31) Wittgenstein on Personal Time - Maurice F. Stanley    247“There is what we say there is,” means in his case that even “objective” time, or “measurable” time, has no ontological status, because we can paraphrase it away. Subjective time gets no chance at all with Quine.    Except in logic theory, of course, simplification is not always justified.  Pretending there is no such thing as death, for example, simplifies one’s view of life, but at the cost of any authentic understanding of human reality.  Denying the existence of poverty might  simplify economic theory, but simplification that blinds itself to poverty is hardly adequate to an understanding of our actual world. At least that could be argued.  In any case my main point is that the “scientistic” view acknowledges no phenomenological, subjective time, at all. To return to the questions of time and of the language of time, it would seem that we need only ask, “What is deeper in language than even pain or deeper than negation or disjunction?  What is the essence of personal time?  When we talk about time what is the real depth of it?  Arthur Schopenhauer believed that the most basic thing there is, is will – not necessarily reasoned, human will, or personal will, but blind will:     “The plant raises its manifestation from the seed through the stem and the leaf to the blossom and the fruit, which again is the beginning of a new seed, a new individual, that runs through the old course, and so on through endless time.  … Eternal, endless flux, characterizes the revelation of the inner nature of will.” (Shopenhauer, 1939, 73) Language is an expression of will. Indeed we call a statement an “assertion”.  Pain language replaces crying. Language is more than that. Time-language, so ubiquitous,  must replace some primitive expression of will, something more primitive than pain, something universal, something  as deep as the content of a statement. It is what is there in every assertion, a part of that which is as fundamental as the will to speak. That is what Wittgenstein might have said about personal (real) time.    References Bradley, F.H. 1893 Appearance and Reality, London: Oxford University Press. Bradley, F.H. 1994 Writings On Logic and Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Heidegger, M. 1972 On Time and Being, New York: Harper and Row. Quine, W.V.O. 1970 Philosophy of Logic, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Quine, W.V.O. 1960 Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. Schopenhauer, A. 1939 The Living Thoughts of Shopenhauer, Philadelphia: David McKay. Wittgenstein, L. 2001 Wittgenstein’s Lectures, New York: Promethus Books. Wittgenstein, L. 1974 Philosophical Grammar, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. 1953 Philosophical Investigations, New York: MacMillan. Wittgenstein, L. 1958 The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: Blackwell.    

Wittgenstein on Personal Time

Elektronisch archivierte Theorie - Sammelpunkt

  245
Wittgenstein on Personal Time 
 
Maurice F. Stanley, Wilmington 
 
 
The most grandiose of the many philosophical 
problems of time is whether it is real or not.  An example of 
a metaphysical argument to the effect that time is unreal is 
that of the idealist F.H. Bradley.  In setting forth his case 
he made a distinction between 1) time as space-like and 2) 
time “as presented,” the “now.”  
Both conceptions, he argues, involve contradiction.  
Time as space-like must somehow contain, as parts of it, 
past and future. “Time in fact is ‘before’ and ‘after’ in one; 
and without this diversity it is not time.” (Bradley, 1893, 34) 
But if time – the whole thing – has duration, then all its 
units must have duration, too.  But then these “units” are 
not really units.  So time as space-like is contradictory.  
On the other hand, Bradley argues, we also 
conceive of time as the “now,”  “as presented,” which 
Bradley pictures beautifully: 
 “Let us fancy ourselves in total darkness hung 
over a stream and looking down on it.  The stream has no 
banks, and its current is covered and filled continuously 
with floating things.  Right under our eyes is a bright 
illuminated spot on the water, which ceaselessly widens 
and narrows its area, and shows us what passes away on 
the current. And this spot that is light is our now, our 
present.”   (Bradley, 1994, 44) 
Bradley finds that this image of time  as the 
moving “now”  also harbors a  
contradiction: 
“But presented time must be time present, and we 
must agree, at least provisionally, not to go beyond the 
‘now’… is the ‘now’ simple and indivisible?  We can at 
once reply in the negative.  For time implies before and 
after, and by consequence diversity; and hence the simple 
is not time.”  (Bradley, 1893, 34-35) 
So the “now” is also contradictory. 
My intent here is not to wrestle with Bradley’s 
metaphysical arguments but to introduce Wittgenstein’s 
arguments and statements on time by way of a serious 
example of a metaphysical  pseudo-problem, in its natural 
habitat, so to speak. I also want to point out the distinction 
Bradley makes between “space-like” time and time “as 
presented” (the “now”) which Wittgenstein and certain 
other philosophers also make.      
Wittgenstein in his various discussions of time 
made points relevant to Bradley’s treatment of time (as 
well as to those of St. Augustine,  Schopenhauer,  
McTaggart. and many others): 
“The puzzles about time are due to the analogy 
between time and motion.  There is an analogy, but we 
press it too far; we are tempted by it to talk nonsense.  We 
say time ‘flows’, and then ask where to and where from, 
and so on.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, 60-61) 
“Why does one feel tempted to say “ The only 
reality is the present”? … The person who says only the 
present is real because past and future are not here has 
before his mind the image of something moving [past him]. 
                          past      present      future 
                                Å------------------ 
 “This image is misleading … That the statement 
“Only the present experience is real” [as Schopenhauer 
believed] seems to mean something is due to familiar 
images we associate with it, images of things passing us in 
space.” (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 25) 
 
Wittgenstein is definite in his rejection of such 
arguments, but at this point he modestly attributes their 
failure to the standard fallacy of false analogy, rather than 
to a mistake in “philosophical grammar”: 
“When words in our ordinary language have prima 
facie analogous grammars we are inclined to try to 
interpret them analogously; i.e. we try to make the analogy 
hold throughout. ___”  (Wittgenstein, 1958, 7) 
This is a big generalization, but not yet a theory of  
“philosophical grammar.”  But then  he speaks more 
directly about the “apparent contradictions” in the grammar 
of time: 
“Consider as an example the question “What is 
time?” as Saint Augustine and others have asked it.  … 
Now the puzzlement about the grammar of the word “time” 
arises from what one might call apparent contradictions in 
that grammar. 
“It was such a “contradiction” which puzzled Saint 
Augustine when he argued:  How is it possible that one 
should measure time?  For the past can’t be measured, as 
it is gone by; and the future can’t be measured because it 
has not yet come.  And the present can’t be measured for 
it has no extension.” (Wittgenstein, 1958, 26) 
But then he quits talking about false analogies and 
introduces the concept of “philosophical grammar,” which 
he uses to dissolve the cluster of pseudo-problems 
involving  “mental processes,” “minds,” “pain,” and so on:  
It is difficult to find a brief quote in PI that sums up this long 
argument, but the following passages will perhaps serve to 
call it to mind: 
“I have a pain in my hand” has the same surface 
grammar as “I have a quarter in my hand, ” so we wrongly 
infer that pains are things, physical objects.  But I can 
throw the quarter away, or up in the air, but not the pain.  
So pains are not objects.  But this argument seems to 
suggest that pains don’t exist, but Wittgenstein is not 
saying that, of course.  Pain is real but it is not a thing, like 
a coin, as Wittgenstein says: 
“But you will surely admit that there is a difference 
between pain-behavior accompanied by pain and pain-
behavior without any pain?”--  Admit it? What greater 
difference could there be? – “And yet you again and again 
reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing.” 
– Not at all.  It is not a something, but not a nothing either 
… We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force 
itself on us here.””(Wittgenstein, 1953, 102)         
 
Wittgenstein on Personal Time - Maurice F. Stanley 
 
 
 246 
This is perhaps Wittgenstein’s most famous 
passage.  Therefore we expect him to say something quite 
similar about time.  The appropriate argument would be 
(now, after Wittgenstein) easy to supply: 
“I went back to 1940” has the same surface 
grammar as “I went back to Dallas,” so 1940 must be 
“space-like.”  We have clearly been misled by grammar, as 
Wittgenstein says.  
Or, “He slept from Tuesday until Friday” has the 
same grammar as “He slept from Paris to Vienna,” so 
Tuesday and Friday must be “space-like,” like places or 
like stops on a railroad line, moving, flowing, etc.   
What Wittgenstein has said about pain we expect 
him to say about time.  Instead he brings up certain very 
odd considerations:                            
“How does the temporal character of facts 
manifest itself?  How does it express itself, if not by certain 
expressions having to occur in our sentences?”… 
     “We are inclined to say that negation and 
disjunction are connected with the nature of the 
proposition, but that time is connected with its content 
rather than with its nature.” (Wittgenstein, 1974, 215) 
     “Might one also put the question thus:  “How 
does it happen that every fact of experience can be 
brought into a relationship with what is shown by a clock?” 
(Wittgenstein, 1974, 216)     
Since time and the truth functions taste so 
different, and since they manifest their nature only and 
wholly in grammar, it is grammar that must explain the 
different taste.” 
“One tastes like content, the other like form of 
representation.” (Wittgenstein, 1974, 216) 
The “taste” of time, the “taste” of negation and 
disjunction?  What can he mean? I think he means that the 
time of a thing or event is part of it, the fact or event, rather 
than a part of the statement. In “My poker is hot at time t” 
the time, or temporal aspect, is  
part of the proposition,  while the negation of it 
must be stuck on.  
Then he makes a distinction between “personal 
time” and “measurable time”: 
“It is noteworthy that the time of which I am here 
speaking is not time in a physical sense. We are not 
concerned with measuring time. It is fishy that something 
which is unconnected with measurement is supposed to 
have a role in propositions like that of physical time in the 
hypotheses of physics.” (Wittgenstein, 1974, 217) 
Then in the margin of PG at this point he begins 
(but at a later date) to approach time and time-language in 
the same way he approached the language of pain: 
“ A sentence can contain time in very different 
senses,” he says, and gives a list of  sentences about time: 
You are hurting me. 
Water freezes at 0 degrees. 
etc., etc.  (Wittgenstein, 1974, 217) 
Wittgenstein goes no further in this direction.  But 
we do know that time is not a thing or a place, not a 
something, not a nothing either.  We know that pain 
language is not referential but is a replacement for a cry.  
So perhaps time language is also a replacement for 
something.  It’s also true about time that it is in all 
assertions, but has the taste of the content of assertions, 
not their form. So time is deep in assertions, deeper than 
pain.  And the kind of time we are talking about is personal 
time, not measurable time – subjective time, not objective 
time. 
Heidegger made very much the same distinction 
between “real,” (subjective) time and  
“measurable” (objective) time: 
“Time familiar to us as the succession in the 
sequence of nows is what we mean when measuring and 
calculating time.  It seems that we have calculated time 
immediately and palpably before us when we pick up a 
watch … look at the hands and say “Now it is eight-fifty 
(o’clock).  “We say “now” and mean time.  But time cannot 
be found anywhere in the watch that indicates time … nor 
can it be found  in modern technological chronometers.  
The assertion forces itself upon us:  the more technological 
– the more exact and informative – the chronometer, the 
less occasion to give thought first of all to time’s peculiar 
character.”(Heidegger, 1972, 11) 
“Measurable time” for Heidegger is scientific, 
technological time, which draws us off the path  of serious 
thinking.  “Real” time is subjective time, of course, for 
Heidegger: 
“Time is not a thing, thus nothing which is.”  
(Heidegger, 1972, 3) 
“There is no time without man.”  (Heidegger, 1972, 16)  
These passages represent  Heidegger’s way of 
holding the personal and human as real in the case of 
time, as against the inhumanity, impersonality and 
abstractness of scientific, measured time.  How can a 
more technologically advanced watch get us closer to the 
truth of real, personal time?  It is the lived experience of 
time that is of philosophic interest.  (This insight derives 
from Husserl.)  Obviously Wittgenstein was interested in 
personal time, too, rather than scientific, objective, 
“measurable” time. 
Interestingly, Heidegger, concerned with “true 
time” which, he says,  appears as the “It” of  “It gives 
being” (“es gibt Sein”, or in the English idiom, “What time is 
it?”) asks parenthetically:  
“Or are we puzzled now only because we have 
allowed ourselves to be led astray by language or, more 
precisely,  by the grammatical interpretation of language?” 
(This passage might be brought into harmony with 
Wittgenstein’s  view of language.) 
On the other hand, the logician W.V. Quine holds 
an absolutely opposite, even antagonistic view.  He 
accepts the space-time view for reasons of simplifying 
grammar, avoiding theoretical awkwardness, etc. in the 
task of the “artificial regimentation” of ordinary language. 
He does not seem to even  recognize any such distinction 
as Bradley, Wittgenstein and Heidegger made.  Quine is 
interested only in  “theoretical simplicity,” which can be 
achieved through the “artifice of canonical notation,” the 
“regimentation of ordinary language”:  
 “Where the artifice comes is in taking the present 
tense as timeless always, and dropping other tenses.  This 
artifice frees us to omit temporal information or when we 
please, handle it like spatial information.”  (Quine, 1960, 
170) 
Quine is committed to space-time: “This four-
dimensional view of things is an aid to relativity physics; 
also it is a simplification of grammar, by resolution of tense 
… (Quine,  1970,  30-31) 
Wittgenstein on Personal Time - Maurice F. Stanley 
 
 
 247
“There is what we say there is,” means in his case 
that even “objective” time, or “measurable” time, has no 
ontological status, because we can paraphrase it away. 
Subjective time gets no chance at all with Quine.    Except 
in logic theory, of course, simplification is not always 
justified.  Pretending there is no such thing as death, for 
example, simplifies one’s view of life, but at the cost of any 
authentic understanding of human reality.  Denying the 
existence of poverty might  simplify economic theory, but 
simplification that blinds itself to poverty is hardly adequate 
to an understanding of our actual world. At least that could 
be argued.  In any case my main point is that the 
“scientistic” view acknowledges no phenomenological, 
subjective time, at all. 
To return to the questions of time and of the 
language of time, it would seem that we need only ask, 
“What is deeper in language than even pain or deeper than 
negation or disjunction?  What is the essence of personal 
time?  When we talk about time what is the real depth of 
it?  
Arthur Schopenhauer believed that the most basic 
thing there is, is will – not necessarily reasoned, human 
will, or personal will, but blind will:     
“The plant raises its manifestation from the seed 
through the stem and the leaf to the blossom and the fruit, 
which again is the beginning of a new seed, a new 
individual, that runs through the old course, and so on 
through endless time.  … Eternal, endless flux, 
characterizes the revelation of the inner nature of will.” 
(Shopenhauer, 1939, 73) 
Language is an expression of will. Indeed we call a 
statement an “assertion”.  Pain language replaces crying. 
Language is more than that. Time-language, so ubiquitous,  
must replace some primitive expression of will, something 
more primitive than pain, something universal, something  
as deep as the content of a statement. It is what is there in 
every assertion, a part of that which is as fundamental as 
the will to speak. That is what Wittgenstein might have said 
about personal (real) time. 
 
 
 
References 
Bradley, F.H. 1893 Appearance and Reality, London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bradley, F.H. 1994 Writings On Logic and Metaphysics, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Heidegger, M. 1972 On Time and Being, New York: Harper and 
Row. 
Quine, W.V.O. 1970 Philosophy of Logic, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Quine, W.V.O. 1960 Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. 
Press. 
Schopenhauer, A. 1939 The Living Thoughts of Shopenhauer, 
Philadelphia: David McKay. 
Wittgenstein, L. 2001 Wittgenstein’s Lectures, New York: 
Promethus Books. 
Wittgenstein, L. 1974 Philosophical Grammar, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Wittgenstein, L. 1953 Philosophical Investigations, New York: 
MacMillan. 
Wittgenstein, L. 1958 The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
 
 
 


Wittgenstein on Personal Time

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