Negotiating with insurgents can be a perilous endeavor and talks do not always succeed in ending the conflict. A comprehensive review of the counterinsurgency (COIN, henceforth) literature reveals an emphasis on “how to win” in COIN, in addition to an overrepresentation of the same handful of case studies—Algeria, Malaya, Vietnam—with little to offer in the way of concrete policy prescriptions regarding conflict resolution. By examining four more recent insurgencies (Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and South Africa) and the operational and organizational capacities of each group, this dissertation identifies several factors related to an insurgent group’s likelihood of negotiating with the host-nation government, including sanctuary, financing, group composition, popular support, and a military stalemate. After completing a cross-case comparative analysis of the four groups, policy implications and recommendations are provided for the Afghan Taliban. This research relies on archived documents, books, journal articles, semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts, media accounts, and other open sources in order to outline specific conclusions and recommendations while also providing decision-makers with a foundation for related policy on how to approach negotiations with insurgents, both now and in the future
