Bayes logics based on Bayes conditionalization as a probability updating mechanism have recently been introduced in [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14136/]. It has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions or on a standard Borel space is not finitely axiomatizable [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14136/]. Apart from Bayes conditionalization there are other methods, extensions of the standard one, of updating a probability measure. One such important method is Jeffrey's conditionalization. In this paper we consider the modal logic \JL_{<\omega} of probability updating based on Jeffrey's conditionalization where the underlying measurable space is finite. By relating this logic to the logic of absolute continuity and to Medvedev's logic of
finite problems, we show that \JL_{<\omega} is not finitely axiomatizable. The result is significant because it indicates that axiomatic approaches to belief revision might be severely limited
