The widespread use of the statutory authority has long been
seen as a major characteristic of Australian public
administration. A major theme in the literature on statutory
authorities in countries such as Australia whose core
institutions of government are based on the Westminster model
is the problem of accountability which these bodies are
alleged to cause. This thesis addresses that problem in the
context of Australian Commonwealth government.
The general aim of the thesis is to challenge the
traditional view that the statutory authority is not a
suitable administrative form upon which to build an
accountable public administration. It begins by showing how
the dominant conception of accountability associated with the
Westminster 'syndrome' of ministerial control of
administration and ministerial responsibility to parliament
has shaped, and prejudiced, the understanding of
accountability in Commonwealth statutory authorities. Next,
it is argued that there is less difference between the
accountability of Australian Commonwealth statutory
authorities and that of ministerial departments than is often
supposed. The thesis then questions the continuing
application to statutory authorities of assumptions about
accountability which have for some time been under serious challenge in Australian public administration. It is argued
that, considered in the light of an understanding of
accountability informed by contemporary developments in
Australia and elsewhere, Commonwealth statutory authorities
demonstrate a reasonably healthy degree of accountability and,
perhaps more importantly, reveal the potential to play an
important role in the development of a more accountable public
administration.
Central to the thesis is an attempt to develop an
appropriate conceptual framework for understanding the public
accountability of statutory authorities. To this end, the
root idea of accountability is identified as the satisfaction
of diverse expectations and concerns about the exercise of
administrative discretion. It is then argued that three
conceptions of, or perspectives on, accountability may be
usefully distinguished. Alongside the traditional notion of
'parliamentary control', 'managerialist' and 'constituency
relations' conceptions are introduced. The differences
between the three may be summarized as follows: parliamentary
control relies heavily on essentially bureaucratic
relationships of close supervision or control of the
administrative agency; the managerialist conception employs
quasi-contractual relations, emphasizing strategic control and
periodic evaluation; and the constituency relations conception
rests on an essentially political set of relationships,
emphasizing the responsiveness through various mechanisms of
the agency to a range of interested constituencies.
The three conceptions are presented as complementary
rather than mutually exclusive ways of viewing accountability. All have a role to play in contemporary public administration,
and indeed all three may be utilized in different mixes to
engineer a desired level and form of public accountability for
particular statutory authorities. Accountability regimes, it
is suggested, ought to be tailored to the nature and mission
of the individual administrative organization.
It is also suggested, finally, that debate over the
accountability of statutory authorities may be viewed as an
aspect of a wider debate over the relative merits of competing
models of democracy. Statutory authorities have a role to
play in a system of government based on dispersal of power and
widespread responsiveness. They allow administrative tasks to
be located in a wide range of purpose-built administrative
agencies with a wide range of purpose-related means of
responding to the concerns and expectations of many relevant
constituencies regarding the use of administrative discretion
