Golunov, Sergey V.

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Policy 
Documentation 
Center Feature Article
Drug Trafﬁcking and Russian Security
by Serghei V. Golunov1   
Drug-trafﬁcking is one of the most serious and socially dangerous challenges to the national security of Russia
and its neighbors. According to ofﬁcial ﬁgures, the number of drug addicts in Russia is about 400,000, but by
expert estimations, the ﬁgure could be as high as 3-4 million. Two thirds are young people not older than 30.
During the last ten years the number of drug addicts in Russia has increased ninefold while the annual income 
of the narcomaﬁa is estimated at between 8 to 18 billions of US dollars.
The strategic response to this challenge is only in the initial stage. It is determined by the combination of fac-
tors such as the perception of the problem by decision-makers, the interests of the Russian political elites and 
external actors such as the EU. The current policy emphasis on military and police measures is manifested in 
increasing expenditures for border control and the tightening of migration policy. At the same time, efforts to 
reduce demand through narcological programs (including regional programs carrying out in border regions) 
often receive insufﬁcient ﬁnancial support. There is a common tendency to call for extraordinary measures and
additional funding at the expense of education, health protection etc.  In addition, violations of human rights 
and maltreatment of ethnic groups are justiﬁed by the necessity to struggle with narcomaﬁa. Critics of such
policies are routinely portrayed as “accomplices of the mob”. 
Taking into account these considerations, there is a strong need for well-reasoned critical evaluation of anti 
drug trafﬁcking policy including measures for responding to transboundary trafﬁcking.
This policy research project will focus on addressing the following questions are: a) How effective are military 
and police measures to counter narcotrafﬁc through Russian borders? b) In which cases is the policy successful
and why? c) To what extent are demand reduction measures effective? d) In which circumstances will the re-
distribution of funds from “force measures” to demand reduction be useful? e) Taking into account that citizens 
of CIS states and “ethnic criminal groupings” often appear to play key roles in transboundary drug-trafﬁcking,
how can security measures be combined with observation of human rights and the maintenance of close rela-
tions between Russia and other post-Soviet countries?
This research will carry out a structural-functional analysis of transboundary narcotrafﬁc in Russia, analyse
drug related statistics concerning the main trafﬁcking routes and in border regions, draw on expert estima-
tions, and event analysis of cases of trafﬁckers’ arrests.
The structure of drug-trafﬁcking through Russian borders is determined by many factors not least demand,
the geography of drug producing sites, pre-existing smuggling routes, and the reactions of the narcodealers 
to state and international agencies efforts.  Drugs are brought to Russia through several main directions. With 
its weak landscape-based border and its well-developed network of transboundary communications, the Rus-
sia-Kazakhstan border is the main drug route.  Lower volumes are smuggled through Russia’s borders with 
the Transcaucasian states, China, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic countries. The main routes of drug-traf-
ﬁcking originate in Afghanistan (heroin and opium) and Tshu (Chu) valley area at Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan bor-
derland (cannabis), lesser routes are from Ukraine (poppy straw), and the EU countries (synthetic drugs and 
cocaine). After crossing Russian border the most intensive ﬂows of heroin, opium and cannabis are directed to
Central (Moscow) and Northern-Western (St. Petersburg) Russia and partially further westwards to EU states, 
to the Volga and the Ural regions, Caucasian resorts (Krasnodar and Stavropol regions), gas-and-oil producing 
1 Sergey Golunov is an International Policy Fellowship holder for 2005-06.  More details of his work can be found at http://www.policy.
hu/golunov/index.html
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areas of Western Siberia. According to ofﬁcial estimations levels of drug consumption and drug-related crimes
in the region bordering Kazakhstan and the Transcaucasian states is noticeably higher than in Russia on aver-
age. In such administrative regions as Krasnodar krai; Astrakhan, Novosibirsk, and Tiumen oblasts the rate of 
drug-related criminal activity is higher than in Moscow and St. Petersburg. 
The structural organization of narco-business evolves from the prevalence of individuals and small groups into 
stronger large branch groupings.  Some are well-organized systems encompassing all stages from produc-
ing, processing (e.g. from opium to heroin), smuggling, wholesale trade, to retailing. Nevertheless, there are 
not sufﬁcient grounds to afﬁrm that the transboundary drug-trafﬁcking through Russia is evolving in a strictly
centralizing fashion nor are there increasing signs of the creation of dug monopolies. At some stages in the 
narcotrafﬁc trade, the role of “ethnic criminal groupings” is great, especially with smuggling and wholesale
trade. But using ofﬁcial data on criminal prosecutions of drug-trafﬁckers, representatives of ethnic minorities
or “ethnic criminal groupings” are not the main players in the whole process of narcotrafﬁc. In many cases the
composition of such criminal groupings is international with increasing numbers of drugs being smuggled by 
Russian citizens or “ethnic Europeans” whose appearance arouse less suspicions. 
In order to provide safety for their smuggling operations, drug-trafﬁckers attempt to establish corrupt ties
with border ofﬁcials.  These may facilitate the transboundary transportation of narcotics, insure them from
criminal responsibility or even return conﬁscated drugs. Among the relevant structures are the border guard
and customs services, the regional branches of the Agency for Control of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(Narkokontrol’), and the police. The amount of the bribes proposed (especially at the stage of border and cus-
toms control) can be hundreds of times the salary of these ofﬁcials. However, the risk of serious punishment,
the possibilities for less risky illegal income (assistance for smuggling of consumer goods) and informal rules 
(for example, assistance to drug-dealers is censured even among bribable customs ofﬁcials) has, to some ex-
tent, restrained the increase of “narco-corruption” within state structures controlling Russian borders. 
On the whole, the smugglers have a wide range of ways to avoid border and customs control. Most drugs 
are brought through existing checkpoints and, taking into account these possibilities, there are no grounds to 
assume that more than 5-10% of such contraband is seized. Local achievements in some border regions (in 
2003-2004 the prices for heroin increased signiﬁcantly) are concerned ﬁrst with the struggle against wholesale
and retail structures.  These efforts will almost certainly simply cause the reorganization of these networks. 
Unfortunately, in border regions and at national level demand reduction programs are poorly ﬁnanced despite
the fact that international experience shows that such programs are effective with far less signiﬁcant invest-
ments than military and police measures.
To conclude, the current stress on border closures as the panacea for the struggle against transboundary drug-
trafﬁcking is inexpedient. Most smuggling goes through the existing checkpoints while the imperfection of the
inspection procedures and the low salaries of ofﬁcials (working for border guard and customs services, police
of border regions and districts) make evident breaches within the system of control at Russian borders.  Taking 
into account the special vulnerability of the enormous Russian land boundaries, the huge expenses required 
for the establishment of fully-ﬂedged border control with sufﬁcient salaries for responsible ofﬁcials, should lead
Russian decision-makers to pay far more attention to demand reduction. Finally, both policy decision-makers 
and the community should resist attempts to use the struggle with drug-trafﬁcking as justiﬁcation of extraor-
dinary measures causing gross violations of human rights. Such measures will hardly lead to any essential 
improvements, but they can pose a serious threat to democracy and the human rights of Russian citizens.


Drug trafficking and Russian security

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