Drawing on research from conversation analysis and developmental psychology, we point to the existence of “supporters” of morally responsible agency in everyday interaction: causes of our behavior that we are often unaware of, but that would make goodenough reasons for our actions, were we made aware of them

Reddy, Vasudevi

Zinken, Jörg

Publikationsserver des Instituts für Deutsche Sprache

The practice of everyday life providessupporters and inviters of morally responsibleagencydoi:10.1017/S0140525X17000851, e64Jörg Zinkena and Vasudevi ReddybaInstitut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS), 68161 Mannheim, Germany;bDepartment of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UnitedKingdom PO1 2DY.zinken@ids-mannheim.de vasu.reddy@port.ac.ukhttp://www1.ids-mannheim.de/prag/personal/zinken.html?L=1http://www.port.ac.uk/department-of-psychology/research/situated-action-and-communication/Abstract: Drawing on research from conversation analysis anddevelopmental psychology, we point to the existence of “supporters” ofmorally responsible agency in everyday interaction: causes of ourbehavior that we are often unaware of, but that would make good-enough reasons for our actions, were we made aware of them.Doris is troubled by “defeaters”: causes of our behavior that weare not aware of and, to make things worse, that we would notthink of as good reasons for our behavior were we made awareof them. Research in experimental social psychology claims tohave identified many such defeaters. To cite one of Doris’s exam-ples, some people seem to vote for the guy at the top of the ballot,although they would probably not claim that “because he was topof the ballot” was the reason for their choice, or that it would makea good reason for anyone’s choice. But if our decisions can beswayed in such irrational ways, the worry follows, how can wethink of ourselves as responsible agents?To soften the blow dealt to our agency by such potential “defeat-ers” and to support the overall thrust of Doris’s work, we want todraw attention to research on everyday social life. Some of thatresearch points to the existence of what we might call “supporters”:causes of our behavior that we are often unaware of, but that wouldmake good-enough reasons for our actions, were wemade aware ofthem. Work in Conversation Analysis, which examines the norma-tive order of our mundane social interactions, has identified manysuch supporters (e.g., Stivers et al. 2011; Zinken 2016).Consider the ways a person might address a request for someaction to another. Requests for small-scale acts of cooperation areubiquitous in everyday life, and they provide a central arena formorally accountable agency. In languages around the world, wefind complex systems of practices for making requests (Floydet al. 2014). But how do I come to the decision to use an interrog-ative in one situation (Can you pass me a plate?) and an imperativein another (Pass me a plate)? As it turns out, we make these littledecisions in highly systematic ways: Imperative requests – the pre-dominant format for requesting little acts of cooperation across lan-guages – build on the other’s availability for the job, whereasinterrogative requests take into account the fact that the other isoccupied with something unrelated. In other words, a cause forchoosing an interrogative over an imperative request is the relativelack of continuity of the requested action with what the other isalready doing (e.g., Rossi 2012; Wootton 1997).People seem to care about these contextual cues a lot. If yourpartner is standing in just the right spot to pass you the plate youwant, you might begin to address him with an imperative. But ifhe begins to walk to the fridge right as you start talking, youmight break off and restart your request in an interrogativeformat (data discussed in Zinken 2016). But when we asked video-taped participants about their choices in such everyday interactions,they either spoke broadly about matters of politeness, or suggestedthat their choice of request form was quite arbitrary. It seems then,and maybe unsurprisingly so, that we are not always aware of thesubtle contextual cues that sway our decisions in our everyday inter-actions with others. But if we were made aware of them, wouldthere be cause for embarrassment? I would say not: My more orless subliminal awareness of the fact that my partner’s moving to53Published in: Behavioral and brain sciences vol. 41 (2018), invited commentary on Doris M. John: Précis of talking to our selves: reflection, ignorance, and agency, pp. 53-54the fridge constitutes an engagement that is in conflict with passingme a plate has moved me to express the value of respecting anotherperson’s autonomy. Two seconds earlier, my sensitivity to my part-ner’s availability for cooperation had moved me to express anotherimportant value: our need to express closeness to others (Brown &Levinson 1987). In sum, the contextual cues that regularly sway ourdecisions in designing interactional moves can indeed make goodreasons for occasions when we are asked to rationalize what wedid (see Doris 2015b, pp. 141–43). They are supporters ratherthan defeaters of our morally responsible agency.Surely we do have our irrational moments. But maybe theextant research in social psychology over-advertises these a bit.Research on everyday adult interaction instead finds “supporters”of moral agency to be ubiquitous in our social lives. And from theearliest months of infancy, we are drawn into action by “inviters”of action and response, without which development would beimpossibly difficult. Infants begin from 6 or 7 months of age tounderstand and comply with adult directives. However, ratherthan being enabled by a newly developed grasp of others’ inten-tions, infants come to this gradually. The adults around set up con-texts of repeated and routinized invitations to act, to attend, toshow off their skills to visitors, and to join in easy cultural rituals(Reddy et al. 2013). Infants are drawn into participating in theseengagements, and without direct focus on it, begin to grasp thevery structures of moral participation in social life.These inviters and supporters seem to fit well into the theory ofthe social genesis and development of morally responsible agencythat Doris has argued for. Their recognition might further reducethe appeal of skepticism about responsibility and agency.54

English

The practice of everyday life provides supporters and inviters of morally responsible agency. In response to: Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency

Portsmouth University Research Portal (Pure)

BBS-D-17-00229_ Doris_Zinken & Reddy 
 
The practice of everyday life provides supporters and inviters 
of morally responsible agency 
 
Jörg Zinkena and Vasudevi Reddyb 
 
aInstitut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS). R5, 6-13 ,68161 Mannheim, Germany 
bUniversity of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, England 
 
zinken@ids-mannheim.de 
http://www1.ids-mannheim.de/prag/personal/zinken.html?L=1 
vasu.reddy@port.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: Drawing on research from Conversation Analysis and Developmental 
Psychology, we point to the existence of “supporters” of morally responsible agency in 
everyday interaction: causes of our behavior that we are often unaware of, but that would 
make good-enough reasons for our actions, were we made aware of them. 
 
Doris is troubled by “defeaters”: causes of our behavior that we are not aware of and, to 
make things worse, that we would not think of as good reasons for our behavior were we 
made aware of them. Research in experimental social psychology claims to have 
identified many such defeaters. To cite one of Doris’s examples, some people seem to 
vote for the guy at the top of the ballot, although they would probably not claim that 
“because he was top of the ballot” was the reason for their choice, or that it would make a 
good reason for anyone’s choice. But if our decisions can be swayed in such irrational 
ways, the worry follows, how can we think of ourselves as responsible agents? 
 
 To soften the blow dealt to our agency by such potential “defeaters” and to 
support the overall thrust of Doris’s work, we want to draw attention to research on 
everyday social life. Some of that research points to the existence of what we might call 
“supporters”: causes of our behavior that we are often unaware of, but that would make 
good-enough reasons for our actions, were we made aware of them. Work in 
Conversation Analysis, which examines the normative order of our mundane social 
interactions, has identified many such supporters (e.g., Stivers et al. 2011; Zinken 2016).   
  Consider the ways a person might address a request for some action to another. 
Requests for small-scale acts of cooperation are ubiquitous in everyday life, and they 
provide a central arena for morally accountable agency. In languages around the world, 
we find complex systems of practices for making requests (Floyd et al. in preparation). 
But how do I come to the decision to use an interrogative in one situation (Can you pass 
me a plate?), and an imperative in another (Pass me a plate)? As it turns out, we make 
these little decisions in highly systematic ways: imperative requests – the predominant 
format for requesting little acts of cooperation across languages – build on the other’s 
availability for the job, whereas interrogative requests take into account the fact that the 
other is occupied with something unrelated. In other words, a cause for choosing an 
interrogative over an imperative request is the relative lack of continuity of the requested 
action with what the other is already doing (e.g., Rossi 2012; Wootton 1997). 
 People seem to care about these contextual cues a lot. If your partner is standing 
in just the right spot to pass you the plate you want, you might begin to address him with 
an imperative. But if he begins to walk to the fridge right as you start talking, you might 
break off and restart your request in an interrogative format (data discussed in Zinken 
2016). But when we asked video-taped participants about their choices in such everyday 
interactions, they either spoke broadly about matters of politeness, or suggested that their 
choice of request form was quite arbitrary. It seems then, and maybe unsurprisingly so, 
that we are not always aware of the subtle contextual cues that sway our decisions in our 
everyday interactions with others. But if we were made aware of them, would there be 
cause for embarrassment? I would say not: my more or less subliminal awareness of the 
fact that my partner’s moving to the fridge constitutes an engagement that is in conflict 
with passing me a plate has moved me to express the value of respecting another person’s 
autonomy. Two seconds earlier, my sensitivity to my partner’s availability for 
cooperation had moved me to express another important value: our need to express 
closeness to others (Brown & Levinson 1987).  In sum, the contextual cues that regularly 
sway our decisions in designing interactional moves can indeed make good reasons for 
occasions when we are asked to rationalize what we did (see Doris, pp. 141-143).  They 
are supporters rather than defeaters of our morally responsible agency. 
 Surely we do have our irrational moments. But maybe the extant research in 
social psychology over-advertises these a bit. Research on everyday adult interaction 
instead finds “supporters” of moral agency to be ubiquitous in our social lives. And from 
the earliest months of infancy, we are drawn into action by “inviters” of action and 
response, without which development would be impossibly difficult. Infants begin from 6 
or 7 months of age to understand and comply with adult directives. However, rather than 
being enabled by a newly developed grasp of others’ intentions, infants come to this 
gradually. The adults around set up contexts of repeated and routinized invitations to act, 
to attend, to show off their skills to visitors, and to join in easy cultural rituals (Reddy et 
al. 2013). Infants are drawn into participating in these engagements, and without direct 
focus on it, begin to grasp the very structures of moral participation in social life. 
 These inviters and supporters seem to fit well into the theory of the social genesis 
and development of morally responsible agency that Doris has argued for. Their 
recognition might further reduce the appeal of skepticism about responsibility and 
agency. 
 
References 
 
Brown, Penelope; Levinson, Stephen C. (1987): Politeness. Some universals of language 
usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Floyd, Simeon; Rossi, Giovanni; Enfield, Nick. J. (Eds.) (in prep.): Getting Others to Do 
Things. A Pragmatic Typology of Recruitments. Berlin: Language Science Press. 
Reddy, Vasudevi; Liebal, Katja; Hicks, Kerry; Jonnalagadda, Srujana; Chintalapuri, 
Beena (2013): The emergent practice of infant compliance. An exploration in two 
cultures. In Developmental Psychology 49, pp. 1754–1762. 
Rossi, Giovanni (2012): Bilateral and unilateral requests. The use of imperatives and mi 
x? interrogatives in Italian. In Discourse Processes 49, pp. 426–458. 
Stivers, T.; Mondada, L.; Steensig, J. (Eds.) (2011): The Morality of Knowledge in 
Conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wootton, Anthony J. (1997): Interaction and the development of mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Zinken, Jörg (2016): Requesting responsibility. The morality of grammar in Polish and 
English family interaction. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 


The practice of everyday life provides supporters and inviters of morally responsible agency

AbstractDrawing on research from conversation analysis and developmental psychology, we point to the existence of “supporters” of morally responsible agency in everyday interaction: causes of our behavior that we are often unaware of, but that would make good-enough reasons for our actions, were we made aware of them.</jats:p

Jörg Zinken

Vasudevi Reddy

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences

https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/ws/files/9994277/The_practice_of_everyday_life.pdf

The practice of everyday life provides supporters and inviters of morally responsible agency

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