Motivated by the growing prominence of third-party data providers in online
marketplaces, this paper studies the impact of the presence of third-party data
providers on mechanism design. When no data provider is present, it has been
shown that simple mechanisms are "good enough" -- they can achieve a constant
fraction of the revenue of optimal mechanisms. The results in this paper
demonstrate that this is no longer true in the presence of a third-party data
provider who can provide the bidder with a signal that is correlated with the
item type. Specifically, even with a single seller, a single bidder, and a
single item of uncertain type for sale, the strategies of pricing each
item-type separately (the analog of item pricing for multi-item auctions) and
bundling all item-types under a single price (the analog of grand bundling) can
both simultaneously be a logarithmic factor worse than the optimal revenue.
Further, in the presence of a data provider, item-type partitioning
mechanisms---a more general class of mechanisms which divide item-types into
disjoint groups and offer prices for each group---still cannot achieve within a
loglog factor of the optimal revenue. Thus, our results highlight that the
presence of a data-provider forces the use of more complicated mechanisms in
order to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue