In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical formulation for a specific
form of collaborative industrial relations called "Industrial Symbiotic
Relation (ISR) games" and provide a formal framework to model, verify, and
support collaboration decisions in this new class of two-person operational
games. ISR games are formalized as cooperative cost-allocation games with the
aim to allocate the total ISR-related operational cost to involved industrial
firms in a fair and stable manner by taking into account their contribution to
the total traditional ISR-related cost. We tailor two types of allocation
mechanisms using which firms can implement cost allocations that result in a
collaboration that satisfies the fairness and stability properties. Moreover,
while industries receive a particular ISR proposal, our introduced methodology
is applicable as a managerial decision support to systematically verify the
quality of the ISR in question. This is achievable by analyzing if the
implemented allocation mechanism is a stable/fair allocation.Comment: Presented at the 7th International Conference on Industrial
Engineering and Systems Management (IESM-2017), October 11--13, 2017,
Saarbr\"ucken, German