CORE
🇺🇦
make metadata, not war
Services
Services overview
Explore all CORE services
Access to raw data
API
Dataset
FastSync
Content discovery
Recommender
Discovery
OAI identifiers
OAI Resolver
Managing content
Dashboard
Bespoke contracts
Consultancy services
Support us
Support us
Membership
Sponsorship
Community governance
Advisory Board
Board of supporters
Research network
About
About us
Our mission
Team
Blog
FAQs
Contact us
research
Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
Authors
Florian Englmaier
G. Mühlheusser
Andreas Roider
Publication date
1 September 2012
Publisher
Abstract
Abstract is not available.
Similar works
Full text
Open in the Core reader
Download PDF
Available Versions
University of Regensburg Publication Server
See this paper in CORE
Go to the repository landing page
Download from data provider
oai:epub.uni-regensburg.de:217...
Last time updated on 03/02/2021
University of Regensburg Publication Server
See this paper in CORE
Go to the repository landing page
Download from data provider
oai:epub.uni-regensburg.de:217...
Last time updated on 11/07/2013
