Ankeny, Rachel

Boon, Mieke

Boumans, Marcel

Chang, Hasok

English

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Introduction: Philosophy of Science in Practice.

Ankeny, R.

Chang, H.

Boumans, M.

Boon, M.

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications

Introduction: philosophy of science in practice

University of Twente Research Information

EDITORIAL ARTICLEIntroduction: philosophy of science in practiceRachel Ankeny & Hasok Chang & Marcel Boumans &Mieke BoonPublished online: 28 September 2011# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011Philosophy of science is booming—at least in sheer quantitative terms, such as thenumbers of scholars and professional organizations associated with the field. On thesurface, one might attribute these trends to the concurrent growth of science itself,along with the large amounts of funding committed to scientific research and thelasting cultural power of scientific paradigms in the late 20th and early 21stcenturies. Yet, much work in the philosophy of science continues in nearly completeisolation from real scientific practice. The Society for Philosophy of Science inPractice (SPSP) grew out of a recognition of the need to promote the philosophicalstudy of “science in practice”, by which the organizers of the Society meant bothscientific practice and the functioning of science in practical realms of life. Despiteoccasional exceptions such as some recent literature on models, experimentation,and measurement which have engaged in detailed consideration of scientificpractices in pursuit of their philosophical points, concern with practice has tendedto fall outside the mainstream of Anglophone analytic philosophy of science. SPSPwas founded with the aim of changing this situation, through the promotion ofEuro Jnl Phil Sci (2011) 1:303–307DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0036-4R. Ankeny (*)School of History & Politics, University of Adelaide, Napier Building, The University of Adelaide,Adelaide, SA 5005, Australiae-mail: rachel.ankeny@adelaide.edu.auH. ChangDepartment of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane,Cambridge CB2 3RH, UKe-mail: hc372@cam.ac.ukM. BoumansFaculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Valckenierstraat 65-67, 1018 XEAmsterdam, The Netherlandse-mail: m.j.boumans@uva.nlM. BoonDepartment of Philosophy, University of Twente, Postbox 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlandse-mail: m.boon@utwente.nlconscious, detailed, and systematic study of scientific practice that nevertheless doesnot dispense with concerns about truth and rationality.This special issue of the EJPS brings together a selection of papers presented atthe 2nd Biennial Conference of SPSP, which was held in June 2009 at the Universityof Minnesota in Minneapolis, where Douglas Allchin was the chief local organizer.(For information about other conferences we have held, please see the SPSP website:http://www.utwente.nl/gw/spsp). The eight authors of the papers presented here arebased in the US, France, Canada, Finland and the Netherlands, and they are womenat various stages of their careers, ranging from a PhD student to full professors. It isa remarkable coincidence that all of the authors are women, especially as the gendermix at the conference itself was about equal. However, the fact that such acoincidence was possible at all does reflect something about the inclusive andinnovative spirit in which SPSP has developed. The purpose of this briefintroduction is twofold: firstly to present a concise view of the vision of ‘philosophyof science in practice’ pursued by SPSP, and secondly to introduce the topics of theindividual papers in the issue and indicate how they fit into that vision.In many of its traditional forms, philosophy of science has focused on the relationbetween scientific theories and the world, oftentimes to the neglect of scientificpractice. In contrast, in social studies of science and technology the dominant trendhas been to examine scientific practice as a human creation, sometimes wilfullydisregarding the world except as a product of social construction. Both of theseapproaches have their merits, but they each offer only a limited view neglectingsome important perspectives or approaches which are necessary for the developmentof a fuller picture of science. If we are interested in exploring the assumptions andmethods underlying the sciences, it is essential not only to explore the theories andresults produced by scientists, but the processes by which they came to theseconclusions. And what we learn from history of science is that scientific practicesshould be evaluated in their historical contexts reaching up to the present moment.Without excavating underneath the tidy surface of published papers or finalizedtheories, it is extremely difficult to identify these processes. SPSP is dedicated tofostering the pursuit of a philosophy of science that considers theory, practice andthe world simultaneously, and never in isolation from each other.The direction of philosophy of science we advocate is not entirely new andclearly has prestigious forerunners. For example, naturalistic philosophy of sciencehas often emphasized the need to study scientific practices. In integrated approachesto the history, philosophy and sociology of science, much philosophical attention hasbeen paid to actual scientific practices. Outside of the philosophy of science,pragmatists, ordinary-language philosophers and followers of the later Wittgensteinhave attempted to ground truth and meaning in practices. And those in theContinental philosophical traditions often have also emphasized the need to considerexperience and practice, as well as rejecting the positivist traditions which they viewas privileging science unduly and taking scientific progress for granted. Scholarsparticipating in SPSP activities have been making conscious efforts to inject theselines of thought into analytic philosophy of science.In order to understand the implications of the SPSP approach, it is necessary toconsider what is meant by ‘practice.’ Practice consists of organized or regulatedactivities aimed at the achievement of certain goals. Therefore, any useful304 Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2011) 1:303–307investigations of a particular form of practice must elucidate what kinds of activitiesare associated with and required for the generation of knowledge in that domain.Traditional debates in the philosophy of science concerning epistemologicalconcepts such as truth, fact, belief, certainty, observation, explanation, justification,evidence, and so on may be usefully re-framed in terms of activities. Rather thanasking abstract or theoretical questions about the appropriate scientific standards forevidence, recasting the questions of interest in terms of activities allows us toexplore various (and often competing) approaches to the generation and weighing ofevidence. Examining the goals underlying the activities associated with science alsoforces us to focus not only on epistemological considerations but also on the values,norms, and ideals inherent in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. Further, itencourages us to question the metaphysical and ontological assumptions underlyingthese practices rather than taking them as obvious or as unquestionable ‘givens.’ Inshort, focusing on practice allows philosophy of science to return to fundamentalissues which have increasingly become neglected in favour of a relatively narrowpreferred approach to the field which is largely epistemic, highly theoretical, andoften overlooks the implications of the sciences as practiced.In our approach to the philosophy of science, it is crucial to have productiveinteractions between philosophical analyses and the study of actual scientificpractices, past and present. This requirement provides a strong rationale forcultivating the participation of practicing scientists, engineers, policymakers, andothers at the ‘coal face’ of science and practice. We aim not only to learn from theexperiences and understandings of these practitioners, but encourage them tobecome more reflective about their practices, as well as the underlying assumptionsand the implications of these practices. We hope that philosophy of science canincreasingly be viewed as relevant and useful for scientific practitioners.Practice, of course, happens in the real world, and SPSP is eager to encourageinvestigations not only of the acquisition and validation of knowledge, but also ofthe use of such knowledge in the material and social world. Our concern is not onlyabout how pre-existing knowledge gets applied to practical ends, but also about howknowledge itself is fundamentally shaped by its intended uses. Consequently, it iscritical to break down traditional barriers between the ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ sciences,between the ‘natural’ and the ‘social’ sciences, and between ‘science’ and‘technology,’ in order to allow us to be more reflective about the extent to whichand the ways in which all areas of science may be shaped by the uses to which theknowledge generated through scientific research may be put.We also seek a more inclusive and integrated philosophy of science. At timesthere has been lopsided attention to certain areas of science, held up as exemplars forall science in general without adequate reflection on their limitations. The traditionalfocus on fundamental physics, as well as the more recent focus on certain subfieldswithin biology, have distorted our view of science and of scientific practice, and maywell have contributed to the canalization of approaches described above as typical oftraditional Anglophone philosophy of science. There has been a tendency for somesubfields and approaches to be considered by some to be more marginal, such as thephilosophy of medicine and the philosophy of technology due to their connections toapplications of science, or the philosophy of the social sciences for its subject matternot being really ‘scientific’, or feminist perspectives as being too relativistic or inEuro Jnl Phil Sci (2011) 1:303–307 305some sense non-analytic. Hence scholars working in these fields have created theirown venues for exchange and publication. In contrast, SPSP advocates re-integrationof various subfields and approaches within the philosophy of science. It aims toencourage the examination of a range of scientific fields including economics andother social or human sciences, the engineering sciences, and the medical sciences,as well as relatively neglected areas within biology and physics, using the full rangeof methods and theories available to us. At a metalevel, we seek to foster reflectionon our methodologies for examining science and its practices, including limitationsand prospects for learning from other disciplinary traditions devoted to the study ofscience such as sociology of science, science and technology studies, publicunderstanding of science, and history of science.The papers included in this special issue represent some of the main themes thathave begun to emerge as SPSP has taken shape and grown. For instance, one keytheme is the importance of understanding how human artefacts, such as conceptualmodels, laboratory instruments, linguistic constructs, and scientific standards,mediate between theories and the world, and the role that these artefacts play bothin the shaping of scientific practice and of scientific theories. The paper by TarjaKnuuttila and Mieke Boon examines one such artefact that has been revisitednumerous times in both the history and the philosophy of science, Sadi Carnot’sideal heat engine. They use this example to focus on explaining how and whymodels give us useful knowledge through scientific practice, arguing that what theyterm an ‘artefactual’ approach to modelling is required since traditional, represen-tational approaches are either misleading or too minimal depending on howrepresentation is defined. Isabelle Peschard’s essay focuses on modelling as anactivity, going beyond the representational relationship between the model and thetarget object. She contends that models should be regarded as elements of an‘epistemic space’ composed of models of phenomena and activities of modelling,and that the worth of a model depends on the difference it makes in this epistemicspace with respect to the investigation of scientifically significant problems. Herexamples are drawn from both abstract and experimental models in fluid mechanics,with a particular focus on models which are used in the construction of other models,which she claims is the most common way in which models can 'make a difference.'As noted above, there are traditions within philosophy which we view aspredecessors or inspirations for the current SPSP mandate, including pragmatism.Amy L. McLaughlin’s paper supports this vision in its investigation of thepragmatist recommendations in relation to the proper way to conduct scientificinquiry. She examines Charles Sanders Peirce’s ideas on the economy in determiningwhich experimental tests to perform, and shows that they reveal traces of his broaderepistemological recommendation to pursue nature’s resistance to our ideas. Herdiscussion hence makes a contribution to deepening our understanding of Peirce’sphilosophy at the same time as providing practical guidance for conducting researchunder economical or other constraints.The essays by Monica Aufrecht and Léna Soler both engage with SPSP’smetalevel goal of fostering a wider range of methodologies and approaches availableto philosophers of science in order to further our understanding of science and itspractices. Aufrecht examines a debate related to the legitimacy of feministapproaches to philosophy of science. She revisits the classic ‘context of discovery’306 Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2011) 1:303–307and ‘context of justification’ distinction as deployed within this debate, andconcludes that the use of the context distinction is deeply ambiguous and thusmasks underlying debates about naturalism as well as the nature of justification. Shemakes the further point that the context distinction might serve as an underlying,often unspoken, motivation for many who continue to question the turn to scientificpractice (such as that being advocated through SPSP). Soler investigates the tacitdimension of knowledge, which has been highlighted by Michael Polanyi and HarryCollins especially. She argues that the irreducibly tacit presuppositions and corporalskills inevitably involved in experimental practices create what she calls ‘opacity’ inexperimental practices. Examining the consequences of this opacity, she concludesthat the stabilization of experimental results is sensitive to the identity of theindividuals forming the ‘core set’ responsible for the stabilization. This opens up thepossibility that there may be several different stabilizations, each with sufficientrobustness; there are obvious implications for the question of the contingency ofscientific results.Finally, the contributions by Kirstin Borgerson and Miriam Solomon both usemedicine and its practice as the window for examining fundamental epistemologicalissues in the philosophy of science as well as their implications for science policyand practice. Borgerson defends a modified version of Helen Longino’s criticalcontextual empiricism (CCE), using evidence from recent medical research toillustrate lessons particularly regarding epistemic diversity. She shows how arigorous social epistemology such as CCE is indispensable for understanding andassessing contemporary scientific practice, particularly given the various socialpressures which influence contemporary biomedical research as well as the criticalrole of such research in shaping public policy. Solomon develops a critique ofevidence-based medicine (EBM), based on a helpful review of the main tenets ofEBM and the extant critical literature. She notes a curious discrepancy between thehigh degree of reliability that is theoretically expected from the techniques advocatedin EBM, and the actual results they deliver in practice. She advocates a moreinstrumental or even pragmatic approach, in which any ranking of evidence is doneby reference to the actual, reliability of results.We hope you will find this issue thought-provoking and perhaps a bit disruptivecompared to more traditional scholarship in the philosophy of science. On the whole,the papers we present here are pioneering forays into new directions, rather than thefinal word on any given topic. Our wish is that they will stimulate further work byreaders of this journal by illustrating the kind of philosophy of science that we areattempting to promote in SPSP.Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2011) 1:303–307 307

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