Lettinga, D.

Saharso, S.

Saharso, Sawitri

University of Twente Research Information

Runnymede Perspectives42IntroductionWe have been involved in a European project comparing the political debate and regulating of the Islamic veil (see www.veil-project.org). Doutje Lettinga and I constituted the Dutch team. Our contribution is based on the work we have done for VEIL. All over Europe, headscarves, or more generally the veil, have become a controversial subject.1 One important insight we gained from comparing national cases is that the controversies over the veil are in reality not so much about the veil as about national identity. That is, about European states reconfiguring and reconsidering themselves as they are becoming increasingly more multicultural and multi-religious societies in a globalizing world. There are national differences in the response to the veil, but over time a convergence can be identified, which we find worrying because, in the end, it is limiting the space for Islamic women to choose whether they want to veil. We will illustrate our claim with data from our research on headscarf debates in France and the Netherlands, and conclude with some comparative observations with reference to Britain.Dutch regulation is by and large accommodative, while French regulation has been prohibitive, culminating in the prohibitive laws of 2004 that forbid the wearing of signs or clothing, such as the veil, which conspicuously manifest students’ religious affiliations in the realm of public schools. In this paper, we present an analysis of the political debates on the veil in France and the Netherlands covering the time period of 1989–2007. We review how the problem of the veil was defined and discussed in parliament to get a better understanding of these national differences in responses to the veil, and also to see whether a change occurred over time. The NetherlandsWhile the regulation on veiling in the Netherlands is largely accommodative, we are seeing a gradual decrease in tolerance. An example of this occurred in 1999, when a teacher-trainee was forbidden to wear a headscarf in the classroom. This sparked a small opposition party, Groen Links (the Greens), to argue that it hampers emancipation if women 8. Headscarf Debates as a Prism for Conceptions of National IdentitySawitri Saharso and Doutje Lettinga University of Twente Enschede/VU University Amsterdamcannot wear their headscarf at work. Again, in 2001, when a court clerk was refused to wear a headscarf, the Green Party’s MP, Femke Halsema, compared the headscarf to ethnicity, social class, or sexual preference. She claimed the idea that the headscarf might be a symbol of oppression is mistaken, as it is simply a symbol of identity. The underlying problem is the discrimination Muslim women face from mainstream society. Therefore, the Greens proposed that dress rules be adjusted so that Muslim women could participate in society. The right to wear a headscarf was confirmed in a policy directive in 2003.In 2004, Stef Blok, the chair of the Commission Blok in charge of evaluating the integration policy, expressed the view which was dominant at the time: “The main point is that it is someone’s own choice. If you want to restrict it, you need to show good reasons for it.” Public neutrality was considered as an insufficient reason for restriction. It was not that the Dutch did not care about neutrality, but they did not perceive the headscarf as a danger to public neutrality. This view was laid down again in a policy document.  The preceding year saw cases in the courtrooms associated with the niqab. Two students brought a case before the Commission on Equal Treatment, which was then dismissed following the Commission’s judgment that a niqab is dysfunctional when teaching young children. However, in two other cases on the use of the niqab, the Commission on Equal Treatment ruled in favour of the women.In 2005, right-wing politician, Geert Wilders, proposed a motion to the Dutch parliament to ban the burqa in public spaces. His proposal was strategically timed to be discussed during a national debate surrounding terrorism. The burqa became framed as a problem of security and public order. Liberal MP Frans Weekers said: ‘When people cover their face in public, whether this is with a burqa or with a balaclava, this seriously affects other people’s feelings of safety, and the concern for a civil public order involves that we do not tolerate such face covers.’ The burqa was also framed as a symbol of gender inequality within Islam. A right-wing majority in Parliament voted Secularism, Racism and the Politics of Belonging 43through a motion supporting prohibitive laws on the burqa. In 2009, the government announced its plans to introduce regulations that would forbid the wearing of all types of garments which cover the face (including balaclavas) in schools, both public and private, for school-goers and visitors alike. The reasons given included issues on interpersonal interaction, communication, public safety and active citizenship. A  directive has been sent to Ministerial departments to prohibit this type of clothing in public offices as well. Wilders’ initial motion (to ban the burqa in all public spaces) was rejected because it infringed on equality and religious freedom, and was considered disproportional. This explains the more moderate law of the current government.FranceIn 1989, three Muslim girls were excluded from a College in Creil. In what later came to be known as the Creil affair, the socialist government condemned the ban on headscarves. Some wondered if this was inspired by the displays of Dutch multiculturalism , but the Socialists had other reasons to oppose the ban. They agreed with the Right that the Republican’s promise of equality could only be maintained if citizens were treated as abstract individuals, instead of as members of ethnic-religious communities. They defended their belief that the school would liberate Muslim girls. Michel Rocard (then prime minister) said: ‘I don’t believe a pure authoritarian procedure to be very effective, and despite the militant lay-man I am, I don’t accept a repressive aspect to be the dominant face of laicité. Laicité wants to convince, to persuade and to be shining. That is the laicité that should be maintained in our schools. (..) The aim of our public and lay school is to welcome, to persuade, to integrate, that means, to realize the goals of education in another way than through a politics of a priori exclusion.’ The Socialists saw causes of the headscarf problem to include social deprivation and alienation, and they did not want to further isolate Muslim girls in their communities. This was reflected in their policy (see table below). During the 1990s, the Socialists gradually lost their trust in the integrative and emancipative power of the public school, as Muslim girls stayed unwilling to give up their veil and hence appeared rather unassimilable on this point. The fact that girls insisted on wearing the headscarf was no longer considered as stemming from marginalization, but framed as expressing separatism and political Islam and. the policy changed accordingly.At the turn of the 21st Century, the Socialists agreed with the analysis of the Right and  the left-wing parliamentary groups Republic et Liberté  (RL) and Radicale, Citoyen et Vert (RCV) that some Muslims rejected integration, secularism and the Republican project of equality. These fundamentalist groups forced their ideology upon others and particularly Table 1. The NetherlandsTime and conflictsFrame Policy1999t e a c h e r t r a i n e e , court clerkHeadscarfNot allowing headscarves hampers emancipation  & integration, the problem is discrimination by society (Green Party). Other parties: Mainly framed as conflicting with neutrality, but not strong enough to warrant a ban. (but socialists associated niqab with gender inequality within Islam)Right to wear headscarves in schools and civil service confirmed in directive 20032004police N i q a b (students)In general: right to religion trumps public neutrality except for certain functions (dress signalling authority, impartiality) (all parties except List Pim Fortuyn)Policy document: confirms right to wear the headscarf, except for court personnel and certain police functions2005-2007BurqaBurqa framed as security & public order problem and as a symbol of submission. Must be banned therefore (Geert Wilders Freedom Party, followed by majority in Parliament)2009 law in preparation to ban burqa and niqab in schools, labour market and public transportRunnymede Perspectives44threatened the freedom and equality of young secular Muslim girls. We can clearly see this diagnosis in a legislative proposal of 2003, in which some Socialists proposed to ban all religious, political and philosophical symbols from schools (law proposition no. 2096 put forward by Georges Sarre (PS) and signed by Jaques Desallangre, Jean-Pierre Michel, Pierre Carassus and Michel Suchod). Donning the headscarf was framed as a ‘contestation of French values and culture’ (referring to gender-equality and the freedom of individual conscience), and ‘a rejection, often imposed on young girls, of the Republican and laic model of integration’. A growing communalism in the suburbs would contribute to this fundamentalism that fragmented the nation into separatist and potentially violent communities where the rights of women were being undermined. On March 15th 2004, the French government passed the law that banned the wearing of conspicuous signs of religious affiliation. Comparison and ContextualizationWhy is veiling more contested in France than in the Netherlands? It is often argued that the French adhere to a strict interpretation of public neutrality because of their Republican tradition. French secularism developed not only as a mechanism to free the state from religious influence, it also was a tool to emancipate individual citizens from (Catholic) communities seeking to control their members. The French Republicans sought to secure national cohesion by integrating citizens into a public realm where they were to share the same universal values of equality, freedom and solidarity (Scott, 2007). In contrast to France, Dutch secularism sought to protect the freedom of religious minorities from the liberal state. Furthermore, secular (leftist) liberals in the Netherlands were forced to make a compromise with Catholic and Calvinist minorities over political and social life. In the late 19th century, these had established local and regional politically organized religious subcultures to oppose the liberal’s secular nation-building project, later joined by the social democrats that likewise had begun to organize parties, professional and leisure time associations (Kersbergen & Manow, 2008). This resulted into the segmentation of Dutch society along confessional lines, known as pillarization. Given this background it is understandable why veiling is more contested in France than in the Netherlands. The two countries’ responses to the veil follow from their nation-building process.It should be noted, however, that even in France there was a time when politicians did not consider the headscarf as conclusively incompatible with the laic public school. After 2003, Dutch tolerance towards veiling declined. This was in a context in which Table 2. FranceTime & conflicts Frame Policy1989Creil affair, 3 girls expelled from schoolHeadscarf in public schools conflicts with public neutrality (laïcité) & integration: symbol of alienation (marginalization) & gender: the laïc school liberates (socialist party) Council of State: headscarves not necessary incompatible with laïcité, if not acts of pressure, provocation, proselytism, propaganda 1994Several conflicts in schools, strike on behalf gym teacher (no headscarf for safety reasons)Integration: headscarf symbol communalism, rejection French values and political Islam And a symbol of gender inequality (socialists now follow right wing (RPR) + Republican left wing (Groups RL, RCV)Decree Bayrou: ostentatious symbols not allowed in public schools, room to negotiate about ‘light’ scarves, bandanas2004Commission Stasi installedSame frames, but become stronger (2002 Right wing UMP majority in parliament) + decree Bayrou ineffective, for still many conflicts  Stasi commission Law: conspicuous religious signs or clothing prohibited in public schools. Headscarves always conspicuous.Secularism, Racism and the Politics of Belonging 45new political players had made their appearance on the Dutch scene (Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali).  The integration policy was blamed as being too multicultural, allowing Islamic radicalism. This was at a time when Islamic violence had not only manifested itself internationally, but also on Dutch soil. Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh was murdered by a radical fundamentalist in 2004. In this climate, Dutch politicians felt the necessity, it appears, to distance themselves from multiculturalism. Re-assertion of Dutch national identity and Dutch values became a theme. One way of doing this was by making a firm stand against the burqa. The change in attitude of Dutch politicians towards veiling that likened the Dutch political debate to the French debate was a reconfiguration of the Dutch ideal of a multicultural and multi-religious society in a globalizing world. The consequences for Muslim women were limitations on their freedom to wear the veil, due to manifestations of Dutch policy.We did not research the British veil debates (see Kilic, 2008), and therefore limit ourselves to just a few comparative observations regarding Britain. In the literature on citizenship and immigrant integration, Britain and the Netherlands are usually lumped together as two multicultural countries and contrasted with France as an example of a civic assimilationist or universalist integration regime (see Koopmans et al., 2005). When we look at these countries through the lens of state-church relations, France gets characterised as following a model of strict secularism and the Netherlands as a case of principled pluralism. State neutrality means in the Dutch context of pillarization that the state does not ban religion from the public sphere, as in France, but that it does not discriminate between religious and non-religious institutions. Therefore, religious groups not only have the right to establish their own schools, but also receive full public funding. This gave Muslims and other newly-established religious minorities the opportunity to make  religious claims and get them accommodated. Treating Islam differently from the established religions would amount in Dutch eyes to discrimination. The UK is an altogether different case, as the Church of England is the established religious authority in England, but not for the rest of Britain. Yet despite the decline of formal ties between Parliament and the Church of England, there exist comparatively strong formal and legal ties between church and state. The British Monarch also represents the head of the church and has considerable authority in church affairs, such as the power to appoint archbishops. The church itself continues to have an important political role in the workings of the state, as some bishops have reserved seats in the House of Lords (see Monsma & Soper, 1997 and Fetzer & Soper, 2005). How this affects the space for the religious claims of Muslims, and in particular, how this plays out in the framing and regulating of the veil is not so obvious. First, the big difference with both France and the Netherlands is that in these two countries there are legal rules which restricts, in the case of France, or accommodates, in the case of the Netherlands, the wearing of the veil, while in Britain there is no formal regulation. There exists a rather accommodative or laissez-faire practice as Kilic (2008: 444) calls it towards the veil. Secondly, until 2006 when former Foreign Affairs Minister Jack Straw publicized his article (‘I want to unveil my views on an important issue’, The Lancashire Telegraph, 6 October 2006) in which he expressed his discomfort with women wearing niqabs (a garment that covers the face, but leaves the eyes uncovered), Britain had not experienced a widespread public debate on veiling (Kilic 2008: 434). Given the privileged position of the Church of England as the established religious authority, the absence of a public debate and the accommodative practice is surprising as one would expect that the space for Muslims’ religious claims would be limited in Britain.  This is the more so if one realizes that the multicultural framework in Britain is set by the Race Relations Act that determines the space for recognition of minority claims. As Muslims are considered a religious group, and not as a racial or ethnic group like Jews or Sikhs, this works to the disadvantage of Muslims (Modood 2006). Yet this is not reflected in debates or policies regarding the veil. Up to this day, veiling in the UK is relatively uncontested and the policy reaction accommodative. While we were inclined on the basis of our comparison between France and the Netherlands to conclude that the framing and regulating of the veil is more determined by a country’s self image as a nation and the way state-church relations are institutionalised in the nation-building process than by its integration regime, this explanation certainly will not do for Britain, but neither is an explanation in terms of integration regimes.Notes1. We will use ‘the veil’ as a shorthand to refer to all forms of Muslim women’s head- and body- covering together, such as chador, jilbab or niqab. When we want to refer to a specific form of veiling, such as the headscarf or the burqa, this will be mentioned as such.2. Fortuyn had founded his List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in February 2002. After his assassination in May 2002 his party gained a huge election victory (26 seats in Parliament). Hirsi Ali was in 2003 elected as a MP for Runnymede Perspectives46the Dutch liberal party. She castigated Islam for its gender inequality. They were later followed by Geert Wilders, a dissident member of the liberal party who formed in 2004 his Patij voor de Vrijheid (Party for the Freedom) and by Rita Verdonk, again a former liberal MP who founded her movement ‘Trots op Nederland’ (Proud of the Netherlands) in 2007.ReferencesFetzer, J. S. and Soper, C. J. (2005) Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kilic, S. (2008) ‘The British Veil Wars’, in: Sevgi Kilic, Sawitri Saharso and Birgit Sauer (eds) The Veil: Debating Citizenship, Gender and Religious Diversity, Special Issue of Social Politics. International Studies in Gender, State, and Society 15(4): 433–454. Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., and Passy, F. (2005) Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.Modood, T. (2006), ‘British Muslims and the Politics of Multiculturalism’, in: Modood, Tariq, Triandafyllidou, Anna and Zapata-Barrero, Ricard (eds) Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship. London/New York: Routledge.Monsma, S. and Soper, C. J. (1997) The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in Five Democracies. Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield publishers.Scott, J.W. (2007) The Politics of the Veil. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.Van Kersbergen, K. and Manow, P. (eds) (2008), Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare State Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Headscarf debates as a prism for conceptions of national identity

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Headscarf debates as a prism for conceptions of national identity

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