The paper presents two objections against Putnam’s Twin Earth
argument, which was intended to secure semantic externalism. I first
claim that Putnam’s reasoning rests on two assumptions and then try to
show why these assumptions are contentious. The first objection is that,
given what we know about science, it is unlikely that there are any
natural-kind terms whose extension is codetermined by a small set of
microstructures required by Putnam’s indexical account of extension
determination. The second objection is that there may not be a plausible
concept of a speech community whose adoption would classify Oscar and
Twin Oscar as members of different speech communities and, at the
same time, render Oscar and Twin Oscar as being in the same
psychological state. I contend that Putnam’s argument fails because both
objections are justified.Publikacja została sfinansowana ze środków Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego w ramach programu Narodowego Programu Rozwoju Humanistyki przyznanych na podstawie decyzji 0014/NPRH4/H3b/83/2016 - projekt „Przygotowanie i publikacja dwóch anglojęzycznych numerów monograficznych Internetowego Magazynu Filozoficznego HYBRIS” (3bH 15 0014 83)