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Rainey, Gene E.

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Journal of the Arkansas Academy of ScienceVolume 16 Article 121962Toward a More realistic Evaluation of the UnitedNationsGene E. RaineyHarding UniversityFollow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaasPart of the International and Intercultural Communication Commons, and the InternationalRelations CommonsThis article is available for use under the Creative Commons license: Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0). Users are able toread, download, copy, print, distribute, search, link to the full texts of these articles, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without asking priorpermission from the publisher or the author.This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Arkansas Academyof Science by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.Recommended CitationRainey, Gene E. (1962) "Toward a More realistic Evaluation of the United Nations," Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science: Vol. 16, Article 12.Available at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol16/iss1/1249Arkansas Academy of Science Proceedings, Vol. 16, 1962TOWARD A MORE REALISTIC EVALUATIONOF THE UNITEDNATIONSGene E.RaineyHarding CollegeFour months removed from India's conquest of the Portu-guese enclaves, it is now possible to realistically —and perhapsobjectively —evaluate the impact of this event on the UnitedNations. The doomsday prophecies have not been fulfilled,viz., war over Dutch West New Guinea, British Honduras, andGuantanamo has not occurred. Now that the death knells forIe United Nations rung so frequently in December have sub-led the international politician should embark on a soberaluation of the role of international organization in Americanreign policy.Two DevelopmentsThe Goan invasion of December 16, 1961, sculptured inrelief two developments which necessitate a more realistic evalu-ation of the United Nations.(1) Multiplicationof membership.The first of these developments is the oft-referred-to mul-tiplication of United Nations membership, which may be di-vided into three stages.The earliest period spanned the beginning five years ofUnited Nations' existence, during which the United States em-ployed the U.N. as an effective instrument of foreign policy.The United States, with the approval of its N.A.T.O. allies,with an almost unanimous support from Latin American coun-tries, and a smattering of votes from the Afro-Asian nations, con-trolled the majority on substantive measures brought before theGeneral Assembly. 1 As the Cold War began and worsened afterthe founding of the United Nations, the United States relied onthe U.N. for a host of international problems ranging fromRussian troops in Iran to Communist aggression in Korea. 2During this period, the American and Soviet delegates experienceddifficulty agreeing on new members for the United Nations:therefore, only eight nations were added. 3'Of the original 51 members of the United Nations, 14 were European, 22Western Hemisphere, and 1 5 Afro-Asian nations.case of Korea, the United Nations legitimized a policy of intervention,hich the United States would have followed anyway.3Two European (Iceland and Sweden) and six Afro-Asian (Afghanistan.Thailand, Pakistan, Yemen, Burma, and Israel) nations were the eight.49Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 16 [1962], Art. 12Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 196250Arkansas Academy of Science ProceedingsThe second period of U.N. history is a transition stage.Chronologically, it began with the Korean War and was char-acterized by a noticeable lack of induction of new members, andby further increase in the power of the General Assembly throughthe "Uniting for Peace" resolution. 4 The authority of the Se-curity Council continued to wane vis-a-vis the General Assem-bly.The birth of the third period of United Nations historyis precisely dated —December 14, 1955 —when East-West ap-proval of sixteen new members broke the membership dikes.This trend has continued down to the present day until thegeographical distribution of the United Nations' 104 membersshows 26 European, 22 Western Hemisphere, and 56 Afro-Asian nations. Under these conditions, the statement of a Por-tuguese diplomat aptly describes the American position:Iam afraid your delegation in the United Na-tions no longer organizes and creates majorities. Itseems reduced now to merely joining them. 5While these words were spoken out of Portugal's bitternessover the United States' lack of diplomatic action in the Goaninvasion, they have been increasingly true since 1955. TheU. S. successfully organized and created majorities only whenthe Communist empire blundered (e.g., Russian suppression ofHungary and Chinese conquest of Tibet) and on a subject clear-ly defined as a matter of national security (admission of Com-munist China). On other occasions, such as the General As-sembly resolution on Angola, the smaller nations flexed theirvoting muscles. 6 In regard to Goa, formidable opposition byminor powers to action against India's aggression discouraged aUnited States' plan to transfer the dispute from the SecurityCouncil to the General Assembly after the Soviet veto.•*The nation that joined the U.N. during this period was Indonesia on Sep-tember 28, 1950. For a description of the "Uniting for Peace" resolu-tion, see Everyman's United Nations, 6th ed., (New York: United Na-tions Office of Public Information, 1959), pp. 75-77.»New York Times, December 19, 1961, p. 19.sThe General Assembly resolution on Angola was adopted January 30, 1962,by a vote of 90 in favor, 2 opposed (Spain and the Union of SouthAfrica) and one abstention (France) . Portugal boycotted the debate. Thisresolution urged Portugal "to undertake, without further delay, extensivepolitical, economic and social reforms and measures and in particular toset up freely elected and representative political institutions with a viewto transfer power to the people of Angola." This was a stronger reso-lution than the one approved by the Security Council six months earlier-June 9, 1961.50Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 16 [1962], Art. 12http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol16/iss1/1251Evaluation of the United Nations(2) Disputes between minor powers.The Goan incident also points up a second —and muchnewer—development in the U.N. evolution: the inability ofcollective security to solve disputes between minor powers.Since 1945, enforcement of United Nations decisions hasresulted in a dichotomy. On one hand, the U.N. successfully en-forced its willindisputes involving small nations while, on theother, it failed in the all-important area of Cold War disagree -iits between the two superstates—the Union of Soviet So-ist Republics and the United States of America. Is Goa aw in the wind portending a break-down of enforcement ma-lery on problems which heretofore have been solved? This is>bering question for the friends of international organizationhonestly answer.IGoa is nota clear-cut case of U.N. failure to solve a minor>ute because the Soviet veto blocked Security Council actioncomplicated the issue. The U.S.S.R.'s attempt to make po-al hay in the sunshine of colonialism injected the Goan ques-iinto the Cold War, where it is largely out of place. Goat or may not represent a new trend in United Nations' evo-on, a trend which heralds the decline of international or-ization as an effective instrument for world peace. At alimum, United Nations' efficiency is impaired and its pres-damaged by India's action.¦ In a more optimistic vein, Ambassador Stevenson analyzedPortuguese-Indian dispute recently and recalled thatin December came the alarming military actionagainst Goa, in which armed force was used, in thename of anti-colonialism but contrary to the Charter—yet without any action on the part of the UnitedNations. Ispoke at the time of the very grave conse-quences for peace if this most ill-considered stepshould be taken as a precedent by others. Let us hopethat it proves no more than an aberration. 7Iai Stevenson, speech delivered February 22, 1962, before the Woman'sational Press Club, Washington, D. C. (Mimeographed copy releasedr the United States Delegation to the United Nations.) This statementfar removed from the pessimism of Mr. Stevenson after the Russian-to on December 18, 1961, which prevented U.N. action on Goa: "In the only delegate, I think, at this table who was present at the birththis organization. Tonight we are witnessing the first act in the dramahich could end with its death." New York Times, December 19, 1961.14 389948 UN|VERS|TY OF ARKANSAS 51Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 16 [1962], Art. 12Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 196252Arkansas Academy of Science ProceedingsConsequently, two developments make it imperative thata fresh look be given the United Nations. First, the machinerycreated by the United States to use in the Cold War is now inthe hands of the non-aligned countries. Our post-World WarIIstrategy of increasing the power of the General Assemblycreated a weapon which the United States can no longer aimwhen fired. Second, the ability of the U.N. to solve disputesinvolving minor powers is seriously questioned.A Possible AlternativeAs if anticipating the Goan invasion by several months,Senator J. William Fulbright opened the door for reconsidera-tion of the United Nations' role in American foreign policy.8*Senator Fulbright's thesis is, simply, that the United Nationshas failed primarily because it was founded on the assumptionof unanimity among the major powers following World WarII. The "formidable threat of aggressive imperialistic Commu-nism" dictates that the West forge a new unity—a Concert ofFree Nations. Mr. Fulbright was not alone in raising thesedoubts before India's aggression, for Commentator Sulzbergerechoed the same theme when he penned the warning:. . . by giving (the) U.N.more authority and at thesame time watching our own authority diminish in(the) U.N. we edge toward an uncomfortable po-sition. A few years hence we may desperately try toextricate ourselves. 9While attention should be given to the major contentionsof Senator Fulbright, it is also important to note his omissions.For example, he does not believe that the United States shouldabdicate its responsibilities toward the underdeveloped countriesof the world, for he envisions an "inner community" composedof our N.A.T.O. allies and an "outer community" open to anynon-Communist nation. He does not advocate United States'withdrawal from the United Nations, nor does he attack in-ternational organization as a threat to American sovereignty.And, finally,his Concert of Free Nations cannot be interpretedas a "fortress America" concept in modern dress.8j. W. Fulbright, "For a Concert of Free Nations," Foreign Affairs, v. 40(October, 1961), pp. 1-18. For additional information on Senator Ful-bright's views on international affairs, see John H. Burnett, "J. W. Fui-bright. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," ArkansasHistorical Quarterly, v. 20 (Winter, 1961), pp. 318-330.sC. L. Sulzberger, "AnEmbarrassing Diet of Principles," New York Times,October 5, 1961, p. 44.52Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 16 [1962], Art. 12http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol16/iss1/1253Evaluation of the United NationsAs a result, the more ardent disciples of international or-nization find the Concert of Free Nations palatable. If thenited Nations could be de-emphasized as an arena for East-West disputes —a role which has given the U.N. its failures androunds for criticism—then it would receive the respite neces-ary for evolving toward a more effective organization. Sup->orters of the United Nations should guard against overestimat-ng the U.N. as the sole elixir for the deep-seated differenceslat divide the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Overestimating Unitedations' capabilities will lead to overloading, and as Assistantcretary of State Cleveland pointed out, "overloading can beangerous." 10The Domestic SettingUnfortunately, the re-evaluation of United Nations' use-fulness to the United States in the Cold War must take placeat an inopportune time, from a domestic point-of-view, be-cause of the resurgence of ultraconservative sentiment. Current-ly an assortment of criticisms which run the gauntlet fromconcern over loss of sovereignty to the contention that thecharter was inspired by the Soviet constitution are hurled at theUnited Nations. 11 However, as David Riesman has observed,domestic distrust of the U.N. is not "merely isolationist jeal-ousy of our sovereignty; rather, it is based on the belief thatany mediator tends to persuade the reasonable fellow to give into the truculent one." l2While the Kennedy administration restudies U. S. policytoward the United Nations, it is buffeted by groups opposed1o"Up to a point, loading more onto the United Nations helps to enhance itscapacity to act. Beyond that point, overloading can be dangerous if itmakes the machinery creak too badly or exposes the executive to too manydifferent kinds of political attack at one time." Harlan Cleveland, "TheRoad Around Stalemate," Foreign Affairs, v. 40 (October, 1961), p. 36.Mr. Cleveland amplified the ideas contained in this article in a recent speech.See New York Times, February 1, 1962, p. 6-n"A part of that (Communist) plan, of course, is to induce the gradualsurrender of American sovereignty, piece by piece and step by step, tovarious international organizations —of which the United Nations is theoutstanding but far from the only example —while the Communistsare simultaneously and equally gradually getting complete working controlIof such organizations. . .. Until one day we shall gradually realize thatwe are already just a part of a world-wide government ruled by theKremlin, with the police-state features of that government rapidly closingin on ourselves." The Blue Book of the John Birch Society, 8th print-ing, (1961), pp. 29-30. For additional comments on the United Nationssee W. Cleon Skousen, The Naked Communist, (Salt Lake City, Utah:Ensign Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 265-269.l2David Riesman, "Dealing with the Russians over Berlin," The AmericanScholar, v. 31 (Winter, 1961-62), pp. 61-62.53Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 16 [1962], Art. 12Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 196254Arkansas Academy of Science Proceedingsto international organization altogether. The danger is twofold: that, first, President Kennedy will react to extremisviews and support an organization which no longer constitutesa reliable instrument of American foreign policy, or second, theadministration willbe tempted to offer the United Nations asa sacrificial lamb, ignoring its effectiveness on non-Cold "Warissues. Thus far, President Kennedy has been unwavering in hissupport. "In my opinion," he said in a January press confer-ence, "the United Nations justifies the effort we put into itsubstantially." 13 Later he stated that, "I support the UnitecNations very strongly and Ithink the American people do...." 1*While the American people support the United Nationsvarious developments during the past year serve to dampentheir enthusiasm. The American man-in-the-street is, by anclarge, a prudent breed and views with suspicion the financiatroubles at Lake Success. In addition, the chaotic tug-of-warin the Congo and the misunderstood policy of both the UnitecNations and the United States are not helping matters. Thedenial of membership to Communist China represents the onlytangible victory for "our side" which Americans can cheer.Despite the trend toward a realistic evaluation of theUnited Nations, a thread of idealism remains woven into cur-rent thinking to remind the international politician of the ulti-mate port-of-call of international organization. This segmentof the political spectrum holds the opinion that the UnitedNations is the "only true alternative to war," to borrow thephraseology of President Kennedy. 15 Walter Lippman chastizesthose wholike spoiled children wish to stop playing if theycannot always win the game. But the grown-up viewof the United Nations is,Isubmit, that if the 50 newmembers do not agree with us inside the U.N., in allprobability they would disagree with us even moreviolentlyoutside the U.N. Those new nations wouldstill exist if there were no United Nations that theycould belong to.16isNew York Times, January 16, 1962, p. 14.i4\Vall Street Journal, March 22, 1962, p. 12.« 'President Kennedy used these words in his speech before the United NationsGeneral Assembly, September 25, 1961, as reported in the New YorkTimes, September 26, 1961, p. 14.isWalter Lippmann, "Indispensable Headaches," Lexington Herald, Decem-ber 27, 1961, p. 3.54Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 16 [1962], Art. 12http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol16/iss1/1255Evaluation of the United NationsThe QuestionIAmerican policy-makers face the challenge of preventingrid War III.Inis Claude points out that the League of Na-is was established to prevent another World War I(that is,¦ by accident) ,but was incapable of stopping World WarFurthermore, the United Nations was conceived as a rem-for future World War II's (that is, war by design) . Dr.ude observes that the "United Nations could be interpretedin attempt to equip the world for dealing with Hitlers—r Hitler was already dead." 17 It is outside the capabilitiesnternational organization mirroring imperfections of the po-al scene around it to prevent a future atomic holocaust.IA realistic evaluation of the United Nations is not synony-is with scuttling it. In spite of Goa, to use the crude butriptive statement of Professor Stanley Hoffman, "it is toojto throw in the sponge." 18 Nor does re-evaluation signifythe international politician is jettisoning his idealism. Itns rather that we must, with a sigh, set aside the techniqueyorld collecive security until conditions are more appropri-This strategy will, in effect, shield the United Nationsia disastrous fate which it does not deserve, but neverthe-is prescribed by the realities of East-West conflict. Theibility exists that, when the Cold War is ended, we willrn to the process of international organization as one of thelulas for eradicating war.BiL. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares, 2nd ed., (New York: Ran-m House, 1959), p. 87. Also see pp. 43-50 for additional comments.¦nley Hoffman, "Popularity and Power at the U.N.," The New Leader,45 (February 19, 1962), p. 22.55Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 16 [1962], Art. 12Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1962