Compliance with labour law has costs and bene\u85ts which may depend on the institutional
environment in which \u85rms operate. Although several studies have documented a negative e\ua4ect
of informality on \u85rms\u92productivity and growth it is a fact that \u85rms may resort to undeclared
employment to escape excessive tax or regulatory burden. We argue that \u85rms may respond to
strict employment protection legislation through accrued informality thus (partially) o\ua4setting
the negative e\ua4ect of informality on productivity. We exploit the Italian dismissal legislation
imposing higher \u85ring costs for \u85rms with more than 15 workers and show that informality
reduces the turnover of formal jobs for \u85rms above the 15 workers threshold; furthermore, while
the overall e\ua4ect of informality on \u85rms\u92productivity is negative, the di\ua4erential e\ua4ect for \u85rms
above the threshold as compared to smaller \u85rms is positive and signi\u85cant