Treball Final de Grau en Finances i Comptabilitat. Codi: FC1049. Curs: 2017/2018In this paper we suggest a theoretical framework to theoretically analyze auditor’s
apparent independence as perceived by external users of financial and audit reports of
a certain company. The framework suggested is based on a game-theoretical model of
imperfect information in which an auditor has to decide whether or not to keep his
independence when issuing a report about the financial situation of a company he is
auditing. Once the company’s audit report is published, it is checked by an external
user in order to decide whether or not to establish a financial relation with the company
without knowing the decision taken by the auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor’s context
generates a signal about his independence which is correct with certain probability and
helps the external user to better decide whether or not to trust the audit report
