HAYNES, JOHN

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NATIONAL AND STATE POLITICS.
THE MERGING OF -NATIONAL AND STATE
POLITICS.
By JOHN HAYNES,
OF JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.
An American is subject to two sovereign powers. If he be a
voter he is a partner in two governments. No principle is more
firmly intrenched in the literature of constitutional law than the
doctrine that the spheres of the National and State Governments
are distinct, and each within its sphere supreme. "The dividing
line between sovereignties is usually a territorial line," says Judge
Cooley; " in American constitutional law, however, there is a
division between the National and State Governments by subjects,
the'former being possessed of supreme, absolute and uncontro-
vertible power over certain subjects throughout all the States and
Territories, while the States have the like complete power within
their respective territorial limits over other subjects." "The
powers of the General Government and of the State, though both
exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits," says
the United States Supreme Court, "are yet separate and distinct
sovereignties, and the sphere of action appropriated to the United
States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial processes issued
by a State judge or a State court as if the line of division was
traced by landmarks visible to the eye."
This feature of our government is the pride of American
writers and the admiration of foreign critics.
Following this principle to its logical conclusion we might
expect to find the same sharp division in the politics of the land;
inferring that National politics would centre about the great
questions whose decision must be reached in the National Capitol
and that State politics would deal with questions falling within
the jurisdiction of each State.
We might suppose that there would be two sets of parties, the
people of the country at large being divided into two or more
political camps along the lines suggested by issues of National
concern, while the people of each State were divided into such
parties as local circumstances might call into existence. Such a
condition of politics would manifestly be in a high degree favor-
able to good government. But the facts are the exact reverse of
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this ideal conception. State parties do not exist and never have
existed except in a few instances and for short periods of time.
In State elections the vote is divided between the same parties as
in National elections, for the most part in the same proportion,
and with unfavorable results, as this paper aims to show, both to
State and Nation, though chiefly to the former.
The reasons for this are not far to seek. Men who are asso-
ciated in one line of effort, be it social, religious or political, natu-
rally tend to associate in other activities. Those who work
together for the accomplishment of a desired end in National pol-
itics, by reason of their acquaintance with one another and with
the voters of the locality in which they live, come to coperate in
local politics. The same tendency causes men associated for the
advancement of purely local projects to work together in a wider
field. The result is two strong political organizations pitted
against each other in every election. While it is perhaps inevit-
able and, it may be, desirable that our present party system
should be retained in its general features, its disadvantages are
capable of much amelioration through the action of independent
voters. One of the most favorable signs of the times is the
increasing tendency among such voters to discriminate sharply
between State and National issues. The recent action of Massa-
chusetts in re-electing a democratic governor while at the same
time she pronounced unequivocally against the policy of his party
in national affairs is the most striking instance of this trend,
though evidence of it is not lackingin other quarters.
But there is a force preventing the just separation of the
spheres of our political activity stronger than the tendency to
which allusion has been made, and for which independent voting
is a powerless remedy. This force is constitutional and statute law.
The United States Constitution and National Statutes are not
completely consistent with" the great fundamental principle that
the spheres of action of the State and National Governments are
separate and distinct.
The constitutional provision that United States Senators shall
be elected by the Legislatures of the respective States and the
statutory provision that the several Legislatures shall divide the
States into congressional districts, give to the legislative depart-
ment of the States, including of course the Governor, a power
which has a direct and vital relation to National politics.
The reasons which led the framers of our Constitution to pre-
scribe this method of electing United States Senators are not given
at length in the histories of their deliberations, but they thought,
IVATIONAL AND STA TE POLITICS.
no doubt, that an indirect method was most likely to result in the
choice of able and efficient Senators, just as they thought an indi-
rect method best for the election of the President. In nothing
did the Convention so conspicuously fail to forsee the effect of its
action as in the matter of the election of President, which now
has all the disadvantages of a popular election and none of the
supposed advantages of an indirect choice.
Under our party system the actual method of electing Senators
has departed almost as far from its original design as the method
of choosing the President. "It is worth observing," says James
Bryce, "that the election of Senators has in substance almost
ceased to be indirect They are still nominally chosen, as under
the letter of the Constitution they must be chosen, by the State
Legislatures." * * * "It is now generally true that in most
States little freedom of choice remains with the Legislature. The
-people, or rather those wire-pullers who manage the people, and
act in their name, have practically settled the matter at the elec-
tion of the State Legislature. So hard is it to make any scheme
of indirect election work according to its original design."
While this statement of the matter may be somewhat too
strong, there is abundant reason to believe that were the Senators
elected by the people of the several States, most of the able and
useful men who now hold seats in that body would still be found
there. Most exceptions to the rule would be members who owe
their election to Legislatures not of the same political party as the
majority of the voters in their States.
But, granting that the indirect method has some advantages,
they cannot be substantial enough to compensate for the disadvan-
tages incident to the intrusion of National affairs into State pol-
itics.
This intrusion hampers the voter in the expression of his will.
In casting his ballot he must often choose whether he will express
-his convictions on National or State questions. If he expresses
them fully on National questions he is often not only precluded
from a full expression on State questions, but is compelled to
indorse State policies with which he has anything but sympathy.
Are there instances of- this in actual experience ? Their name is
legion. Let us take a single one. The elections of 189o and 1892
show that there is in Iowa a body of voters large enough to hold
the balance of power in that State who are in sympathy with the
principles and policies of the Republican party as expressed in its
conduct of the National administration, and who disapprove of
the same party's policy in the State. In what position did a voter
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belonging to this number find himself in 1890? A Governor and
Legislature were to be chosen. If the voter wished to express
himself on the local question (prohibition) he voted the Demo-
cratic ticket; but thereby he endangered to some extent the
National policy of the Republicans, for the new Legislature was to
choose a United States Senator and with the help of the Governor
might so arrange the Congressional districts of the State as to
favor the National policy which he disapproved. If he voted the
Republican ticket he lost his voice in State matters, or rather
expressed himself in a way he did not desire. On one or the
other horn of this dilemma he was sure to be impaled! Other
instances in abundance will occur to any one who has followed
the course of our political history.
The intrusion of National politics into the sphere of State
action often causes Senators to sit in the National Legislature who
misrepresent the settled and abiding convictions of the major part
of their constituency. This is brought about in two ways. First,
by the minority party's securing control of the State Legislature.
Cases of this kind are notorious. Connecticut, for example, has
three times cast her electoral vote for the Democratic presidential
nominee, but she is now and will continue to be represented (or
misrepresented) by two Republican Senators. In the case of Con-
necticut this is brought about by a most inequitable method of
choosing the Legislature; but the same result, though less likely,
would be possible if all State Legislators represented districts of
exact equality in the number of their inhabitants. Secondly, mis-
representation occurs when a party which is or would be a minor-
ity party on National issues, becomes a majority party in any
State because State issues have temporarily obscured National
issues. In off years, i. e., when no National election was held,
Ohio has several times chosen a Democratic Legislature and conse-
quently has had one Democratic Senator most of the time for years
though she has cast her electoral vote (with the exception of a
single elector's vote in 1892) for the Republican Presidential candi-
date since the organization of that party. Virginia, as a result of
the contest over the readjustment of her debt, recently had two
Senators who acted with the Republicans, though her allegiance to
the National Democracy did not waver meanwhile.
The most pernicious influence of the blending of National and
State politics is its powerful tendency to divert the attention of
law-makers and people alike from vital State matters. The mag-
nitude of this evil is apparent in view of the wide range of impor-
tant legislation falling entirely within the field of State action.
A TIONAL AN STA TE POLITICS.
The laws which touch a man's daily life most frequently and most
materially are State laws;-laws in reference to property, mar-
riage, inheritance, corporations, labor, public health, and pauper-
ism. Does he commit a crime? He is tried in a State Court.
Does he pay taxes? He does so largely according to State law.
Is his life safe and are his rights secure? The State makes them
so. Does a mob threaten destruction and bloodshed? The State
suppresses it. To defend a man against his commonest dangers
the National arm is impotent. The baneful result of excessive
interest in National affairs is manifest in the character and work
of Legislatures whose members are chosen not so much for their
fitness to legislate, as for the positions they take on National ques-
tions. On this point James Bryce remarks: "In one respect this
connection is no unmixed benefit, for it has helped to make the
National parties powerful and their strife intense in these last-
named bodies (State Legislatures). Every vote in the Senate is
so important to the great parties that they are forced to struggle
for the ascendency in each of the State Legislatures by whom the
Senators are elected." The voters are urged to cast their ballots
for certain candidates for State office because a United States Sen-
ator is to be chosen, or because the State is to be redistricted, or,
forsooth, for the moral effects which the result will have in deter-
mining a National contest which perchance is yet in the dim dis-
tance! Such a method results in sending inferior men to the
Legislative halls. The voter of independent tendencies is
restrained from administering a just rebuke to his party and
defeating an unworthy aspirant for office, for fear of injuring
some National policy dear to his heart. Not long ago we were
treated to the spectacle of an Ex-President of the United States
arguing on. the stump that tariff reformers should vote for a cer-
tain man for Governor of New York because his defeat would
imperil the cause in which they were interested. The argument
was, under our system, as sound in logic as it was effective in
practice. But what shall we say of a system that requires a voter
to sacrifice what he considers the best interests of the great State
of New York to his interest in tariff reform which must come if
it comes at all through the National Legislature? When the
Republicans of Massachusetts met in caucuses last fall to nominate
candidates for the State Legislature, the question most often
asked as to a possible candidate was,-whom he favored for
United States Senator. What has such a question to do with a
man's fitness to legislate for his fellow citizens? In the mem-
orable campaign between Douglas and Lincoln in 1858 the sole
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question made prominent in the canvas was whether Lincoln or
Douglas should be Senator. With that question uppermost each
voter decided for whom to vote for members of the State Legisla-
ture. Yet such is the perversity of the system that Douglas got
the seat though Lincoln led on the popular vote! If the people
of Illinois got a good Legislature it was solely by the favor of a
gracious Providence.
Much is heard of late about the poor quality of our Legisla-
tures. Perhaps their quality would improve if they were chosen
more with reference to their chief function.
The protracted and bitter controversy in the New York Legis-
lature which followed the resignation of Senators Conkling and
Platt, the disgraceful scenes which preceded the election of
Senator Blodgett by the New Jersey Legislature, are still fresh in
memory, to say nothing of other contests full of bitterness and
recrimination which have taken the time and diverted the atten-
tion of legislators for weeks or months from their legitimate busi-
ness, as well as debauched their morals and ruined their reputa-
tions.
What is the remedy for these evils? The answer is plain.
Let the people elect the Senators and put the duty of dividing the
States into Congressional districts somewhere else than in the legis-
lative department of the States. Various methods of accomplish-
ing the latter object might be adopted. For one, each State
might choose by popular vote a commission whose duty it should
be to divide the States into congressional districts. But whatever
method might be adopted it is hardly conceivable that it could
produce worse gerrymandering than the present method. These
things done, the theory that the spheres of the National and State
governments are distinct would be completely embodied in law
and we might expect the practice of our politics to become more
and more conformed to it.
The United States Senate is justly deemed by thoughtful
critics of our Government the flower of our Legislative bodies.
Would the proposed change detract from its dignity or impair its
usefulness? By no means. It is not the purpose of this paper to
discuss the causes which have made the United States Senate
what it is. It is sufficient to say that they are numerous and that
the election of its members by the State Legislatures has contrib-
uted little or nothing to the excellence of the Senate as a law-
making body.


THE MERGING OF -NATIONAL AND STATE POLITICS

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THE MERGING OF -NATIONAL AND STATE POLITICS

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