Since my work on world affairs is sensitive to the legal dimensions of the course of events, it is an especial pleasure to participate for the first time in a meeting of the International Law Association

Rosenau, James N.

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TRANSNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THEPOLITICS OF SHAMEJames N. Rosenau"Since my work on world affairs is sensitive to the legal dimensions ofthe course of events, it is an especial pleasure to participate for the firsttime in a meeting of the International Law Association. But I must note atthe outset that I am somewhat illiterate in the both the practice and study ofinternational law. My sensitivity to the relevance of the legal context thatinfuses any international situation has never superseded my preoccupationwith other dimensions of such situations. Hence my illiteracy stems fromalways locating questions of law in more encompassing political, social,and economic contexts. Such is the case with this panel. The questionswe shall address are essentially political questions, or at least mycomments on them will perforce focus on other than their legal aspects.Indeed, my main message largely involves epistemology andmethodology, the need to be clear what we mean by certain terms and toapproach their implications in a cautious and nuanced way. With theworld undergoing powerful challenges marked by huge uncertainties,pervasive contradictions, and endless ambiguities, it is not easy to tracenuance. It is easier to yield to the temptation to come up with clear-cutand simple solutions rather than to extend ourselves to avoid falling into awide rage of definitional and epistemological traps.Perhaps the most dangerous trap involves what I call the "domesticanalogy": The tendency to think about the problem of accountability at theinternational level as if we had domestic processes in mind. Even if oneaccepts that a sharp distinction can be drawn between the domestic andinternational worlds-as I do not-the procedures that allow foraccountability in domestic systems cannot be developed in an internationalcontext. Or at least the practice of holding elected officials andadministrations responsible for what happens on their watch cannot beduplicated in international settings. The reasons are numerous.International organizations are run by states that are not accountable toProfessor of Law, George Washington University. This paper was prepared for theOpening Panel of the Annual Meeting of the American Branch of the International LawAssociation, New York, New York, October 25, 2001.1. See JAMES N. ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIC-FOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORINGGOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD (1997).354 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:353their domestic publics for how they vote because such votes are notpolitically salient. NGOs and transnational advocacy groups are notaccountable to their memberships in any meaningful way. In some theirleaders may be elected by their memberships, but this form ofaccountability is rare and it is ineffective in those rare cases when it isoperative. Corporations are accountable to their stockholders, but theyusually manage to prevent dissident stockholders from having anyconsequence. In short, elections in which individual citizens or membershave any say in what transnational collectivities do or plan are eithernonexistent or superficial. Accordingly, it is far-fetched to ponder howaccountability can be achieved through the domestic methods that allow forthe ouster of old leaderships and the election of new ones. The traditionaldefinition of democratic practice simply does not apply in the case oftransnational and international collectivities.Does this mean that transnational accountability cannot be achieved?No, it does not if one can break free of the stranglehold that the domesticanalogy has on our thinking. There are mechanisms for maximizing ratherthan minimizing accountability beyond domestic boundaries. They maynot be adequate from a domestic perspective, but they can be more ratherthan less effective if different criteria of effectiveness are employed.A second mistake to avoid is that of focusing on radical rather thanpractical changes. There is no reason to believe that proposals to replacethe IMF and World Bank, or to enlarge the membership of the UNSecurity Council, or to create a .third house of the United Nations thatrepresents civil society-to mention just some of the radical proposals thathave been bandied about-can ever be realized. To borrow a socialscience concept, the course of global affairs, like that of any largeorganization or society, is too path dependent, too habituated to set ways ofgetting from one day to the next, to undertake radical changes of course.As noted below, however, there is a host of less encompassing and morepractical steps that can be taken to enhance the transparency andresponsiveness of the prevailing international architecture.A third trap to avoid is that of aspiring to one instrument ofaccountability suitable to all situations. The world is too diverse, itsdependent pathways too numerous and too pervaded with contradictions,for any single mechanism to be sufficient.But, despite the diversity, and notwithstanding the deeply entrenchedpathways in which the course of events are ensconced, there aremechanisms for enhancing the accountability of the present internationalarchitecture. Some of these are linked to the continuing disaggregation ofworld affairs. My view of the current scene is one in which traditionalcenters of authority are breaking down and new ones proliferating, withRosenauthe result that the global stage is ever more dense with both governmentaland nongovernmental collectivities that enjoy sufficient legitimacy withtheir followers to act on their behalf.2 More than that, the advent of theInternet and other micro-electronic technologies have facilitated extensivenetworking among NGOs. There is strength and accountability in thecomplexity of this surfeit of ever-proliferating transnational actors andtheir networks. Their growing numbers make it increasingly difficult forany one actor, or any coalition of actors, to act imperiously and withoutbeing held to account. To be sure, the density of the global stage rendersthe chances of wide consensus's in response to the challenges of our timehighly problematic. But muddling through in the absence of broadconsensus's is not a bad price to pay for greater accountability.Put differently, the pathways on which the world is dependent haveundergone a major bifurcation. There are now two worlds of worldpolitics: the state-centric world that has presided over global structures forcenturies and what I call the multi-centric world, which encompasses thewide range of new actors that have clambered onto the global stage andthat have the authority to challenge, cooperate, or otherwise interact withthe state-centric world and its institutions. Some analysts refer to the state-centric world's new rival as civil society, but I prefer to view it as a multi-centric world in order to allow for a diversity that includes corporations,professional societies, and other entities as well as the advocacy groupsthat are usually viewed as the core of civil society. Indeed, using the letter"n" to represent any number, one can say that the emergent structure ofbifurcation is best labeled as an "nfurcation" of world politics.But this is not to downplay the relevance of advocacy groups. Theboisterous politics of shame they practice through their recurrent protestsagainst international financial institutions (IFs) is not withoutconsequence. They have succeeded in elevating the rich-poor gap and thepervasiveness of poverty to a perch high on the global agenda. There ismore than a little evidence that their messages are being heard in corporateboardrooms- and the halls of governments. It is not far-fetched toanticipate that the accountability and transparency of IFIs will beconsiderably expanded in the coming years through the publication of theirboard minutes, country-assistance strategies, letters of intent, internalevaluations, and other documentary evidence of their decisions and actions.Conceivably, too, the politics of shame will contribute to bargaining thatresults in more seats for developing countries on the IFI boards and the2. The notion of proliferating authority centers is elaborated in JAMES N. ROSENAU,DISTANT PRoxiMmEs: DYNAMICS BEYOND GLOBALIZATION (forthcoming Princeton Univ.Press).20021356 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:353establishment of think tanks to provide independent analyses and advice tothe boards.Needless to say, the politics of shame is not dependent on recourse toviolent protests. On the contrary, the shaming messages get overriddenand lost when protests turn violent.Of course, there are other mechanisms besides that of publicitythrough shaming protests. Shame can take the form of publishing statisticssuch as the annual corruption index released by Transparency International(TI). Quiet pressures can also be effective. Rather than sponsor massprotests, for example, TI devotes most of its resources and energies tonegotiating with the elites that preside over IFIs and other internationalinstitutions rather than mobilizing mass publics.,If time permitted, one could list a number of other mechanisms forfurthering accountability without reliance on the domestic analogy. Mostof these involve working with international organizations and nationalgovernments to promote further disaggregation, thus bringing transnationaldecisions closer to the people and publics affected by them. And it is withrespect to these mechanisms that the legal profession has a huge role toplay inasmuch as treaties and public policies will have to be rewritten toachieve desirable levels of decentralization. But elaborating thesemechanisms will take me beyond my allotted time. And having alreadyindicated that my legal competencies are limited, that is just as well. Fornow it is enough to stress that while the storehoise of potentially effectiveaccountability mechanisms may not be overflowing, it is full.4 And there isno dearth of able individuals and organizations, including my colleagues onthe panel and in the audience, committed to enumerating, analyzing, andimplementing them.3. Cf. Hongying Wang and James N. Rosenau, Transparency International andCorruption as an Issue of Global Governance, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 25 (Jan. 2001).4. See, e.g., Report on the 2020 Global Architecture Conference, Centre for GlobalStudies at the University of Victoria (Aug. 29-31, 2001).

Transnational Accountability And The Politics Of Shame

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Transnational Accountability And The Politics Of Shame

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