Objectives: 1) Optimize S&MA organization to best facilitate Shuttle transition in 2010, successfully support Ares developmental responsibilities, and minimize the impacts of the gap between last Shuttle flight and start of Ares V Project. 2) Improve leveraging of critical skills and experience between Shuttle and Ares. 3) Split technical and supervisory functions to facilitate technical penetration. 4) Create Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO) stand-alone position for successfully implementation of S&MA Technical Authority. 5) Minimize disruption to customers. 6) Provide early involvement of S&MA leadership team and frequent/open communications with S&MA team members and steak-holders

Malone, Roy W., Jr.

NASA Technical Reports Server

Roy W. Malone, Jr., Director
Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA)
CHANGING THE S&MA
PARADIGM
Advanced Safety Engineering & Management 
Program, UAB
Sept. 24, 2010
Marshall Space Flight Center
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100040590 2019-08-30T13:28:38+00:00Z
Marshall Space Flight Center
AGENDA
Background
Creating the Environment
The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Paradigm Shift
The Impact – Early Involvement in the Design Process
The S&MA Path to the Future
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 2
Marshall Space Flight Center
BACKGROUND
The Challenger Report
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 3
• Following the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, the 
Rogers Commission reported in 1986:
– S&MA was not included in technical issue discussions.
– Inadequate S&MA staffing at MSFC – “Reductions in the safety, 
reliability and quality assurance work force at Marshall and NASA 
Headquarters have seriously limited capability in those vital functions 
(safety program responsibility) to ensure proper communications.”
“A properly staffed, supported, and robust safety
organization might well have avoided these faults
(addressing faults within the S&MA organization 
that contributed to the Challenger Accident)….” 
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 4
• Following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) reported 
in 2003:
– “Throughout its history, NASA has consistently
struggled to achieve viable safety programs and
adjust them to the constraints and vagaries of
changing budgets.”
– “The Board believes that the safety organization,
due to lack of capability and resources independent
of the Shuttle Program, was not an effective voice
in discussing technical issues or mission operations
pertaining to STS-107.”
BACKGROUND
The Columbia Report
Marshall Space Flight Center
BACKGROUND
The 2006 NASA Exploration Safety Study
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 5
• The 2006 NASA Exploration Safety Study (NESS) Team 
found that NASA “Safety and Mission Assurance is 
ineffective in carrying out its assigned responsibilities as 
given in the Governance document in many, but not all, 
NASA Centers.”  They cited:
– Lack of leadership 
– Lack of clearly defined lines of authority for action 
– Lack of clearly defined levels of responsibility for S&MA requirements
– Lack of technical excellence of personnel in the safety disciplines
– Lack of personnel with domain knowledge
“All of the above have led to lack of peer level respect from programmatic 
and engineering personnel and has rendered S&MA ineffective.”
Marshall Space Flight Center
BACKGROUND
The Message from the Past
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 6
• Inadequate resources
• Lack of discipline expertise
• Lack of respect by engineering 
peers
• Lack of inclusion in technical 
decisions
• Lack of independence
Common 
themes of 
all three 
efforts:
Marshall Space Flight Center
Creating the Environment
The Professional Development Roadmap
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 7
• Overall Objective - Improve and maintain S&MA expertise 
and skills. 
• Supporting Objectives:
– Develop a “Professional Development Roadmap” (PDRM) for each of 
the three main S&MA engineering disciplines (Systems Safety, 
Reliability & Maintainability, and Quality Engineering).  
• Provide structured guidance for S&MA engineers to use in their 
efforts to become experts in their field.
– Identify courses and knowledge that S&MA engineers need in 
order to develop their expertise.
– Training based on individuals current level of expertise.
• Provide structured guidance to engineers in the development of their 
annual Individual Development Plan (IDP).
8Creating the Environment
DETERMINE
DISCIPLINE LEVEL
(Section 4.2)
Select S&MA Specialty/ 
Discipline & Volunteer to 
participate.
APPRENTICE
NOVICE
JOURNEYMAN
Select 
appropriate 
mentor
EXISTING S&MA 
PERSONNEL
TRANSFEREE
FRESH OUTS
CONTINUOUS 
LEARNING AND 
MENTORING
Engineer identifies and 
provides evidence of Roadmap 
elements already completed to 
Supervisor.
Supervisor makes 
recommendation with rationale 
to S&MA Management Team.
S&MA Management Team 
selects discipline level based 
on documented evidence and 
Supervisor Recommendation.
Complete training & OJT. 
Validate knowledge with mentor 
Prepare IDP using Training 
Roadmap to ID training needs.
Complete training & OJT. Validate 
knowledge with mentor. 
Prepare IDP using Training 
Roadmap to ID training needs.
Complete training & OJT. 
Validate knowledge with mentor 
Prepare IDP using Training 
Roadmap to ID training needs
Candidate 
satisfies 
prerequisites 
(Appendix A)
A
p
p
e
n
d
I
x
A
A
p
p
e
n
d
I
x
B
A
p
p
e
n
d
I
x
C
EXPERT
S&MA Professional 
Development Flow
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 9
Creating the Environment
The Professional Development Roadmap
Auditor 
Software 
Assurance 
Industrial 
Safety 
Specialist 
Quality 
Assurance 
• S&MA Discipline Training Roadmaps were expanded 
beyond Systems Safety, Reliability & Maintainability, and 
Quality Engineering to include:
Marshall Space Flight Center
• Objectives
– Optimize S&MA organization to best facilitate Shuttle transition in 
2010, successfully support Ares developmental responsibilities, and 
minimize the impacts of the gap between last Shuttle flight and start of 
Ares V Project.
– Improve leveraging of critical skills and experience between Shuttle and 
Ares.
– Split technical and supervisory functions to facilitate technical 
penetration.
– Create Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO) stand-alone 
position for successfully implementation of S&MA Technical Authority.
– Minimize disruption to customers.
– Provide early involvement of S&MA leadership team and frequent/open 
communications with S&MA team members and steak-holders.
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 10
Creating the Environment
S&MA Re-organization
1111
Mission Systems Assurance 
and Technical Support 
Department
Science and 
Program Integ. 
Team
Exploration 
and Space 
Ops Team
SR&QA Core 
Expertise/  
Development 
Team
Software 
Assurance
Team
Vehicle Systems
Department
Solid Motors 
Branch
Upper Stage/ET 
Branch
Liquid Engines 
Branch
Launch Systems 
Integration 
Branch
Technical 
Support 
Branch
Science & 
Mission Sys.  
Assur. Branch
IA/CRM Team
MSFC Program Support Office
Constellation Lead and Safety 
Panel Support
Safety, Quality and Management 
Systems Department
Manufacturing 
and Test 
Assurance 
Team
Audits Team
Industrial
Safety 
Specialist 
Team
Quality 
Assurance 
Branch
Industrial Safety 
Branch
Vehicle 
Systems Test 
Assurance 
Team
QD10
QD11 QD12
QD20
QD21 QD22
QD30
QD31 QD33
QD32 QD34
Industrial Safety 
Engineering 
Team
QD02
Director
Admin Officer
2 – Associate Directors
Deputy Director 
Program and Safety Panel Support
Deputy Program Assurance 
Lvl. 2 Constellation CSO 
Lvl. 2/3 Shuttle CSO
NSC R&M Tech. Fellow QD01
Business 
Management  
Team
Creating the Environment – S&MA Re-organization
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 12
Creating the Environment
S&MA Re-organization
Vehicle Systems Department
Department. Manager
Ares I Level 3 CSO
Ares V Level 3 CSO
Upper Stage/ET Branch
Branch Chief
External Tank  CSO 
Ares US CSO
Liquid Engines Branch
Branch Chief
Space Shuttle Main Engine CSO 
Ares J-2X CSO
Launch Sys Integration 
Branch
Branch Chief
Shuttle Integration. CSO
Ares VI CSO
QD30
QD31 QD33
QD32 QD34
Solid Motors Branch
Branch Chief
Reusable Solid Rocket Booster CSO 
Ares FS CSO
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 13
Creating the Environment
S&MA Re-organization
• Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officers (CSOs)
– Are equivalent to Element, Project and Program Chief Engineers. 
– Center Management and Operations (CM&O)Technical Authority (TA) funded.
– Mainly responsible for project technical down and in.
– Represent S&MA TA on assigned boards and panels.
– Responsible for technical quality of organizational products.
• Department Managers and Branch Chiefs
– Are the supervisors for the Level III and Level IV CSOs. 
– Can act for their CSOs and implement TA in their CSOs absence.
– Are CM&O TA funded.
– Responsible for the care, feeding and staffing of organization.
– Represent S&MA TA on assigned boards and panels. 
– Responsible for the development of organizational technical products.
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 14
• Agency
– Created S&MA Technical Authority.
– Created NASA Safety Center.
– Created Discipline Fellows ST for S&MA Disciplines (executive technical 
position -in work).
• MSFC 
– Elevated MSFC S&MA Office to a Directorate.
– Elevated MSFC S&MA Deputy Director position to Senior Executive 
Service (SES) level.
– Created senior level engineering SES rotational position (every two years) 
in S&MA – Director for Program Assurance. 
– Elevated Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO). positions to 
grade levels equivalent with MSFC Chief Engineers.
Creating the Environment
Post Columbia S&MA Enablers
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 15
Creating the Environment
Level II
Level III
Level IV
AA
P
ro
gr
am
/P
ro
je
ct
 A
ut
ho
rit
y
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 16
The S&MA Paradigm Shift
The System Design Requirements Change
• NASA had committed to a major space exploration program, called 
Constellation, which was intended to send crew and cargo to the 
International Space Station (ISS), to the moon, and beyond.
• In the past, space vehicle designers focused on performance. 
• Lessons learned from the Space Shuttle and other launch vehicles show the 
need to optimize launch vehicles for other system parameters (reliability, 
safety, cost, availability, etc.) besides performance.
• The Constellation program had, therefore, put in place ambitious 
requirements for reliability, safety, and cost . 
• The new requirements resulted in a paradigm shift on how to design and 
build new launch vehicles which resulted in the creation of an integrated 
Risk-based design environment (e.g. Integrated analyses, disciplines, 
organizations, etc.) and the early involvement of S&MA  in the design 
process.
These lessons will be used to help NASA build future launch vehicles.
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 17
Assurance: Making certain that specified activities performed by others are performed in accordance 
with specified requirements. (Upper stage Engine and First Stage). 
Examples of the activities include:
• Assess Hazard Analyses, FTAs, FMEA/CIL, PRA, etc.
• Approving Material Review Board dispositions.
• Performing government inspections, audits, and surveillance.
• Independent assessments.
• Evaluating engineering and manufacturing changes, or proposed variances (adaptations, 
deviations, and waivers), for impacts to safety, reliability, and/or quality.
• Evaluating the disposition of problems, including corrective actions (e.g., PRACA 
problem reports).
In-Line: S&MA activities performed in direct support of the program/project to ensure that the 
program/project will achieve its objectives (Upper Stage and Vehicle Integration).
Examples of the activities include:
• Establish and implement S&MA programmatic and technical requirements.
• Perform Probabilistic Risk Assessments, Reliability Analysis, Integrated System Failure 
Analysis, Hazard Analyses, Fault Tree Analyses, FMEA/CIL, etc.
• Develop S&MA plans and methodologies.
• Establish and implement Industrial Safety.
The S&MA Paradigm Shift
The System Design Requirements Change
Marshall Space Flight Center
Creating the Environment
The S&MA Project and Engineering Integrated
Operating Environment Change
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 18
FMEA/CIL 
Working Group 
(FMEA WG)
Ascent Risk 
Working Group 
(ARWG)
Integrated Aborts 
Working Group
(IAWG)
Crew Safety & 
Reliability Integration 
System Safety 
Working Group 
(SSWG)
Simulation 
Assisted Risk
Analysis
S&MA Integration with Project and 
Engineering
Crew Safety & 
Reliability
FMEA/CIL Ascent Risk SARA
Integrated 
Aborts
System 
Safety
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 19
Creating the Environment
The S&MA Project and Engineering Integrated
Operating Environment Change
• S&MA leading the Ares I System Safety Working Group 
– Integrated Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) feeds other key analyses 
used to drive the safety and reliability of the Ares I design.
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 20
Creating the Environment
The S&MA Project and Engineering Integrated
Operating Environment Change
• S&MA leading the Ares I System Safety Working Group 
– Integrated Hazards
• Identify hazard causes and controls that cross system and element 
boundaries and assure mitigation for the hazard causes
• Ensure proper communication between Engineering (Design input for 
Hazard Controls) and S&MA – verify safety’s understanding of vehicle 
design and ensure engineering design implementation of potential 
hazards.
• L2 – address hazards associated with Ares/Orion integrated stack 
interface with Level 2 System Engineering and Integration (SE&I).
• L3 – address hazards associated with Ares vehicle Ares VI S&MA
– Assumed lead role in development of Fault Trees for Controls Hazard 
Report (HR) and Flight Termination System HR to meet Phase 1 
requirements .
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 21
Creating the Environment
The S&MA Project and Engineering Integrated
Operating Environment Change
Conceptual Design Phase Design & Development Phase Operational Phase
• Integrated with IPT’s
• Component reliability
modeling and analysis
• Integrated element
modeling and analysis
 Support System 
Design
 Support Subsystem and
Component Design
 Support System 
Risk  Assessments
• Integrated system risk 
modeling and analysis
• System physics-based 
modeling and analysis
• Blast modeling for
abort risk assessment
• Support launch issues
• Support upgrades
S&MA leading the Ares I Ascent Risk Working Group
Marshall Space Flight Center
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 22
The Impact – Early Involvement in the Design Process
Ares I Design Impact (Examples)
• Example of S&MA impact on the Ares I Design
– Influenced the choice of the solution to the Thrust Oscillation issue.  Jointly working 
with engineering and Ares I project, S&MA assessed the reliability, quality and safety 
impacts of the various design solutions to the thrust oscillation issue. A lesson learned 
in “integrated failure analysis” from the Shuttle External Tank (ET) foam problem that 
contributed to the Columbia accident (Vehicle Integration).
– Influenced the design solution to the First Stage-Upper Stage separation issue.  Jointly 
working with engineering and Ares I project, S&MA assessed the reliability and safety 
impacts of the various design solutions to the First Stage-Upper Stage separation issue. 
Another lesson learned in “integrated failure analysis” from the Shuttle ET foam 
problem that contributed to the Columbia accident (Vehicle Integration).
– Recommended pressurization line be moved out of cable tray to reduce risk to Linear 
Shape Charge (LSC) and avionics (Upper Stage).
– Optimized valve design for reliability and safety for LH2 and LO2 pressurization.
– Identified issue with use of KC fittings in safety-critical applications and approach to 
qualifying fittings as providing two seals (Upper Stage).
– Influenced the change of LSC initiation timers from percussion to Flexible Confined 
Detonation Cord initiated timers (Flight Termination System).
Marshall Space Flight Center
• S&MA In-House Developed Products
– Vehicle Integration – Crew Safety and Reliability Products
• Ares I Failure Mode Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMA/CIL)
• Ares I System Safety Analysis Report (Hazard Analysis)
• Ares I Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Report
• Ares I Ascent Risk Analysis (ARA) Report
• Integrated Aborts Plan
• Aborts Risk Assessment
– Upper Stage S&MA Products
• Safety, Reliability and Quality Plan
• Failure Mode Effects Analysis
• System Safety Analysis Report (including Fault Tree)
• PRA Report
• Reliability and Maintainability Analysis Report (Reference)
• Limited Life Items List
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 23
The Impact – Early Involvement in the Design Process
Ares I Design Impact (Examples)
Marshall Space Flight Center
• Peer Review Products
– Upper Stage Engine and First Stage Peer Review
• Quality Assurance Plan
• System Safety Plan, Safety, Health and Environment Plan
• Reliability and Maintainability Program Plan
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Critical Items List, Limited Life Items
• Reliability Allocations, Predictions and Analysis Report
• Hazard Fault Tree Analysis Report
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 24
The Impact – Early Involvement in the Design Process
Ares I Design Impact (Examples)
Marshall Space Flight Center
Safety & Mission Assurance 25
The Impact – Early Involvement in the Design Process
Ares I Design Reviews (Examples)
Marshall Space Flight Center
S&MA Path to the Future
Continue to build accomplishments 
from Ares I.
Leverage successes from Ares I in 
planning for potential Heavy Lift Launch 
Vehicle conceptual design.
Leverage the new Agency S&MA 
Technical Excellence Program to develop 
S&MA discipline expertise.
Program based on MSFC PDRM program.
9/24/2010 Safety & Mission Assurance 26


Changing the S and MA [Safety and Mission Assurance] Paradigm

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

NASA Technical Reports Server