'Paleontological Institute at The University of Kansas'
Abstract
Today, the post-Cold War world order based on the US unipolar supremacy is no longer a main paradigm in world affairs. Militarily, the US number one global power has still no questions. However, other powers have risen economically, diplomatically and militarily. China challenges a post-Second World War order, such as the Washington consensus, and Russia challenges a post-Cold War order, such as a recent Ukraine crisis. However, potential nuclear states, including Iran and North Korea, challenge nuclear world order that the US set and radical Islamic terrorist groups, including so-called Islamic State, challenges the US hegemony in Middle East. Uncertainty about a new world order has increased because of these diverse international events which challenge the US hegemony. This uncertain world situation was similar to the post-Second World War. After the Cold War, the winner was no question. However, multiple winners in 1945 led an uncertainty about a new world order. Studies on the post Second World War world situations are useful historical lessons if we look at today’s uncertain world order. This dissertation examines Stalin’s Cold War strategy from 1945 to 1953 with a new interpretative perspective. I argue that Stalin actively used new strategic situations for the Soviet Union’s interest. Stalin did not hesitate to manipulate his junior partners who paid prices for enhancing a security of the Soviet Union. To the Kremlin, foreign communist countries were useful tools and means as security buffer zones, not revolutionary brothers. Scholars often explain that Stalin was a passionate ideologue based on his speeches and words. However, I argue that Stalin’s Cold War strategy was fundamentally based on his realistic calculation, not a revolutionary ideology. Stalin was not his political rival, Leon Trotsky who was an idealistic romanticist and believed the third world permanent revolutions. Instead, Stalin was a Machiavellian realist and a cold calculator, especially in a foreign policy realm
