Seamans, R. C., Jr.

English

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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION WO 1-41 5 5  
TELS W O  3-6915 - WAWINGTON, D C 20546 
FOR RELEASE: lI'@lEDIATE 
February 25, 1967 
RELEASE NO: 67-38 
NOTE TO EDITORS: 
The attached statement by NASA Administrator James E. 
Webb, and report by Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr . ,  
were re leased a t  5:30 p.m. today. 
-end - 
(NASA CR OR TMX OR AD NUMBER) (CATEGORY)' 
2/27/67 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19670009429 2020-03-11T22:52:28+00:00Z
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546 
OFFlCsl O F  THE ADMINISTRATOR 
STATEMENT BY 
JAMES E. WEBB 
February 25, 1967 
NASA is releasing today a third interim report on the work 
of the Apollo 204 Review Board resulting from two days of meetings 
with the Board by Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans at Cape 
Kennedy. These meetings took place on February 23 and 24. 
This statement and Dr. Seamans' third interim report have 
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been reviewed with Chairman Clinton Anderson and Senior Minority 
Committee Member Senator Margaret Chase Smith and with Congressman 
George Miller. In continuation of the Senate Committee's review 
of the Apollo 204 accident, Senator Anderson has announced that 
the Senate Committee will hold an open hearing on the preliminary 
findings of the Board and actions to be taken by NASA at 3 P-m.1 
Monday, February 27. 
In additicn t.o the information set forth by Dr. Seamans 
j-n his three interim reports, I have had the benefit of a review 
by three members of the Board--the Chairman, Dr. Floyd Thompson, 
Astronaut Frank Borman, and Department of Interior combustion 
expert Dr. Robert van Dolah. This included the preliminary views 
of the Board as to the most likely causes of ignition,-the 
contributing factors in the rapid spread of the fire, the 
inadequacy of the means of emergency egress for the astronauts, 
and”the need to recognize that a l l  future such tests be classifigd 
as involving a higher level of hazard. 
The following emerges from the preliminary views of the Board 
1 
1 .  ./ and the Board’s preliminary recommendations: 
(1) The riskof fire that could not be controlled or from 
which escape could not be made was considerably greater than was 
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r e c o g n i z e d  w h e n  t h e  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  t h e  c o n d u c t  of t h e  test  
were e s t a b l i s h e d .  O u r  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  pure oxygen a t m o s p h e r e s  
i n c l u d e d  n o t  on1.y t h e  successfu l  Mercury  and  Gemini  f l i g h t s  b u t  
a number of i n s t a n c e s  where  a c l e a r l y  p o s i t i v e  s o u r c e  of i g n i t i o n  
d i d  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  a f i re .  I n  o n e  such i n s t a n c e  a n  e l ec t r i c  l i g h t  
b u l b  was s h a t t e r e d ,  e x p o s i n g  t he  i n c a n d e s c e n t  e l e m e n t  t o  t h e  
oxygen atmosphere w i t h o u t  s t a r t i n g  a f i r e .  
( 2 )  Our s u c c e s s f u l  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  p u r e  oxygen a t m o s p h e r e s  
i n  Mercury  a n d  Gemini ,  our e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  the  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  
s t o r i n g  and u s i n g  hand-he ld  equipment  u n d e r  z e r o - g r a v i t y  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
and o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  making s u r e  before f l i g h t  
t h a t  n o  u n d i s c o v e r e d  i t e m s  had been d ropped  o r  found t h e i r  way i n t o  
t h e  complex maze of  p l u m b i n g ,  w i r i n g ,  and equ ipmen t  i n  t h e  c a p s u l e ,  
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led u s  t o  place i n  t h e  Apollo 204 capsule  such i t e m s  a s  Velcro 
pads t o  which  f requent ly  used  items could be e a s i l y  a t tached and 
removed, p ro tec t ive  covers o n  w i r e  bundles, nylon n e t t i n g  t o  
prevent a r t i c l e s  dropped i n  ground t e s t i n g  from being l o s t  u n d e r  
o r  b e h i n d  equipment i n  t h e  capsule ,  and a pad or cushion on which, 
i n  t h e  planned escape exe rc i se ,  the  hatch could be placed without 
damage t o  t h e  hatch i t s e l f  or t o  t h e  equipment i n  t h e  spacec ra f t .  
W h i l e  m o s t  of these  w e r e  constructed of  low-combustion-potential 
ma te r i a l ,  they w e r e  not  so arranged as t o  provide b a r r i e r s  t o  t h e  
spread of a f i r e .  T e s t s  conducted i n  an Apollo-type chamber since 
t h e  accident  have shown t h a t  an oxygen f i r e  i n  t h e  capsule  will 
spread along the  sur face  of Velcro and along t h e  edges of  n y l o n  
n e t t i n g  much f a s t e r  than through t h e  ma te r i a l  i t s e l f .  
( 3 )  Soldered j o i n t s  i n  piping car ry ing  both oxygen and f l u i d s  
w e r e  mel ted  away, w i t h  r e s u l t a n t  leakage con t r ibu t ing  t o  t h e  spread 
of t h e  f i r e .  
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( 4 )  The b u r s t i n g  of  the c a p s u l e  happened  i n  s u c h  a way t h a t  
t h e  f l a m e s ,  a s  t h e y  r u s h e d  toward  the r u p t u r e  and  e x h a u s t e d  
t h r o u g h  i t ,  t r a v e l e d  o v e r  and around the a s t r o n a u t s '  c o u c h e s .  
Under t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  and w i t h  j u s t  a f e w  s e c o n d s  of t i m e  
a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  a s t r o n a u t s  c o u l d  n o t  r e a c h  t h e  h a t c h  and open  i t .  
( 5 )  T h i s  f i r e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a number of  i t e m s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
d e s i g n  and  p e r f o r m a n c e  of the e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n t r o l  u n i t  w i l l  r e q u i r e  
t h e  m o s t  c a r e f u l  e x a h i n a t i o n  and may r e q u i r e  r e d e s i g n .  
A s t r o n a u t  B o r m a n ,  i n  commenting on  h i s  reactions t o  the  
c o n d i t i o n s  s u r r o u n d i n g  the  A p o l l o  204 t e s t  and the  s u b s e q u e n t  
knowledge he has g a i n e d  as a r e s u l t  of s e r v i n g  on t h e  R e v i e w  Board ,  
s t a t e d  t o  D r .  Seamans ,  D r .  Thompson, and  t o  m e  t ha t  he would n o t  
h a v e  been  c o n c e r n e d  t o  enter t h e  c a p s u l e  a t  t h e  t i m e  G r i s s o m ,  
White and C h a f f e e  d i d  so fo r  t h e  t e s t ,  and would n o t  a t  t h a t  t i m e  
have regarded the operation as involving substantial hazard. 
However, he stated that his work on the Board has convinced 
him that there were hazards present beyond the understanding 
of either NASA's engineers or astronauts. He believes the work 
of the Review Board will provide the knowledge and recommendations 
necessary to substantially minimize or eliminate them. 
Dr. Thompson, Astronaut Borman, and Dr. van Dolah have 
returned to Cape Kennedy and are proceeding with the work of the 
Board This will require several weeks to complete. 
Chairman George Miller, of the House Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, has announced that as soon as the Board's work is 
complete, the Committee's Oversight Subcommittee, chaired by 
Congressman Olin Teague, will conduct a complete investigation of 
all factors related to the accident and NASA's actions to meet the 
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conditions disclosed. Chairman Teague spend Friday and 
Saturday at Cape Kennedy with members of the Manned Space Flight 
Subcommittee, of which he is also Chairman, reviewing progress in 
the Apollo program. Dr. Seamans, Dr. George Mueller, and I will 
report further to him at 10 a.m., Monday, February 27. 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20546 
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR February 2 5 ,  1967 
MEMORANDUM 
To : Mr. James E. Webb 
Administrator 
From : Dr, Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 
Deputy Administrator 
Subject: Interim report of the Apollo 204 Review Board 
On February 22, 1967, I heard a presentation by the Apollo 204 
Review Board at Kennedy Space Center of the significant information 
develvped to date and of their tentative findings concerning the 
circumstances of the accident. The Board also discussed preliminary 
recommendations. These tentative findings and preliminary recom- 
mendations will serve as guides for those interim decisions to be 
made in the conduct of the Apollo Program prior to the completion 
of the Board report. I a l s o  reviewed the status of the investigation 
and of spacecraft disassembly, and followed up on items previously 
noted in earlier reports. 
The spacecraft has been removed from the launch vehicle and is 
now housed in the industrial area. There detailed disassembly 
continues under careful supervision, each action being undertaken 
in response to a specific Board directive. This disassembly is 
far from complete, but a number of the major systems have been 
removed and are being checked for further verification of the part 
they played during the fire, the effect of fire on the equipment, 
and the evidence that analysis might add to the overall picture 
being built up of the accident. The heat shield has not yet been 
removed, nor has sufficient internal equipment to permit full view 
from inside of the entire pressure hull, and a large number of tests, 
checks and analysis are continuing at NASA, university, and industrial 
facilities around the country. At present, the Board has over 1,500 
individuals, from nine government agencies and departments in addition 
to NASA, from thirty-one industrial groups, and from several universities, 
directly participating in the review and analysis. 
estimates that its report will be completed by the end of March. 
Board is developing procedures to assure that an orderly and rapid 
transition of the personnel under its control from the current accident 
investigation t o  redesign, qualification, and test effort where re- 
quired can be made. 
The Board currently 
The 
In my last report, I noted that an intact on-board biosensor 
recording was being analyzed for possible additional information; 
this analysis is now complete and provides a little more than one 
second's additional information and duplicates data already 
examined that was available from the telemetry recorded during the 
test and subsequent accident. The S-band recording also mentioned 
in the previous report has been completely analyzed by the Bell 
Laboratories, including computer reconstruction and comparison, but 
no significant new information could be derived therefrom. 
The Board has not identified the source of ignition at this 
time. Ignition sources that have been under review include: 
possible chemical reactions, such as those in the on-board batteries 
or in the air purifier of the environmental control unit; possible 
spontaneous combustion of certain materials used in the spacecraft; 
and possible electrical phenomena, such as electro-static spark 
discharges, electrical arcing, or wiring overheating from shorts or 
malfunctions. 
Examination of the environmental control unit lithium hydroxide 
and of the batteries indicates these were not the source of ignition. 
Tests of the combustible materials used in the spacecraft show that 
at least a 4000F temperature would be necessary for spontaneous 
combustion, and that no such materials could have been subjected to 
that temperature except by the malfunction of some other part of the 
spacecraft systems. An electrical malfunction is therefore regarded 
as the most likely source of ignition. While not wholly ruled out, 
electro-static discharge is deemed unlikely in that all reasonable 
concentrations of flammable vapors that could have been present in 
the spacecraft were not sensitive to this type of sparking ignition. 
By the time it has completed its final report, the Board expects to 
have significantly narrowed the list of ignition sources that had a 
relatively high possibility of contributing to the initiation of the 
fire, but the possibility exists that no single source will, ever be 
pinpointed. 
A good deal of the work involved in tracing the history of the 
fire after ignition has been completed. The Board has considerable 
confidence in its present theory as to the initial location, propagation 
mechanisms, and phasing of the fire. This hypothesis, and some of the 
supporting evidence, is summarized as follows: 
Present evidence indicates that the fire had three distinct phases. 
The fire originated in the left, or command pilot side, in the front 
corner of the spacecraft, near the floor. It probably burned for 
several seconds without being noticed by the crew or recorded on 
instrumentation. Because it was below the couch level it was not visible 
c 
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at this stage; because the crew were fully suited and breathing oxygen from 
t-he environmental control system rather than from the cabin, it was not 
smelled or heard. The left front corner shows the evidence of highest 
heat and longest duration of the fire, and the witnesses watching 
the television monitors place the first appearance of flame in that 
corner (the television camera was mounted outside the spacecraft, looking 
in through the window in the hatch). The first crew report of fire 
was at 6:31:04, EST, indicating the fire had become visible. Because 
the metal structure of the spacecraft absorbed the initial heat, the 
fire did not initially cause an increase in cabin pressure. 
By 6:31:12, the fire had spread and become intense, igniting various 
materials along the left side of the cabin. Flames were hot and smoke- 
free, rising along the wall and spreading across the ceiling. The 
cabin shows heavy damage in this area but little smoke, indicating that 
the oxygen in the cabin had not been depleted at this time. The fire 
spread and fed on nylon netting (installed to prevent objects from 
floating into equipment crevices while in zero-g), Velcro fastening 
material (used to fasten equipment to the spacecraft interior), and 
the environmental control unit insulation. The cabin pressure began 
to rise rapidly at this time as the atmosphere became heated. 
At approximately 6:31:19, the internal pressure had risen to an 
estimated 36 pounds per square inch and the sealed cabin ruptured. 
This first puncture of the pressure vessel was a long tear in the floor 
on the right, or pilot's, side of the cabin. With the high internal 
pressure released, cabin gases and flames flowed both over and under 
the couches toward and through the hole, moving from left to right. 
This was the second phase of the fire. Flames passed through the hole 
into the air space between the cabin pressure shell and the surrounding 
heat shield; these flames then escaped through access hatches in the 
heat shield and partially enveloped the outside of the spacecraft for 
a moment. The short duration, left-to-right, flame motion is evi- 
denced by heavier damage on the left than right side of equipment and 
wiring on the floor, of the couches, and of the front panels. 
With the rupture of the cabin and the rush of flame and gas outside, 
the oxygen content of the cabin atmosphere was quickly reduced and 
the fire smoked heavily, laying a film of soot on many interior surfaces. 
This third and final phase of the fire was also characterized by con- 
tinued localized burning. The environmental control system uses a 
water/glycol coolant that leaked from burnt or burst pipes. 
and low pressure oxygen lines were connected with solder joints that 
fail at temperatures below 400°F. 
system, acting as a fuel and supported by the flowing oxygen from the 
failed lines, caused continued hot burning in the left corner and 
melted a large hole in the floor there. 
Both high 
The glycol mixture from the cooling 
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4 
The Board noted that the u n d e r l y i n g  design approach in Apollo 
was t o  centre1 the known risk of  fire--on the pad or in orbit--by 
isolating and rendering safe all possible ignition sources. The 
experience in flight and in tests prior to the accident had Suggested 
that the probability of a spacecraft fire was low. Continued 
alertness to the possibility of fire had become dulled by previous 
ground experience and six years of successful manned missions. 
Ground tests at the pad were 
only when propellants or pyrotechnics were involved, and different 
procedures and safety precautions are taken in handling or working 
under such conditions. Potential ignition sources inside the 
spacecraft had been treated so as to be considered safe; neither 
the crews nor the test and development personnel felt the risk of 
spacecraft fire to be high. The Apollo 204 accident now proves 
this assumption to have been wrong. 
classified as especially hazardous 
The assumption of ignition source safety led to the use of 
several solid combustible materials within the spacecraft, including 
nylon and polyurethane foams. 
fire, these materials were distributed withip the cabin without 
breaks specifically designed to help localize fire if it occurred. 
From the point of view of possible 
The Board noted that, in the event of a fire emergency, the 
time and effort required to open the hatch was too long, and that 
pad emergency procedures were focused on propellant hazards and 
did not include provisions to meet spacecraft fires. 
The principal preliminary recommendations of the Board are 
designed to assist the Administrator in making his decisions 
concerning the continuing Apollo program effort prior to com- 
pletion of the Board review. These are: 
That combustible materials now used be replaced wherever 
possible with non-flammable materials, that non-metallic 
materials that - are used be arranged t o  maintain fire breaks, 
that systems for oxygen or liquid combustibles be made fire 
resistant, and that full flammability tests be conducted 
with a mockup of the new configuration. 
That a more rapidly and more easily operated hatch be 
designed and installed. 
That on-the-pad emergency procedures be revised to recognize 
the possibility of cabin fire. 
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In addition, the Board ha5 draws attmtion to 8 number of 
components, subsystems, techniques, and practices which it feels 
can be improved to increase crew safety and mission reliability. 
These include findings on the environmental control system solder 
joints, location of wiring, electrical equipment qualification and 
design, and the development of checkout procedures. 
An important area of Board attention has been that of the 
cabin atmosphere. The atmosphere and pressure selected for the 
suit and the cabin, before launch and in orbit, have a very 
important relatFon to spacecraft design, hatch type, crew 
physiology, launch procedures, and mission capability. The 
Board did not recommend a change in the use of pure oxygen in 
the suit for either pre-launch or orbital operations. The Board 
did not recommend that cabin atmosphere for operations in space 
be changed from the currently planned 5 psi pure oxygen but did 
recommend that the trade-offs between one- and two-gas atmospheres 
be re-evaluated. The Board specifically recommended that pres- 
surized oxygen no longer be used in pre-launch operations. 
Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 


Apollo 204 Review Board meetings Third interim report

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