Some researchers have suggested that correlation information and
information about action are bound in a single representation:
“causal knowledge”. If children have only observed correlation
information, do they spontaneously try to generate the effect? Do
they represent the relationship as potentially causal? We present
three action and looking-time studies that suggest that even when
toddlers (mean; 24 months) predict that one event will follow
another, they neither initiate the first event to try to generate the
second (as preschoolers, mean 47 months, do spontaneously), nor
do they expect that the predictive relations will involve physical
contact. Toddlers succeed at both of these inferences when the
events are described using causal language. This suggests that
causal language plays a role in helping children recognize the
relationship between prediction, action, and contact causality.American Psychological Foundation (Elizabeth Munsterberg Koppitz Fellowship)McDonnell FoundationMassachusetts Institute of Technology (James H. Ferry Fund grant
