Although the Internal Revenue Service affords preseizure due process rights to the
recipients of fraudulently conveyed property in a tax collection action, it does not afford similar
rights to alleged nominees of the tax debtor The sole legal difference between these groups,
according to the Internal Revenue Service, is the intent of the transferor as determined by the
collection agent assigned to the case. We argue that this distinction is not a meaningful
determinant of the appropriate level of due process afforded to each group in the lien stage of
tax collection actions and that alleged nominees must be afforded the same modicum of
protection given to tax debtors and the recipients of fraudulently conveyed property The cntical
inquiiy whether the Service may lien upon and later seize property in someone s possession
without a preseizure review, has the same import for each group. Therefore, preseizure due
process rights afforded by Congress to the recipients of fraudulently conveyed property should
apply to both groups or to neither
