Since the conflicts of the 1990s, various regions within the Balkans have been granted territorial autonomy in order to avoid further violence. Soeren Keil assesses the strategy, finding a great deal of variety in the implementation and effectiveness of territorial autonomy and power sharing across the region. While in most cases the likelihood of violent conflict is now very small, secessionist movements have been encouraged and functional states have not been created

Keil, Soeren

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LSE Research Online

blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/01/03/balkans-territo rial-autonomy/The granting of territorial autonomy in the Balkans meansthat large scale violence is now near-impossible. But smallscale conflicts continue.Blog AdminSince the conflicts of the 1990s, various regions within the Balkans have been grantedterritorial autonomy in order to avoid further violence. Soeren Keil assesses the strategy,finding a great deal of variety in the implementation and effectiveness of territorial autonomyand power sharing across the region. While in most cases the likelihood of violent conflict isnow very small, secessionist movements have been encouraged and functional states havenot been created.Territorial autonomy and local self -government has become one of  the key strategies f orconf lict management in ethnically divided societies. From Ethiopia to Af ghanistan, and f rom Belgium toIraq, territorial decentralisation has been used to ensure that dif f erent ethnic groups are able to ruleover their own af f airs and enjoy a high degree of  autonomy, while power-sharing has been implementedsimultaneously in central institutions to guarantee decision-making by consensus.No region has seen more variety in the implementation of  territorial autonomy mixed with power-sharinginstitutions than countries in Southeastern Europe. Territorial autonomy varies greatly in the region, f romliterally no self -government f or minorit ies in Croatia to a high degree of  decentralisation in Bosnia andHerzegovina. While some countries have implemented territorial autonomy as a strategy of  peace-building (such as Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo), others use it to avoid conf lict in the f irst place (suchas Serbia in the autonomous province of  Vojvodina). Ongoing debates about constitutional ref orms inBosnia, new demands f or territorial autonomy through f ederalism among the Albanians in Macedonia andthe problematic situation in Northern Kosovo demonstrate that territorial autonomy remains a contestedconcept.Bosnian Serbs continuously point out that their existence in Bosnia is only protected through the highlevel of  autonomy that was granted to their entity in the Dayton Peace Agreement and that any f urthercentralisation would result in a danger that their group might be dominated by Bosniaks. The argumentsof  Bosnian Croats f or a third entity are very similar; they protest that the Federation of  Bosnia andHerzegovina, which they “share” with the Bosniaks in f act disadvantages them and they theref ore requiretheir own territorial unit with the same level of  autonomy as the Republika Srpska and the Federation.In Macedonia, Albanians are becoming more and more f rustrated with the ethnic Macedonian elite,because of  the continued discussion on the name of  the country with Greece, which has resulted in aGreek veto to Macedonia’s entry into NATO and to the start of  membership negotiations with theEuropean Union (EU). Albanians f eel that their concerns are not taken into account and that they aretaken hostage by an increasingly nationalist government in Skopje. While the Ohrid FrameworkAgreement, that ended the violent insurgency in Macedonia in 2001, stated in Article 1.2 that “there are noterritorial solutions to ethnic conf lict,”Macedonia has nevertheless implemented a high degree ofdecentralisation. Nevertheless, new tensions among Albanians and Macedonians have resulted inAlbanian demands f or a complete f ederalisation of  the country.Finally, Northern Kosovo remains the most volatile area in the Western Balkans and conf lict betweenlocal Serbs and Kosovo security f orces can erupt at any time. All territory north of  the Ibar river remainscontrolled by local Serbs and out of  reach f or the government in Priština. Discussions about the re-integration of  Northern Kosovo into Serbia are ignored by the Kosovo government, but it is generallyclear that whatever solution will be f ound must involve a high degree of  territorial autonomy f or NorthernKosovo.By Pe te r Fitzg e rald  (Own wo rk b ase d  o n the  b lank wo rld map ) [CC-BY-SA-3.0(http ://cre ative co mmo ns.o rg /l ice nse s/b y-sa/3.0)], via Wikime d iaCo mmo ns http ://wikitrave l.o rg /e n/Balkans Figure 1 – Balkans Region  Southeastern Europe isa good example thatdemonstrates thestrengths andweaknesses of  territorialautonomy in ethnicallydivided societies. Whileautonomy is generallyseen as a tool to protectminorit ies and theirlanguage and culture, byproviding them with f ar-reaching decision-makingcompetences in theirterritorial unit(s), it canalso serve as a f irst steptowards independence,equipping dif f erentethnic groups with theinstitutions andresources to push f oreventual secession. Thesuccess ofdecentralisation in Macedonia and Southern Kosovo can be contrasted with the f ailure of  similararrangements in Bosnia and Northern Kosovo.We should not be too crit ical with these arrangements and their results. It is important to note thatterritorial autonomy as a tool of  conf lict management was used mainly by external actors in the threecases discussed above. Bosnia’s Constitution was written by the US State Department and themodif ication of  its complex f ederal system has been the result of  high level international intervention,through the Of f ice of  the High Representative. Kosovo’s f irst Constitutional Framework was written byUN lawyers and its current Constitution is heavily based on the Comprehensive Status Settlementpresented by Martt i Ahtisaari, the f ormer Finish President in 2007. American and European lawyers andpolit icians also played a key role in the negotiations that led to the Ohrid Framework Agreement inMacedonia. The three cases are theref ore good examples of  “International Intervention andStatebuilding” and territorial autonomy was a key strategy by international actors to bring an end to theconf licts and ensure the restoration of  peace. Moreover, territorial autonomy was seen in all three casesas a tool of  state building to ensure the continued existence of  the three states within their borders andto ensure that decisions could be reached by consensus where required and otherwise give autonomy tothe dif f erent ethnic groups.Are there any lessons to be learned f rom looking at Southeastern Europe? Some learning among localand international actors seems to have taken place, because the degree of  territorial autonomy is verydif f erent between Bosnia (a f ully f ederal system), Macedonia (limited decentralisation) and Kosovo (highlevel of  decentralisation but no f ederal system). Some of  the problematic elements implemented inBosnia, such as the high level of  f inancial independence of  the territorial sub-units, have not beenimplemented in Kosovo and Macedonia. The degree of  autonomy has also changed so that attempts ofsecession are very unlikely in Macedonia and Southern Kosovo. However, the developments in Bosniaand Northern Kosovo demonstrate the main f law of  all power-sharing and territorial autonomyagreements in the three states. Fundamentally, these three countries remain internally and externallychallenged. Bosnia’s Serbs regularly threaten a ref erendum on secession, Northern Kosovo is de f actoindependent f rom the rest of  the country and the Albanians in Macedonia also question the existence ofthe state and their role in it. Furthermore, Bosnia remains challenged by Serbia, which continuouslysupports radical Bosnian Serb policies that undermine the Bosnian state. The name dispute with Greeceundermines Macedonia’s international standing and Serbia continues to work hard to avoid therecognition of  Kosovo by other countries.For territorial autonomy, the glass is half -empty rather than half - f ull. While large-scale violence hasbecome near- impossible in the region, smaller conf licts will continue to occur. While the arrangements f orterritorial autonomy have contributed to some transf ormation of  the conf licts into polit icaldisagreements rather than violent conf licts, they have however f ailed in establishing f unctional andsaturated states. This is also a f ailure f or those international actors involved in statebuilding andconf lict management in the Western Balkans.More on Bosnia’s complex federal system is forthcoming in: Keil, Soeren: Multinational Federalism in Bosniaand Herzegovina (London: Ashgate, f orthcoming 2013).This article is based on Soeren Keil LSEE lecture “Territorial autonomy as af orm of  conf lict management in South Eastern Europe” on 11 December. Clickhere for more details and to listen to a podcast of the event.Please read our comments policy before commenting.Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP– European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.Shortened URL for this post: http://bit .ly/U5Q8RB _________________________________About the author Soeren Keil – Canterbury Christ Church UniversitySoeren Keil is a Lecturer in International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University.His main research f ocuses on institutional design in post-conf lict societies, including theWestern Balkans. He is especially interested in power-sharing models in divided societies,as well as f orms of  territorial and non-territorial autonomy f or minority nations.Related posts:1. The increase in asylum seekers f rom the Balkans was a predictable consequence of  a f oreignpolicy driven visa liberalisation. (9.9)2. The EU budget process encourages deadlock and makes large ref orms almost impossible. Thebest that ref ormers can hope f or is gradual change. (11.7)3. Last week Serbia was granted candidate status f or joining the EU, which may of f er a way f orwardf or Serbia’s f uture relationship with Kosovo. But rocky times may still lie ahead (8.4)

The granting of territorial autonomy in the Balkans means that large scale violence is now near-impossible. But small scale conflicts continue.

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