Timothy Heppell explores the Prime Minister’s power to appoint or dismiss parliamentarians from cabinet and suggests that while some backbenchers may be irritated by Cameron’s perceived restraint, a reshuffle could permit the Liberal Democrats to renegotiate and improve their portfolio distribution

Heppell, Timothy

English

LSE Research Online

blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/po liticsandpolicy/archives/24946What do I have to do to get promoted? Tory MPs resent thereduced likelihood of reshuffles and promotions undercoalitionTimothy Heppell explores the Prime Minister ’s power to appoint or dismissparliamentarians from cabinet and suggests that while some backbenchers may be irritatedby Cameron’s perceived restraint, a reshuffle could permit the Liberal Democrats torenegotiate and improve their portfolio distribution.The power to appoint and dismiss is one of  the most important powers at the disposalof  the prime minister. It is through their powers of  patronage that they shape, andreshape through reshuf f les, their government. It is this power that gives them polit icalleverage and ensures their dominance over their polit ical colleagues. However, there is increasingf rustration amongst Conservative MPs, especially the new entrants in 2010, about how David Cameron isusing, or rather, not using this power. His f ailure to advance them is creating resentment. Louise Menschencapsulated the problem with Cameron’s reluctance to reshuf f le his ministers when she said: ‘what do Ihave to do to get promoted?’What are the criteria through which prime ministers decide that some parliamentarians should beministers and some should not? A good starting point is identif ying whether they have the qualit iesrequired f or ministerial of f ice: are they administratively competent? Can they def end their department inthe heat of  parliamentary debate? Can they justif y their policy choices to the electorate through themedia?These qualif ications immediately will discount some backbenches within the governing party, with othersdiscounted due to inappropriateness – e.g. personal behaviour, polit ical att itudes, rebelliousness anddisloyalty. From within those who are deemed to be qualif ied, prime ministers also need to considercertain balances – e.g. regional, gender, age and experience.The power of  patronage is also a key weapon in terms of  internal party management and goodgovernment. On the latter issue weak, inef f ectual and tired ministers need to be removed, to allowregular inf usions of  new talent to the ministerial ranks. The prospect of  loyalty being rewarded withministerial of f ice is crit ical. Historically, it is one of  the weapons through which the Whips’ Of f ice hassought to retain cohesion within the division lobbies – i.e. rebels don’t of ten get ministerial of f ice.The dynamics of  coalit ion alter these tradit ional models f or explaining ministerial pref erment withinBrit ish government. Cameron has limited his prime ministerial prerogative to make ministerialappointments. Nick Clegg has to be f ully consulted on ministerial removals or portf olio re-distributions ifa wider ministerial reshuf f le is required. The coalit ion agreement also ensures that Clegg has the right tosecure joint agreement with the prime minister regarding the allocation of  portf olios between the parties.The lessons f rom coalit ion government elsewhere is that the increased risks associated with dual partyministerial reshuf f les means that they occur less of ten than in single party administrations.For Conservative parliamentarians there are clearly negative impacts in terms of  their own careerprogression. A signif icant proportion of  ambitious Conservative MPs f ear that they may f all into thecategory of  parliamentarian that John Major f amously dismissed as the never possessed. Cameron hasdisappointed the f ollowing distinct groups within his own parliamentarians but his reluctance to reshuf f le:First, those who did receive ministerial pref erment in May 2010, but at a level lower than they hadexpected – expectant cabinet ministers f ound themselves at Minister of  State level, and expectantMinister of  States are now Parliamentary Under Secretaries of  State.Second, those who were expecting ministerial of f ice in May 2010, but instead f ound that the redboxes that they dreamed of  holding were being opened by Liberal Democrats.Third, and perhaps most interestingly, coalit ion is stalling the assumed meteoric career rises ofthe new entrants of  2010. Many of  them will have noted with interest the rapid promotions of f eredto the likes of  David and Ed Miliband or Ed Balls in the New Labour era, all of  whom were ministerswithin a year of  entering Parliament. As such new Conservatives would have hoped that pref ermentwould have come their way by 2012.It is the impact of  the second and third categories that has caused Cameron party managementproblems. Both longer serving and new entrants f eel that their f uture ambitions are being limited bycoalit ion and the lack of  a substantive reshuf f le since entering power. This f rustration is manif estingitself  in increased parliamentary rebellion. The rebellion rate in the f irst eighteen months of  the coalit ionrepresents the highest rate in the post-war period (43 percent of  all divisions involving dissent bycoalit ion backbenchers). Of  these the rebellion rate is 31 percent amongst Conservative backbenchers,and 21 percent amongst Liberal Democrats. The coalit ion rate, and the Conservative rate, is larger thanthe previous post war high of  28 percent. Cameron’s reluctance to engage in a substantive reshuf f le willbe a contributory f actor to the increased rebellion rates.However, it could be that Cameron does not reshuf f le because he is relatively content with the numberof  Liberal Democrat ministers and where they are located. Nick Clegg is understaf f ed in the Of f ice ofDeputy prime minister; Michael Moore is marginalised in the Scottish Of f ice (which the Liberal Democratshad previously advocated abolishing); and Danny Alexander has shared responsibility f or the cutsagenda that the coalit ion have f elt compelled to implement. By placing Chris Huhne (and latterly EdDavey) in Energy and Climate Change and Vince Cable at Business, Innovation and Skills, leading LiberalDemocrats were lef t to advance causes (the building of  new nuclear power stations and increased tuit ionf ees) that made a mockery of  the promises they made in the General Election campaign.The experience of  coalit ions abroad tells us that the party who lead the department have ownership ofthat policy agenda. This can be tied into electioneering, allowing smaller parties to claim ownership ofspecif ic policies within the coalit ion. The portf olio allocation that was init ially agreed by Cameron ensuredthat the Liberal Democrats would have litt le substantive policy achievements to their name. It may irritateCameron’s ambitious backbenchers but a reshuf f le would permit the Liberal Democrats to renegotiate onportf olio distribution, and thus limiting reshuf f les may be something Conservatives should be relativelycomf ortable with.This is the second in a series of posts by contributors to the recent ‘Conservatives in Coalit ionGovernment’ conference organised by the Polit ical Studies Association Specialist Group for thestudy of Conservatives and Conservatism and the Centre for Brit ish Polit ics at the University ofHull. The views expressed are those of the author alone and not those of the Polit ical StudiesAssociation or the University of Hull.Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.About the authorDr Timothy Heppell is a Lecturer in Brit ish Polit ics within the School of  Polit ics and International Studies(POLIS) at the University of  Leeds. He is the co-editor (with Dr David Seawright) of  Cameron and theConservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government (2012).You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):1. The Conservatives in Coalit ion Government: Principles, Policy and Power (18.3)2. The Tories have dominated the policy agenda and delivered on their ideology much moresuccessf ully than the Lib Dems in coalit ion (17.5)3. Conservatives in Coalit ion Government series: concluding remarks (16.8)4. Litt le Boy Clegg spots a gap in the Coalit ion Emperor ’s new clothes (16.7)

What do I have to do to get promoted? Tory MPs resent the reduced likelihood of reshuffles and promotions under coalition

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