The EU is now trying to put democracy back into the heart of its foreign policy. Yet, the EU and its member states seem to have greater concern for their own energy interests than engaging with Azerbaijan’s near-autocratic regime. Jana Kobzova, Leila Alieva and Dan Kennedy call for the EU to pursue a “hug and hold” strategy with Azerbaijan –close engagement, complemented by holding the regime to its commitments to reform

Alieva, Leila

Kennedy, Dan

Kobzova, Jana

English

LSE Research Online

blogs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/05/25/eu-azerbaijan-oil/The EU must actively engage with Azerbaijan and hold it to itscommitments. Otherwise it risks being a tacit supporter of anautocracy.May 25 2012The EU is now trying to put democracy back into the heart of its foreign policy. Yet, the EUand its member states seem to have greater concern for their own energy interests thanengaging with Azerbaijan’s near-autocratic regime. Jana Kobzova, Leila Alieva and DanKennedy call for the EU to pursue a “hug and hold” strategy with Azerbaijan –closeengagement, complemented by holding the regime to its commitments to reform.The European Union has been partly successful and wholly incoherent in promotingdemocracy in its neighbourhood. In the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, democracy is in retreat:none of the six Eastern Partnership countries are fully democratic and, apart from in Moldova,democracy scores in the region have been worsening. Clearly, EU efforts to promotedemocracy are failing to work as intended.Nowhere in the eastern neighbourhood is this challenge more evident than in Azerbaijan. Theupcoming Eurovision Song Contest, which takes place in Baku this week, has drawn attentionto the many problems and paradoxes this country presents for the EU’s efforts to promotedemocracy. The regime of President Ilham Aliyev has almost eliminated political oppositionthrough a combination of state repression, election manipulation and harassment ofindependent media.The EU is now trying to put democracy back at the heart of its foreign policy. But while it hastaken a tough approach to Belarus – another systematic abuser of human rights in theEastern Partnership region – it seems more concerned about its own energy interests andsecurity in Azerbaijan than for the state of democracy there. Although they have been vocalabout democracy in Azerbaijan, individual member states and the EU institutions have inreality co-operated with the regime in Baku without imposing conditionality, which has broughtEurope few benefits and continues to discredit the EU in the eyes of Azerbaijani society.Since the mid-1990s, the government of Azerbaijan has restarted economic growth and expanded society’swelfare. Thanks to the country’s rich oil and gas reserves, Azerbaijan’s fortunes, especially in the last 10years, have changed impressively. However, as the country has progressed in economic terms, it hasregressed in terms of corruption and democratic governance. The influx of oil money has helped the regimeof Ilham Aliyev to solidify his own position and steer Azerbaijan towards full-fledged autocracy. Neverthelessthe volume of oil extracted in Azerbaijan peaked in 2010 and is set to decline. The government has failed totranslate the growth figures into corresponding social indicators and while it hopes to generate more revenuefrom increased gas exports, experts suggest the income will not suffice to compensate for the decline of oilrevenues. Unless it reforms and diversifies, Azerbaijan’s economic model is unsustainable.The regime’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies have had little effect on the EU’s approach. Europe’s maininterest in the region is stability of energy supplies and security. Some member states such as France, Italy,Germany and the UK have big economic interests in Azerbaijan and avoid publicly criticising the country or itsregime. There is little co-ordination between member states and various branches of the EuropeanCommission and EU institutions have often been as incoherent in their approach to Azerbaijan as havemember states. The lack of a more coherent EU approach makes it possible for Baku to ignore criticism andpursue good relations with “friendly” member states.While co-operation in the energy sector works well at theCredit: Peretz Partensky (Creative Commons BY SA)While co-operation in the energy sector works well at thelevel of individual EU energy giants and the government ofAzerbaijan, the EU itself has achieved far more modestresults. The Nabucco gas pipeline, the cornerstone of theEU’s gas policy, is probably going to be shelved becauseBaku seems to favour other competing initiatives.Similarly, talks on the new Association Agreement (todeepen Azerbaijan’s political association and economicintegration with the EU) are currently marred in seeminglyendless discussions about the status of the Armenia-occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region.The EU has a whole range of tools and a blueprint it canuse to assist countries that want to become members buthas been struggling to find a way to deal with countriesthat are not willing to join it. Nevertheless, the EU doeshave some leverage. If Azerbaijan is to diversify its oil-based economy, it will need the EU for technology andknow-how. Much of this can be provided by Europeancompanies, but unless it improves its governance andjudicial system, Azerbaijan will struggle to attractinvestment. As the country’s first trading partner, the EU is potentially the most powerful external economicactor in Azerbaijan. These factors create potential leverage which Europe should use more forcefully to makeBaku restrain its autocratic tendencies. It can do so by pursuing a “hug and hold” strategy – huggingAzerbaijan but also holding it to its commitments to reform.At the moment, the EU’s best chance for more reform in Azerbaijan is continued engagement – rather thanisolation – of the Baku government. The EU should prioritise initiatives aimed at the transfer of know-how,capacity-building in the public sector and exchange programmes for junior and mid-level bureaucrats – but itshould carefully monitor results and insist on participation of NGOs and non-state actors, such asindependent experts, in all stages of the process.“Hugging” Azerbaijan does not mean embracing only its government. The EU should give more support toNGOs, small enterprises, independent media and professional organisations, which can put more pressureon the regime domestically and create evolutionary change in the future. Given the closeness between Bakuand Ankara, the EU should also solicit more co-operation from Turkey on pushing Azerbaijan to reform. TheEU also needs to do a better job in explaining its actions and demands to Azerbaijani society.While “hugging” Azerbaijan, Europe should also hold it to the commitments it made by joining the EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy and agreeing action plans. A concerted effort at the EU level to restrict the movementof those in Azerbaijan who violate human rights on a systematic basis is unlikely, but member states can takeaction individually and follow the example set by the UK, which earlier this year adopted a new rule banningentry for non-EU nationals accused of human rights abuses.As Azerbaijan grows more authoritarian, Europe faces a choice. It can fully embrace this country and itssociety, which is proud of becoming the first-ever Muslim liberal democratic republic in 1918, or it cancontinue condition-free dialogue with the regime. If it chooses the second option it risks finding itself a tacitsupporter of autocracy.This blogpost is based on a new European Council on Foreign Relations’ policy memo “The EU andAzerbaijan: Beyond Oil” by Jana Kobzova and Leila AlievaPlease read our comments policy before commenting.Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics andPolicy, nor of the London School of Economics. Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/JXWYaB____________________________________About the authorsJana Kobzova – European Council on Foreign RelationsJana Kobzova is a Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and thecoordinator of its Wider Europe programme. Before joining ECFR, Jana led the Belarusdemocratisation programme at the Bratislava-based Pontis Foundation. She also helpedestablish the Slovak branch of the European webzine Café Babel. Jana has co-authoredseveral book chapters on Eastern Europe and EU Eastern policy as well as articles forvarious journals and media outlets. She has co-authored various ECFR publications includingThe Spectre of a Multipolar Europe (2010), The EU and Belarus after the Election (2011) andDealing with a post-BRIC Russia (2011).Leila AlievaLeila Alieva is a Baku-based political analyst and the founder of the Center for National andInternational Studies. She has held research fellowships at Harvard University, Berkeley, theWoodrow Wilson Center, Johns Hopkins University, NATO Defence College and the NationalEndowment for Democracy. Her publications include Integrative Processes in the SouthCaucasus and their Security Implications (2006) and The EU and the South Caucasus (2006)and she has also written about security, conflicts and politics in the South Caucasus forvarious publications including the Journal of Democracy and Jane’s Intelligence Review.Dan KennedyDan Kennedy is a graduate student at the School of Eastern European Studies at UCL and aresearch assistant at ECFR’s “Wider Europe” programme.Related posts:1. The 2012 Eurovision Song Contest can be a tool for change in Azerbaijan.2. The strain of international commitments has led to the erosion of democratic politics inGreece.3. Despite its costs and limited effectiveness, the European Neighbourhood Policy’s symboliccommitment to engage beyond the EU may mean that it is doomed to survive.This entry was posted in Dan Kennedy, EU institutions, government and politics and enlargement, EuropeanNeighbourhood, Jana Kobzova, Justice and home affairs (including immigration, asylum policies etc), LeilaAlieva and tagged Azerbaijan, Baku, eu, EU agreeements, Eurovision, oil, opposition. Bookmark thepermalink.

The EU must actively engage with Azerbaijan and hold it to its commitments: otherwise it risks being a tacit supporter of an autocracy

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

LSE Research Online