In this paper, we model a Stackelberg game in a simple Gaussian test channel
where a human transmitter (leader) communicates a source message to a human
receiver (follower). We model human decision making using prospect theory
models proposed for continuous decision spaces. Assuming that the value
function is the squared distortion at both the transmitter and the receiver, we
analyze the effects of the weight functions at both the transmitter and the
receiver on optimal communication strategies, namely encoding at the
transmitter and decoding at the receiver, in the Stackelberg sense. We show
that the optimal strategies for the behavioral agents in the Stackelberg sense
are identical to those designed for unbiased agents. At the same time, we also
show that the prospect-theoretic distortions at both the transmitter and the
receiver are both larger than the expected distortion, thus making behavioral
agents less contended than unbiased agents. Consequently, the presence of
cognitive biases increases the need for transmission power in order to achieve
a given distortion at both transmitter and receiver.Comment: 6 pages, 3 figures, Accepted to MILCOM-2017, Corrections made in the
new versio
