Climate change poses the ultimate dichotomy between social welfare and
individual incentives because, despite the global benefits synonymous with
mitigation, individuals lack incentive to reduce their own emissions. Using a
public good experiment with a climate change framing, this paper examines the
scope for cooperation in meeting a national mitigation goal; in particular,
the experimental design examines how different sectors with differing marginal
abatement costs distribute the responsibility of reducing emissions between
themselves. The experiment consists of four treatments including the
counterfactual baseline scenario which examines voluntary cooperation, a
communication treatment examining the role of stakeholder participation in
facilitating cooperation and, finally, two treatments simulating a carbon tax,
where the carbon tax reflects an electricity levy. The results suggest that
voluntary cooperation will not be sufficient to meet the mitigation target.
While communication significantly increases average contribution levels, it
also polarises individual player strategies between full cooperation and free
riding. With the introduction of a tax, cooperation becomes near-universal.
However, a carbon tax crowds out contributions in excess of a specified
mitigation target. This emphasises the important of choosing the correct tax
level.Draf
